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The 2008 presidential campaign contextualized this study of soft-money 
sponsored political spot negative advertising, its content, its influence, inoculation’s 
blanket of protection against it and print versus video media effects. The functional 
theory of campaign discourse (Benoit, 2006) guided a content analysis of over 300 
televised presidential advertisements. Chi-square analyses showed that political stealth 
groups (PSGs, like 527 and 501c) were more negative and more personal than FEC-
compliant groups, like candidates, political parties and PACs. Students (N = 354) at a 
small mid-western university participated in a three-phase experimental study examining 
the influence of extreme attack advertising (control, candidate sponsor, political stealth 
group sponsor), inoculation against negative advertising (control, generic, and candidate 
specific), media (print versus video) and partisanship (low versus high) on campaign-
related attitudinal, emotional and behavioral outcomes. The inoculation process and the 
relative processes of video versus print-mediated influence were also examined. Various 
data analytic strategies (e.g., factorial ANOVA’s, t-tests, regressions and mediation 
analyses) answered 20 multi-part hypotheses and 8 multi-part research questions. Results 
showed that video-mediated political attacks exercised influence through source factors; 
video-mediated generic inoculations worked against all political attacks; and print 
inoculation worked better against print attacks than video attacks. Results are discussed 
within the context of political campaigns, inoculation theory (McGuire, 1970; Pfau, 
1997) and medium theory’s (Meyrowitz, 1994) claim that media are epistemic 
(McLuhan, 1967). 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL STEALTH GROUPS   
Until recently, American political communication was dominated by two clearly 
identifiable and relatively stable political parties (Patterson, 2002). Now, the Democratic 
and the Republican voices are frequently overwhelmed by independent partisans on both 
the left and the right. Either directly or indirectly, they purport to speak for or against the 
all too human candidates who can affect their interests. In short, American political 
communication is multi-vocal, multi-mediated, loud, and sometimes, it is even rude. It 
emanates from radio personalities, television talk show hosts, editorialists, bloggers, 
producers of You Tube videos, political action committees, non-profit corporations 
(501c), labor unions, shadowy campaign organizations (527), political parties and now, a 
controversial Supreme Court decision (i.e., FEC v Citizens United) has constitutionally 
empowered for-profit corporations and labor unions to bet their entire treasuries on 
campaign communication (Waldman, 2010). Candidates and their surrogates must 
compete in this unpredictable and cacophonous communication environment. Not only 
must they defend against unforeseen attacks, they must be prepared to accept 
responsibility for erroneous or uncivil attacks launched on their behalf. The 2008 
presidential election provided a vivid illustration of America’s bifurcated political 
communication milieu.   
This study described and compared the functional content of the 2008 televised 
presidential adverting, which emanated from three categories of sponsor: the candidates’ 
campaigns, Federal Election Commission (FEC) approved organizations and political 
stealth groups (PSG). PSGs were the principal reference point of this investigation. In 
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contrast to FEC-approved organizations, PSGs are front-groups and are not subject to 
federal campaign finance laws. There are two types of PSGs. The first are political action 
committees (527 PACs or 527s) that register with the IRS but do not submit to FEC 
regulation. The second are non-profit corporations (501c) that use their tax-exempt status 
and ostensible political mission to engage in substantial federal electioneering.  
Using actual PSG-sponsored ads from the 2008 presidential general election, this 
dissertation experimentally tested their influence on perceptions of the targeted candidate, 
sponsor and implied beneficiary. This effort further evaluated the capacity of an 
inoculation message strategy to obviate the influence of those attacks (McGuire, 1970; 
Pfau, 1988). Finally, this investigation approximated the multi-mediated nature of 
contemporary political communication by testing both print and video-mediated attack 
advertisements. To enhance mundane realism, the ads were embedded within entertaining 
content, and they were presented to participants during the height of the 2008 presidential 
general election campaign.  
Contemporary presidential campaigns are inherently dynamic and complicated.  
PSGs intensify this complexity. This dissertation appealed to both extant findings and 
theoretical logic to describe, explain and predict the influence of extreme PSG-initiated 
political attack ads aired during the 2008 presidential contest. The first chapter introduces 
and describes the groups at the center of this effort – political stealth groups or PSGs.       
Political Stealth Groups 
Researchers have not paid sufficient attention to the growing influence of 
uncoordinated 527 and 501c political interest groups. They collect soft money, conceal 
their contributor’s identity and hide their highly partisan intentions behind non-partisan 
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sounding names, like Advancing Wisconsin Incorporated (D-501c), Let Freedom Ring 
(R-501c), America Votes (D-527) and American Solutions for Winning the Future (R-
527). Some have called 527 and 501c groups the stealth front groups of political 
campaigns (Public Citizen, 2004b, p. 4). Their principal purpose is to influence elections 
by circumventing the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s (BCRA) stated intention to 
banish soft money from federal electioneering (Public Citizen, 2002). The BCRA was 
passed in 2002, and by the 2004 mid-term elections, 527 groups increased their spending 
by more than 150%, from $151 million in 2000 (Malcomb, Malbin, Weissman & Russell, 
2005) to about $400 million in 2004 (Weissman, 2009). Groups like MoveOn.org and 
Swift Boat Veterans and POW’s for Truth (SBVT) played an influential role and even 
changed the vernacular of America’s presidential politics (Morain, 2007). For example, 
the term “swift boating” has earned entry into Wikipedia.com (2008), where it is defined 
as, “a strong pejorative description of some kind of attack that the speaker considers 
unfair or untrue—for example, an ad hominem attack or a smear campaign” (¶ 1). The 
new reality in federal elections includes these shadowy and unaccountable groups 
(Schouten, 2007). Charles Lewis, of the Center for Public Integrity, lamented that, “hit-
and-run 527 committees have been operating on the fringes of American politics….but 
now, they have clearly arrived as a significant force in our electoral process” (in 
Janofsky, 2004, p. 31). 
Experts predicted that, in the 2008 presidential contest, PSGs would be more 
pervasive and influential than they were in 2004 (Morain, 2007; Public Citizen, 2007). In 
fact, the candidates stated opposition to 527 groups and regulatory changes limited their 
presence, but PSG’s did not go away (Weissman, 2009). Whereas the PSG de jour in 
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2004 was the 527 group, the PSG of 2008 was the 501c. Weissman (2009) reported that 
527’s reduced their spending from $426 million in 2004 to $200 million in 2008. Non-
profit 501c groups made up for the difference. They increased their spending from $60 
million in 2004 to about $200 million in 2008. Although it was spread across the entire 
spectrum of federal elections, political stealth groups spent more than $400 million in 
2008. Considering that presidential candidates who accept public financing cannot legally 
spend more than $134.2 on their entire general election campaign, the $400 million spent 
by shadowy independent groups is astounding. In other words, the total general election 
spending by PSG groups in 2008 was almost twice as much as the two publically 
financed presidential campaigns. In light of these numbers, Democratic candidate 
Obama’s decision to opt of public financing spending limits was prescient. He explained 
the unprecedented move by “citing the specter of attacks from independent groups on the 
right” (Luo & Zelany, 2008, p. A1). It is simply imprudent for the academic community 
to ignore the growing role of political stealth groups, and it behooves political 
communication researchers to investigate their unique influence on presidential politics 
and democratic attitudes.  
The 527 and 501c groups that constitute America’s political stealth groups are 
governed and defined by those sections of the IRS tax code for which they are named. 
Under federal tax law, the political activities of such groups are limited to legislative 
lobbying and issue advocacy. In reality, 527 and 501c groups circumvent their legal 
mandate by indirectly advocating for the election or defeat of federal election candidates. 
Their indirect and uncoordinated activities distinguish them from formal political action 
committees (PAC’s), candidates and other agents of federal campaign influence, which 
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are both governed by federal campaign finance law and legally permitted to electioneer 
with and for federal election candidates.  
Groups organized under section 527 of the IRS tax code are tax-exempt 
organizations that “actively influence elections and policy debates at all levels of 
government” (Center for Public Integrity, 2007b, ¶ 1).  Two kinds of groups use the 527 
designation: political action committees (PACs) and issue advocacy groups. PACs are 
legally empowered to engage in electioneering communications, which was defined by 
the Supreme Court (i.e., Buckley v. Valeo, 1976) as any campaign material that includes 
one or more of eight phrases: “vote for”, “elect”, “support”, “cast your ballot for”, “Smith 
for Congress”, “vote against”, “defeat” and/or “reject” (in Public Citizen, 2004a). Issue 
advocacy groups, on the other hand, are legally prohibited from engaging in 
electioneering communications. Unlike candidate committees and PACs, who campaign 
for candidates in federal elections, 527 issue advocacy groups are not required to register 
with the Federal Election Commission (FEC). Because PACs adhere to similar financial 
disclosure and contribution restrictions as federal candidates, they are permitted to 
coordinate their activities with federal election campaigns. For this reason, PACs are also 
referred to as coordinated interest groups (see Franz, Freedman, Goldstein, & Ridout, 
2008). In contrast, 527 issue advocacy groups are legally prohibited from coordinating 
their efforts with any candidate or nominee for federal office. Thus, they are referred to 
as uncoordinated groups. As long as 527 issue advocacy groups avoid electioneering 
communications, they are neither required to register with the FEC nor must they abide 
by federal campaign finance laws.  
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Unlike coordinated and FEC-approved PACs, uncoordinated issue groups legally 
collect unlimited soft money donations, which are unregulated and can come from 
corporations, unions, individuals and even foreign governments. The only substantial 
limitation on 527 contributions is a requirement that such groups file regular financial 
reports with the IRS. Such reports must include contribution amounts, contributors and 
expenditures, but 527 groups are not required to identify those issues, individuals or the 
organizations for which they advocate.  
Groups organized under section 501c of the IRS tax code are similar but not 
identical to 527’s. They too can legally collect unlimited amounts of soft money. Unlike 
527’s, 501c groups must qualify for their status by demonstrating a dedication to one of 
five broadly defined constituencies: 501c 4 (social welfare groups); 501c 5 (labor 
organizations); 501c 6 (business leagues); 501c 7 (social clubs); and 501c 8 (fraternal 
organizations). Perhaps the most unique feature of 501c groups is their freedom from any 
disclosure requirements, which makes 501c groups the “last ‘black hole’ in public 
disclosure of political financial activity” (Public Citizen, n.d., ¶ 27).  
As long as their political activities are manifestly relevant to their organizational 
mission, 501c groups can legally engage in unlimited legislative lobbying and substantial 
electioneering activities. However, the IRS does not tax-exempt their electioneering 
activities and those efforts cannot be the primary purpose of a 501c’s organizational 
activities. In other words, 501c sponsored electioneering activity must directly contribute 
to the tax-defined mission of the organization. Like 527’s, 501c’s are legally prohibited 
from coordinating their activities with federal candidates or political parties, but they can 
advocate for candidates within the context of their defined issue focus.  
                                                                                                          
7 
 
The need to circumvent the BCRA’s soft money ban, substantially contributed to 
the rise of uncoordinated 527 and 501c groups (Andres, 2006). During the pre-BCRA era, 
soft money flowed freely into elections through the political parties. Although that money 
was legally dedicated for “party building” activities, it often financed “issue” ads that 
clearly benefited individual candidates. Before the BRCA, “more than half of the money 
raised in 2000 came from 800 donors, each contributing a minimum of $120,000” 
(Rosen, 2007, p. 11). The presence of soft money fostered the perception of corruption by 
federal politicians. The BCRA’s soft money ban sought to correct that perception. For 
individuals, the law limited contributions: “$2,000 to a federal candidate per election, 
$5,000 to a political action committee per year, and up to $25,000 to a national political 
party per year” (Public Citizen, 2004b). By requiring political parties and candidates to 
collect money from individual donors, the BCRA facilitated stronger connections 
between citizens and the political process (Rosen, 2007). As of the 2004 presidential 
election, the law’s benefits had not been fully realized. IRS designated 501c and 527 
groups became the new means of injecting soft money into federal election (Potter, 
2006). When employed for their legitimate purpose of advocating on behalf of their own 
special interests, 501c and 527 groups serve a legally defined function. However, 501c 
and 527 that inject the anonymous voices of their donors into political campaigns are 
political stealth groups (PSGs). 
501c and 527 groups collect and use soft money to influence federal elections. 
They do this by adhering to the letter of campaign finance law, but not to its spirit. In 
other words, they use unregulated funds to air “issue ads” that directly or indirectly 
impugn the character or policy positions of active federal candidates (Mooney, 2008).; 
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however, when these groups clearly step outside their legally sanctioned mandate, the 
FEC is empowered to classify them as formal PAC, which means they must adhere to the 
strict contribution, expenditure and disclosure requirements under the Federal Elections 
Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), as amended by the BCRA of 2002. The FECA is the 
official antecedent of modern campaign finance law. Although initially mandated by 
Congress, much of the campaign finance law has been substantially defined by legal 
jurisprudence. This is especially true for interest groups and their activities.  
In Buckley v. Valeo (1976), the Supreme Court ruled that PACs, under the FECA, 
include “organizations ‘that are under the control of a candidate for the major purpose of 
which is the nomination or election of a candidate” (Public Citizen, 2004, p. 4). By 
avoiding the appearance of coordinating with a federal candidate’s campaign, 501c’s and 
527s successfully avoid FEC oversight and campaign finance restrictions. In other words, 
uncoordinated interest groups “gain political committee status under tax law, while 
avoiding regulation under federal election law” (Public Citizen, 2005, ¶ 11).  
501c and 527’s as Political Stealth Groups 
Although uncoordinated 527 and 501c interest groups are prohibited from 
advocating for or against federal candidates, they are “quite free to portray federal 
candidates in such a way that there is little doubt as to the message” (¶ 6). The largest 
single expenditure of most 527 groups and for some 501c groups is for broadcast issue 
advocacy advertising (Claybrook, 2002), which is to say that the primary function of 
many uncoordinated interest groups is to air “political issue-related criticisms of public 
officials” (Public Citizen, 2004b, p. 10). Uncoordinated groups are free to attack, defend 
or otherwise depict federal candidates, so long as those depictions avoid the narrowly 
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defined definition of “electioneering expenditures”, which is defined, in Buckley v. Valeo 
(1976), as “funds used for communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat 
of a federal candidate” (in Federal Election Commission, 2004). Buckley illustrated its 
definition of express advocacy with what has become known as the eight “magic words” 
or definitive signs of express advocacy: “vote for”, “elect”, “support”, “cast your ballot 
for”, “Smith for Congress”, “vote against”, “defeat” and/or “reject” (Public Citizen, 
2004a). As long as 501c and 527 advertisements avoid the superficial (e.g., the “magic 
word”) language of candidate advocacy, they also avoid the legal mandates that 
otherwise govern “express advocacy” and electioneering activities. Issue advertising is 
the unique hallmark of 501c and 527 electoral advocates. These ads “may not instruct 
you to vote for or against a specific candidate, but often…will try to shape your opinion 
of a political candidate or party in the context of a specific issue” (opensecrets.org, 2007, 
¶ 1).  
Uncoordinated 501c and 527 interest groups aptly conceal the details of their 
contributors and expenditures. Specifically, 501c  groups use legal cover to maintain an 
almost total silence about their financial activities, and the IRS financial disclosure 
system, which governs 527 interest groups, is hopelessly complex, inefficient and 
incomplete (Public Citizen, n.d.). Even if one were able to access a total accounting for 
any single 527 interest group, the report(s) would not reveal the beneficiaries of the 
group’s partisan activities. When combined with their ability to collect unlimited funds, 
the ability of 501c and 527s to conceal their donors empowers them to conceal their 
intentions.  
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Innocuous and even noble sounding names further empower 501c and 527 
political stealth groups to obscure their true agendas. The iconic illustration of these new 
PSGs was the 527-designted group known as the Swift Boat Veterans and POW’s for 
Truth (SBVT). The SBVT donors were Republican partisans from Texas who were also 
large contributors to the Bush campaign. Despite the group’s stated intention to pursue 
truth, their actual function was to convey a partisan history of Democrat John Kerry as 
unfit to be commander in chief (see Factcheck.org, 2004). Their claim was based on a re-
reading of Kerry’s military decorations and political opposition to the Vietnam War. 
Clearly, the SBVT’s broadly defined goal of advancing truth was disingenuous, especially 
since they avoided any commentary on the Republican presidential candidate Vietnam-
era military service, which was equally controversial. At the very least, they should have 
investigated and cleared President Bush’s record. Despite their innocuous moniker, the 
SBVT and groups like them have executed some of the most effective and partisan 
campaigns in recent American presidential elections (Center for Public Integrity, 2007a; 
West, 2004).  
Armed with the unique power to collect and spend soft money, PSG spending 
exploded in the 2004 presidential election (Center for Public Integrity, 2007a; Public 
Citizen, 2005). From 2002 to 2004, the number of 527 groups increased by 63% (Public 
Citizen, 2005). Democratic-oriented 527 organizations increased their spending by $220 
million, while Republican-oriented 527 organizations increased spending by $40 million 
(Public Citizen, 2005). The Center for Public Integrity (2007) reported that, “election 
2004 was the first time they [527’s] played a major role, perhaps a decisive role, in 
determining the outcome of a presidential election” (¶ 2). In 2004, 527’s raised $434 
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million; over half (i.e., $246 million) was spent on behalf of presidential candidates. In 
fact, during the final month of the 2004 presidential campaign, 527 groups spent more 
than $40 million on broadcast “issue” advertising alone (Public Citizen, 2005). Some of 
the most memorable and effective political advertisements of 2004 were ostensible 
“issue” ads paid for by 527 PSGs. 
The SBVT’s series of attacks on John Kerry’s Vietnam narrative began with a 
seemingly innocuous press release. On May 4, 2004, a group of Vietnam-era veterans 
staged a press conference in which they “went thermonuclear on the candidate…calling 
him a vain, indecisive, cowardly ‘loose cannon’ who didn’t deserve his medal and went 
to Vietnam so he could run for office” (Kennedy, 2004, ¶ 1). On July 1, 2004, the SBVT 
issued a press release announcing their status as a “special purpose” or 527 political 
action committee. Their release charged that John Kerry lacked “judgment, truthfulness, 
reliability, loyalty and trust – all absolute tenets of command” (Swift Vets and POW's for 
Truth, 2004, ¶ 4). In short, the SBVT accused John Kerry of being Unfit for Command, 
which was the title of a book written by John O’Neill – a prominent member of the 
group. Throughout the spring and early summer of 2004, the SBVT and their charges 
were mostly ignored; however, after the Democratic convention, the SBVT captured the 
nation’s attention with the first of a series of televised attack advertisements that 
questioned the honor of John Kerry’s military service in the Vietnam War.  
The SBVT’s attack ads were devastatingly effective. West (2004) reported the first 
SBVT advertisement ran a mere 739 times in seven markets, meaning only 2.1% of 
Americans could have seen it; however, by mid-September, 66% of voters had heard of 
the SBVT, and 33% believed their central claim that Kerry was lying about his record in 
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Vietnam. Edsall and Grimaldi (2004) observed that the SBVT initial ad, which cost a 
mere $546,000, “was exceptionally cost-effective: most voters learned about it through 
free media coverage in mainstream media and talk radio” (p. A01). After the Democratic 
convention, which was held from July 26 to July 29, it would have been typical for John 
Kerry’s approval ratings to improve. Instead, they declined and continued to decline 
through August. Zogby (in PollingReport.com, 2005) observed that, at the time of the 
Democratic convention, Kerry led Bush by 4% on vote preference. Thirty days later, that 
lead was reversed. Bush overcame Kerry and was ahead by 3% on voter preference. 
Many attributed the reversal to the SBVT’s effective advertising and Kerry’s mishandling 
of their charges (Freedman, Frantz, & Goldstein, 2004).  
Even if the attack ads did not directly affect Kerry’s public approval ratings, the 
group’s dominance of the political agenda kept the Democratic candidate off message 
and on the defensive for over six weeks of the post-convention campaign (Wilgoren, 
2004). One post-election poll found that nearly 75% of respondents recalled the SBVT 
attack advertisements; another poll found that, among crucial swing state voters, the 
attacks were the second most memorable political spots of 2004 (in Birnbaum & Edsall, 
2004). West (2004) called the SBVT campaign against John Kerry one of the most 
effective efforts in presidential electoral history, but others claimed that another PSG-
sponsored ad was the most important of 2004.    
Progress for America Voter Fund (PAVF) produced Ashley’s Story, which was an 
emotional spot featuring an exchange between President George W. Bush and 14-year-
old Ashley Faulknerm, whose mother was murdered in the 911 attacks on the World 
Trade Center. The ad showed a still photo of Bush embracing Ashley. Following the still 
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was an audiovisual close up of the girl, who gratefully observed that, President Bush “is 
the most powerful man in the world and all he wants to do is make sure I’m safe…that 
I’m OK”. The ad concluded with Ashley’s father testifying that, “what I saw is what I 
want to see…in the heart and in the soul of the man who sits in the highest elected office 
in our country”. Ashley’s Story represented the largest single ad buy of the 2004 
presidential campaign. At a cost of $14.2 million, it aired throughout October in nine 
battleground states, including Florida and Ohio (Keen & Memmot, 2004). Bob Shrum 
credited Ashley’s Story with Bush’s victory in Ohio (Green, 2005). A poll conducted by 
Public Opinion Strategies in (2004) found that, in Florida and Ohio, “Bush won voters 
who saw the Ashley’s Story ad by 10-point and 7-point margins respectively. Kerry won 
voters in these crucial states who did not see this ad” (¶ 4).  
Although the PAVF and the SBVT were among the most visible 527’s of 2004, 
they represented only a fraction the overall PSG activity. PSGs deluged the presidential 
race with partisan images, messages and attacks. In terms of revenue collected and spent, 
America Coming Together (ACT) was the largest 527 PSG (Janofsky, 2004). The pro-
Democrat group spent $78 million in support of Democratic candidates and causes 
(opensecrets.org, 2008a). ACT’s efforts on behalf of John Kerry included a massive voter 
mobilization effort, which even included audiovisual issue advertisements delivered 
directly to voters via personal digital assistants (Federal Election Commission, 2007a). 
Those issue spots attacked George W. Bush’s record on health care, jobs and the Iraq 
War. The other major Democratic 527 PSG was the Media Fund, which spent $58 
million to defeat George W. Bush (opensecrets.org, 2008b). The Media Fund attacked 
Bush or promoted Kerry in 34 television commercials, 20 radio spots and 26 print 
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advertisements (Federal Election Commission, 2007b). Most of its advertisements were 
targeted to regions where Bush was campaigning. The attacks on Bush included the entire 
spectrum of 2004 campaign issues, including corruption, the economy, health care and 
the environment to name only a few (opensecrets.org, 2008b).  
Prosecution of PSGs 
The FEC finally responded to the upsurge in uncoordinated political interest 
group activity by prosecuting at least 11 organizations for failing to register as formal 
PACs (Federal Election Commission, 2007b). Fines were imposed on the most prominent 
527 PSGs of the 2004 presidential campaign, including the Media Fund for $580,000; the 
SBVT for $630,000; PAVF for $750,000; and Americans Coming Together for $775,000. 
In each case, the FEC demonstrated that the groups engaged in federal electioneering and 
express advocacy, which invalidated their non-profit status and placed them under the 
rubric of federal campaign finance law. Upon being defined as a federal PACs, the 
groups were indicted for violations of the BCRA, but in the end, each group settled their 
cases by paying fines, which were a fraction of their illegal expenditures. The fines were 
simply too little and too late. Many argued that this lax and late enforcement failed to 
deter the formation and partisan use of PSGs (“FEC's Reluctant,” 2006). Rather than 
implementing broad regulations, the FEC opted to “rely on a case-by-case adjudication of 
whether the 527’s were so immersed in federal campaigns that they had to comply with 
campaign finance laws” (p. A22).  
The FEC’s case-by-case approach fails on two levels. First, the process is too 
slow. While the 2006 mid-term elections were underway and 527’s were already playing 
an enormous role, the FEC was still hearing cases from the 2004 presidential election. By 
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the time those cases were resolved (i.e., in late 2007), America was on the threshold of 
another presidential election in which PSGs were, once again, playing a major role 
(Helman, 2007; Mayer, 1969). The relatively small fines represented the second failure of 
the FEC’s case-by-case enforcement approach. As a Newsday editorial (“527 Loophole,” 
2007) observed, the minimal fines are easily absorbed into the operating costs of the most 
well funded 527 groups. For example, America Coming Together illegally spent $100 
million advocating for federal candidates in 2004, but the group’s fine was only 
$775,000, which is less than 1% of ACT’s total expenses. FEC Chairmen Michael Toner 
opposed the case-by-case approach, but he was outvoted. Toner predicted that, “the stage 
is set for 527’s to once again spend hundreds of millions of dollars in soft money to 
influence the 2006 midterms and the 2008 presidential election” in Edsall, 2006). Events 
validated his prediction when 527s spent more than $200 million during the 2006 
midterm election cycle (opensecrets.org, 2008c). During the 2008 presidential primaries, 
candidates were already contending with a strong 527 PSG presence (La Ganga & Mehta, 
2007; Solomon & Mosk, 2007). By November 2008, 527 PSGs spent more than $200 
million on federal electioneering activities. 
PSGs in 2008 
With respect to PSG activity in the 2008 presidential election, the distinguishing 
feature was the greater role played by 501c groups (Wessman, 2009; Morain, 2007). In 
July 2007, the Supreme Court struck down a provision of the BCRA that forbade non-
profit corporations from advertising within 30 days of a primary election and 60 days of a 
general election. This prohibition had limited the role of 501c non-profits in 2004, but 
that ruling cleared the way for a more active 501c presence in 2008. Indeed, 501c PSGs 
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were a logical alternative to 527 PSGs, which had faced greater regulatory and public 
scrutiny. Moreover, 501c PSGs are almost total immune from disclosure, as defined by 
the IRS tax code (Rutenberg & Kirkpatrick, 2007; Solomon & Mosk, 2007).  
The opacity of 501c groups makes their impact more difficult to estimate, but 
their presence was already on display during the 2008 Iowa presidential caucuses. Trust 
Huckabee, ran positive “issue” ads and made phone calls on behalf of Republican 
presidential candidate Mike Huckabee ("TrustHuckabee Calling," 2007). Trust Huckabee 
was an extension of Common Sense Issues – a 501c organization that often blurred the 
line between issue and candidate advocacy in the 2008 federal election season. Another 
important 501c group was The Foundation for a Secure and Prosperous America. 
Supporters of John McCain financed the group, which ran televised “issue” ads for him 
in South Carolina. Rutenberg and Kirkpatrick (2007) reported that The Foundation for a 
Secure America merely represented the “first trickle in a flood of hundreds of millions of 
dollars that are expected to pour from all sides into groups reminiscent of Swift Boat 
Veterans for Truth of 2004, built to influence voting outside of campaign finance 
limitations” (p. A1). Solomon and Mosk (2007) observed that 501c groups were poised to 
“encroach on turf that has been dominated by political parties, political action committees 
and, in the past few elections, by independent political groups created under section 527 
of the tax code” (p. A01). Using a variety of direct and indirect sources, Weissman 
(2004) estimated that 501c PSGs spent more than $200 million in 2008. The 
prognostications of commentators and campaign professionals were validated.  
Despite the growing role of 501c groups, 527’s resuscitated their shadowy 
influence in 2008. By November, 2007, 527’s raised $76 million, which was $16 million 
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more than at the same time during 2006 (Morain, 2007). That money made its presence 
felt as early as the January, 2008 Iowa caucuses. The 527 Club for Growth spent 
hundreds of thousands on ads attacking Huckabee’s record on taxes (Solomon & Mosk, 
2007, p. A01). Victim’s Voice – another 527—advocated against Huckabee. In the 2008 
South Carolina primary, Victim’s Voice aired an emotional “issue” ad featuring the 
mother of a woman who was raped and killed by a prisoner who was paroled while 
Huckabee was the Republican governor of Arkansas.  
Stop Her Now was a 527 formed with the express intention of defeating the 
“radical ideas of Hillary Clinton”. The defining issue of Stop Here Now was narrowly 
tailored to whatever Hillary Clinton was advocating at the moment. On the Stop Her Now 
(n.d.) web page, the 527 group unashamedly flaunted its intention to “finance a massive 
media blitz and public education campaign….before Hillary and Bill Clinton are able to 
pull the wool over America’s eyes once again” (¶ 9-10). The site’s most prominent 
feature was a regularly updated satirical depiction of Hillary Clinton, entitled The Hillary 
Show. The Hillary Show had a double meaning. On the one hand, it was a show that 
featured Senator Hillary Clinton as the moderator. On the other hand, it purported to 
show the American people the real Hillary Clinton. The Hillary Show re-presented 
Senator Clinton as a bored host who regularly insulted her guests and who only got 
excited when discussing herself or her unfettered ambition to impose a caricatured brand 
of liberalism on the American people. The most interesting and perhaps most disturbing 
feature of The Hillary Show was the painting of Hillary’s teeth as sharp and menacing 
fangs. The image suggested that Senator Clinton was something other than human and 
perhaps, even demonic. Most reasonable observers of political discourse would have 
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agreed that The Hillary Show’s pseudo-speciation of Hillary Clinton degraded both 
democratic discourse and the potential for bipartisan cooperation, which is necessary for 
effective governance. In fact, the extreme and uncivil negativity of the Stop Hillary Now 
Internet site is typical of PSG campaigning. This paper claims and demonstrates that 
PSG-sponsored negativity is both more common and more extreme than the negativity 
sponsored by other campaign organizations.  
PSGs are simply less accountable for their outrageous levels of negativity. 
Candidates and FEC-approved organizations are punished for extreme negativity. 
Incivility is generally unpopular. Furthermore, it carries the risk of being perceived as 
nasty or negative. Not incidentally, that risk generally checks the most outrageous 
expressions of incivility. Uncivil candidates may lose public support. Even worse, the 
public may transfer their support to an opponent. Uncivil political parties and other FEC-
approved groups take the same risk as candidates. Under normal circumstances, the 
public’s potential outrage checks the level of negativity in political campaigns, but the 
financers of PSGs can circumvent that outrage. If a group’s reputation becomes tarnished, 
they can easily dissolve the group and transfer their millions to a fresh and completely 
new organization. The mobility and secrecy of PSG financers shields both them and their 
agenda from the consequences of perpetuating extreme one-sided and personal attacks. 
This power to conceal one’s donors means even a highly attentive public is powerless to 
identify and punish the most corrosive and dirtiest of campaigners. PSGs are the Ring of 
Gyges (i.e., ring of invisibility) for motivated and nefarious political contributors. By 
granting invisibility to their donors, PSGs can use soft money to corrupt politics and 
poison the discourse with extreme negativity.  
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PSGs demonstrably perpetuate greater levels of political negativity than other 
campaign advocates. Franz and colleague’s (2008) content analysis of every political 
advertisement aired in 2000 and 2004 revealed that uncoordinated interest groups (e.g., 
527 and 501c PSGs) sponsored more negativity than the political parties, candidates and 
coordinated political interest groups. In 2000, uncoordinated interest groups aired 75,304 
ads. Seventy percent of those ads were pure attacks, meaning they focused exclusively on 
disparaging information about the targeted candidate. Another 5% contained some 
negative information about the targeted candidate, but only 25% of uncoordinated interest 
group advertisements were purely positive. Uncoordinated interests groups, in the 2000 
presidential campaign, aired almost 60,000 purely or partial attack advertisements. In 
2004 and after the BCRA, the situation worsened. The total number of uncoordinated 
interest-group sponsored advertisements increased by more than 100% to 160,743, and 
the proportion of pure attack advertisements increased by 3%, from 70% to 73%. 
Between 2000 and 2004, the proportion of partial attack advertisements increased by 
more than 9%: 5% in 2000 to 14% in 2004. Ultimately, the uncoordinated interest groups 
of 2004 aired about 120,000 pure attack advertisements, 23,000 partial attack 
advertisements and only about 20,000 positive advertisements. In other words, they aired 
more pure attack advertisements in 2004 than all of the spots they aired in 2000. Andres 
(2006) observed that 527 PSGs, like MoveOn.org and the SBVT, perpetrated the “most 
vicious and negative” attacks of 2004 (p. A21). He further warned that the lack of 
accountability for PSGs means the 2008 presidential race would witness another “flood 
of nasty ads…that would transform electoral discourse into a tabloid freak show” 
(Andres, 2007, p. A21). In keeping with this trend, it was reasonable to posit that the 
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anonymity of ad sponsorship is associated with greater levels of extreme negativity. 
Therefore, this study posited the following hypotheses regarding 2008 political 
advertising content.  
H1a: PSG-sponsored political advertising is more negative than candidate-
sponsored political advertising.   
H1b: PSG-sponsored political advertising is more negative than FEC-sanctioned 
political advertising. 
H2a: Candidate-sponsored political attack advertising is more policy focused than 
character focused.    
H2b: PSG-sponsored political attack advertising is more character focused than 
policy focused.    


















ATTACK ADVERTISING EFFECTS 
Any investigation of political attack advertising effects should be guided by 
theory and the precedents set by previous research. Dubin (1978) reasoned that 
“theories…satisfy a very human ‘need’ to order the experienced world” (p. 7). Theory is 
particularly useful to the extent it empowers the theorist to explain and predict the status 
of units within specified boundaries. Unfortunately, a unified theoretical framework has 
not guided the existing political advertising effects literature. Thus, this investigation of 
PSG-sponsored attack advertising must select a particular perspective with which to 
guide its efforts and interpret the significance of its results. This chapter articulates that 
perspective. It relies on a combination of insights gleaned from the media effects and 
social influence literatures (Breckler, 1984; Eagly & Chaiken, 1998; Fazio & Zanna, 
1978b, 1981; Laswell, 1948; McGuire, 1985; Petty, Priester, & Brinol, 2002; Petty & 
Wegener, 1998; Rosenberg & Hovland, 1960). Like McGuire’s communication matrix 
model (McGuire, 1985), this dissertation organizes its hypotheses according to Laswell’s 
(1948) expectation that media effects are antecedent in source, message, channel and 
receiver variables. With respect to both candidate and PSG-sponsored political attack 
advertising, this study relates those inputs to an attitude construct that consists of four 
dimensions: cognitive, affective, behavioral (Breckler, 1984; Eagly & Chaiken, 1998; 
Rosenberg & Hovland, 1960) and strength (Fazio & Zanna, 1981).  
Attack Advertising Effects 
Unfortunately, the existing attack advertising literature offers very little 
theoretical or empirical coherence across studies. Generally speaking, the findings are 
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motley collection of often contradictory and incomplete results. After conducting a meta-
analysis of 53 studies and 117 findings, Lau and Pomper (2004) concluded that “for 
every research finding about the effectiveness of negative advertising, there is an equal 
and opposite research finding” (p. 19). A substantial number of studies show exposure to 
attack ads predicts less support for the target (Kaid & Boydston, 1987; Pinkleton, 1997, 
1998; Tinkham & Weaver-Lariscy, 1990), but another body of findings shows attacks 
predict reduced support for the sponsor of the message (Basil, Schooler, & Reeves, 1991; 
Hill, 1989; Matthews & Dietz-Uhler, 1998; Meirick, 2002; Merrittt, 1984; Pinkleton, 
1997, 1998; Shapiro & Rieger, 1992; Thorson, Christ, & Caywood, 1991). Still other 
research shows attacks enhance support for the sponsor (Brooks & Geer, 2007; Hitchon, 
Chang, & Harris, 1997; K.F. Kahn & Geer, 1994; Kaid, 1997; Kaid, Chanslor, & Hovind, 
1992; Pfau & Burgoon, 1989; Tinkham & Weaver-Lariscy, 1990). Attack advertising’s 
impact on democratic mobilization is also uncertain. The demobilization hypothesis 
posits attack advertising discourages voters from participating in the political process. 
Several studies have validated the hypothesis (Allen & Burrell, 2002; Ansolabehere, 
Iyengar, & Simon, 1999; Ansolabehere, Iyengar, Simon, & Valentino, 1994b; K. F. Kahn 
& Kenney, 1999), but an approximately equal number of studies have rejected it 
(Garramone, Atkin, Pinkleton, & Cole, 1990; Goldstein & Freedman, 2002; Matthews & 
Dietz-Uhler, 1998; Pinkleton, 2002). And, yet another body of research actually validates 
a mobilization hypothesis, which predicts a positive relationship between exposure to 
attack advertising and political participation (Brooks & Geer, 2007; Finkel & Geer, 1998; 
Franz, et al., 2008; Pinkleton, 1991; Wattenberg & Brians, 1999). Taken together, these 
                                                                                                          
23 
 
findings leave both the interested researcher and the ambitious practitioner with more 
questions than answers.  
Incoherence in the political advertising effects literature can be interpreted either 
pessimistically or optimistically. The pessimistic interpretation is that any effort to 
explain or predict the general effect of attack advertising effects is impossible. The 
optimistic conclusion is that general principles exist but remain concealed within an 
undiscovered constellation of parsimonious moderating and mediating variables. This 
dissertation presumes the optimistic conclusion. It strives to use mass communication and 
social influence theory to demonstrate and explain attack advertising’s influence 
(Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953; Laswell, 1948; McGuire, 1969; McLeod & Reeves, 
1980; Petty & Wegener, 1998).  
The Social Influence of Political Attack Advertising  
More than half a century of social influence theory and mass communication 
research has produced several useful findings regarding mass media effects. Perhaps the 
most important is that mass communicated persuasion is highly conditioned by source, 
message, channel and receiver variables (Laswell, 1948; McGuire, 1985). The earliest 
investigations of mass communicated influence often labored under the erroneous 
presumption that effects are direct (McDonald, 2004). Nevertheless, subsequent research 
had shown hat mass media effects are both highly conditioned (McLeod & Reeves, 1980) 
and frequently mediated by the audience’s attitude toward the object featured in the 
mediated message (Petty & Wegener, 1998). Research has further demonstrated that 
attitudes consist of cognitive, affective, behavioral (Breckler, 1984; Eagly & Chaiken, 
1998; Rosenberg & Hovland, 1960) and strength-related dimensions (Eagly & Chaiken, 
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1998; Krosnick, Boninger, Chuang, Berent, & Carnot, 1993). Political campaign 
advertising presents information that is designed to influence one’s attitude toward 
political objects, like candidates and policies. When an audience’s thoughts, feelings and 
behaviors are changed or reinforced by an attack advertisement, it is effective. When the 
changed or reinforced attitude is also strengthened, the effect is deep and lasting (Eagly 
& Chaiken, 1998; Krosnick, et al., 1993). By studying attack advertising with the context 
of source, receiver channel, message and a dimensionalized conception of attitude, this 
dissertation hopes to provide a valid record of effects that will found a heuristic program 
of research that edifies PSG-sponsored advertising. 
During the early part of the 20th Century, most believed mass communication was 
direct, uniform and powerful. However, attempts to empirically demonstrate direct 
effects were frustrated by inconsistent findings. For example, the Payne Fund Studies of 
movie influence found there is “no simple cause-and-effect relationship….motion picture 
influence is specific for a given child and a given movie and that the same movie may 
influence different children in opposite directions” (in McDonald, 2004, p. 186). Despite 
the Payne Funds nuanced findings, the hypodermic model was reinforced by popular 
anecdotes. For example, the popular myth of direct effects was reinforced by the 
perceived widespread panic associated with Orson Well’s realistic reading of The War of 
the Worlds (Petty, et al., 2002). Yet, even the “War of the Worlds effect” was moderated. 
Cantril’s (in McDonald, 2004) study revealed that, while some of the panic was real, 
those who were more suggestible panicked at a much greater rate than who were less 
suggestible.  
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Eventually, popular myth and wishful thinking accepted that media effects are 
complicated. Studies of political communication were central to debunking the direct 
effects model of mass communicated influence (see Kaid, 1981). Berelson, Lazarsfeld 
and McPhee (1954) demonstrated that mass political communication effects are 
overwhelmed by one’s social situation. Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960) 
demonstrated that mass political communication effects are highly conditioned by one’s 
psychological predispositions. Both studies (Berelson, et al., 1954; Campbell, et al., 
1960) were important illustrations of mass communication’s conditional influence.  
Mass media effects are the product of a sometimes complicated interaction between 
at least four inputs: source, message, channel and receiver (Laswell, 1948; McGuire, 
1985). In the formulation of his communication matrix model, McGuire (1985) added 
context; however, this dissertation is not concerned with context. Nevertheless, the other 
four inputs are particularly useful for organizing and understanding attack advertising 
effects. Research shows that source (Garramone, 1985; Garramone & Smith, 1984; 
Groenendyk & Valentino, 2002), message (Brooks & Geer, 2007; Funk, 2001; Mutz, 
2007; Mutz & Reeves, 2005), channel (Andreoli & Worchel, 1978) and receiver 
(Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; Franz, et al., 2008) are substantial predictors of attack 
advertising’s influence. In one form or another, these conditioning variables have 
informed several persuasion models, including the cognitive response model (Greenwald, 
1968), the elaboration likelihood model (Petty & Wegener, 1998) and of course, the 
communication matrix model (McGuire, 1985).  
McGuire’s (1985) communication matrix model posits that the process of 
persuasion consists of both inputs (i.e., independent variables) and outputs (i.e., 
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dependent variables). Outputs include an orderly series of Guttman-like measurable 
outcomes that eventually culminate in yielding to a persuasive communication. In order, 
the steps are exposure, attention, interest, comprehension, acquisition, yielding, memory, 
retrieval, decision, action, reinforcement and consolidation.  
Unfortunately, persuasion does not occur in the orderly fashion that McGuire 
(1985) predicted. For example, persuasion need not be preceded by acquisition. 
Greenwald (1968) demonstrated that persuasion (i.e., yielding) occurs even when 
messages are not retained (i.e., not acquired). Hastie and Park (1986) revealed that some 
attitudes are influenced online. Holders of online attitudes use new information to update 
their attitudes, but they do not retain the new information. Lodge, McGraw and Stroh 
(1989) found that political attitudes are formed online. Nisbett and Wilson (1977) 
concluded that most people do not comprehend their own most profound beliefs. In other 
words, the process of attitude change and formation is more complicated than presumed 
by the communication matrix model (Petty, et al., 2002).  
The ELM (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Petty, et al., 2002; Petty & Wegener, 1998; 
Petty, Wegener, Fabrigar, Priester, & Cacioppo, 1993) offers a useful alternative to 
McGuire’s matrix model. The ELM posits the persuasiveness of a message is mediated 
by how much the receiver cognitively elaborates on the message. Message elaboration is 
the ELM’s central construct. It consists of both motivation and ability, which 
independently influence message processing (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Messages are 
processed centrally (i.e., high motivation and high ability) or peripherally (low 
motivation and low ability). High elaboration predicts central processing, which means 
that issue-relevant persuasive content mediates influence. Low elaboration predicts 
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peripheral processing, which means issue irrelevant information mediates influence. 
Issue-relevant content is highly relative to the form and purpose of a persuasive 
communication. What has become known as the multiple roles hypothesis is derived 
from the theory’s third postulate: “variables can affect the amount and direction of 
attitude change by: (A) serving as persuasive arguments, (B) serving as peripheral cues, 
and/or (C) affecting the extent or direction of issue and argument elaboration” (Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1993, p. 307). Therefore, within one persuasive context, source may constitute 
issue-relevant argumentation but in another, message content might constitute the issue-
relevant argumentation.  
Communication media are distinct channels that may foreground the same content 
as either peripheral or issue relevant (Chesebro, 1984; McLuhan, 1967; Meyrowitz, 
1985). For example, a video-mediated message may foreground source as issue relevant 
(Chaiken & Eagly, 1983; Pfau, 1990; Pfau, Holbert, Zubric, Pasha, & Lin, 2000; 
Worchel, Andreoli, & Eason, 1975); whereas a print message may foreground the 
message as issue relevant. Petty and Wegener (1998) suggested that video’s external 
pacing undermines processing ability, which leads to the processing of source as a 
peripheral cue; however, video-mediated persuasion can strengthen attitudes against 
counter-persuasion (Pfau, et al., 2000), which is a typical sign of central message 
processing (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Petty & Wegener, 1998; Petty, et al., 1993). 
Therefore, this dissertation posits that, within the context of televised or video-mediated 
political attack advertising, source factors constitute an issue-relevant mediator of 
persuasion.  
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The ELM relies on the common definition of an attitude as, “a person’s overall 
evaluation of persons (including oneself), objects, and issue” (Petty & Wegener, 1998, p. 
323). In this context, “overall evaluation” consists of all the associations one has with a 
particular attitude object (Petty, et al., 1993); therefore, a non-attitude is comprised of no 
associations with an object, whereas a strong attitude is comprised of a large number of 
strong and, therefore, easily accessible associations with an object (see Fazio & Zanna, 
1981; Roskos-Ewoldsen & Fazio, 1997). Attitude strength is evidenced by dimensions, 
like attitude certainty and confidence (Fazio & Zanna, 1981). Strong attitudes are more 
consistent with behavior (Fazio & Zanna, 1978c), and they are more resistant to 
counterpersuasion (Fazio & Zanna, 1981; Krosnick & Abelson, 1991; Krosnick, et al., 
1993). However, to say an attitude is merely strong or weak ignores the quality of the 
associations that can be fused to an attitude object.  
 The ELM acknowledges a multi-dimensional attitude construct that is comprised 
of affective, behavioral and cognitive associations with an attitude object (Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1998; Petty & Wegener, 1998).   
In the present view, affect refers to an emotional response, a gut reaction, or 
sympathetic nervous activity. One can measure it by monitoring physiological 
responses (e.g., heart rate, galvanic skin response) or by collecting verbal reports of 
feelings or mood. Behavior includes overt actions, behavioral intentions and verbal 
statements regarding behavior. Beliefs, knowledge structures, perceptual responses, 
and thoughts constitute the cognitive component. (Breckler, 1984, p. 1191) 
Behavior is an external activity, but as internal activities, emotion or cognition can 
constitute either central or peripheral processes (Petty, et al., 1993). Each dimension 
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expresses distinct and even contradictory evaluations of an attitude object (Breckler, 
1984; Rosenberg & Hovland, 1960); however, the dimensions are more likely to align, 
even if they are not of the same magnitude (Petty & Wegener, 1998). In other words, 
some attitudes might be more affectively driven than others (Rosenberg & Hovland, 
1960). It is even conceivable that some dimensions of an attitude are formed centrally, 
while others are formed peripherally. The influence of attack advertising provides a 
useful laboratory with which to view the joint role of cognitive and affective persuasion.  
Several studies illustrate attack advertising’s cognitive influence. Using actual 
television advertisements, Pfau, Park, Holbert and Cho (2001) found that attack 
advertising influenced voter evaluations of candidate’s character and competence. Kaid 
and Boydston (1987) demonstrated that exposure to newspaper and television attack ads 
influenced evaluations of the targeted candidate in terms of his qualifications, honesty, 
seriousness, sincerity and success. K.H. Kahn and Greer (1994) revealed that exposure to 
political attack advertising influenced evaluations of the sponsor’s issue competence, 
trustworthiness, viability and leadership capacity. Pfau and Burgoon (1989) showed that, 
compared to character attack messages, issue attacks were associated with more positive 
global evaluations of the sponsored candidate and the position advocated in the message. 
Issue attacks also influenced behavioral intentions in terms of voting behavior.   
Actual and intended behaviors are a common outcome in evaluations of political 
attack advertising effects. The most common behavioral measure is intention to vote for 
or against a particular candidate (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; Hitcheon & Chang, 
1995; Pfau & Burgoon, 1989; Shapiro & Rieger, 1992; Tinkham & Weaver-Lariscy, 
1990). With aggregated survey data from several congressional races, Tinkham and 
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Weaver-Lariscy (1990) demonstrated that an attack strategy significantly predicted 
electoral success, which implies that negative campaigning influences actual voting 
behavior. Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995) found that, among those of the same political 
party as the sponsor, exposure to attack advertisements significantly increased intention 
to vote for the sponsor. Shapiro and Rieger (1992) revealed that attack advertising 
reduced intentions to vote for the sponsor. Brader (2005, 2006) found that incidental 
exposure to emotional political attack television ads elicited greater intention to vote for 
the sponsor.  
Investigations of emotional political messages and emotional outcomes represent 
the state of the art in political communication research (Brader, 2005, 2006; Gore, 2007; 
Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000; Westen, 2008). Garramone (1984) found that recall 
of attack advertising was associated with valenced feelings about both sponsors and 
targets of the ads.  Meirick (2002) found that one-sided attacks were associated with 
fewer positive affective responses than comparative attack advertisements. Brader (2005) 
found that fearful advertisements were associated with greater levels of anxiety. In a 
separate study, Brader (2006) demonstrated that, compared to neutral attack ads, fearful 
attacks were associated with greater levels of affective warmth for the sponsor. Brader’s 
(2005, 2006) experiments represent a growing acknowledgement of emotion as an 
important and consequential component of political attitudes (Brader, 2006; Gore, 2007; 
Marcus, et al., 2000; Westen, 2007). This dissertation embraces the growing recognition 
of emotion’s role in political communication effects.  
This study also employs the attitude-strength construct to better understand attack 
advertising’s influence. Eagly and Chaiken (1998) reasoned that attitude strength “is 
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‘something’ over and above the positive versus negative character of an attitude that 
gives rise to its power to influence attitude-relevant responding” (pp. 286-287). The 
strength of an attitude reflects the level of conviction with which it is held. Measuring 
attitude strength as an outcome of political advertising promises to improve the ability to 
detect subtle differences between classes of attack advertising and various inputs (e.g., 
channel or sponsorship). The capacity to detect advertising effects beyond mere valence 
may be an especially helpful method of overcoming ceiling effects. Even if an attack 
advertisement does not significantly influence attitude valence, it might influence attitude 
strength. Krosnick and Abelson (1991) observed that “it is rare for a survey to measure 
the strength of…attitudes. And yet it seems patently obvious to measure the strength of 
those attitudes” (p.  177). With respect to attack advertising, a few studies have measured 
attitude extremity (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; Garramone, et al., 1990), but 
extremity is a controversial assessment of attitude strength. Some argue that it is a true 
indicator of strength (Krosnick, et al., 1993), but others conclude that it is simply another 
measure of attitude valence (Eagly & Chaiken, 1998). This study transcends that 
particular debate by investigating the effectiveness of PSG and candidate-sponsored 
attack advertising with respect to their influence on attitude confidence (Fazio & Zanna, 
1981). Attitude confidence reflects attitude strength, and it is an important corollary of 









SPONSORSHIP’S INFLUENCE ON POLITICAL  
ATTACK ADVERTISING EFFECTS 
In presidential elections, the electorate increasingly bases its voting decisions on a 
candidate’s character, as opposed to his/her policy positions or political ideology. Bishin, 
Stevens and Wilson (2006) showed that intention to vote for George W. Bush was driven 
more by character attributions than a shift in political affiliation from independent to 
Republican. Using American National Election Studies (ANES) data from 1960 to 1984, 
Glass (1985) found that, in five out of seven presidential elections, voter assessments of 
the candidate’s traits significantly predicted vote choice. Benoit and McHale (2003) 
posited that the character of presidential candidates is an important determinate of public 
support. Keeter (1987) observed that, “television has supplanted the political parties as a 
central source of campaign information for voters” (p. 355), and others have noted that 
television highlights the source-related dimensions of mediated social influence 
(Meyrowitz, 1982; Pfau, 1990). Given that campaigns are television centered (Hart, 
1999; Jamieson, 1988, 1992; Keeter, 1987; Patterson, 2002; Postman, 1985; Wattenberg, 
1986), Barber’s (1992) normative model of character-based voter decision making is an 
appropriate lens through which to view them.  
Source credibility is an ancient construct. Aristotle (1954) defined it as one of the 
most important forms of rhetorical proof. He reasoned that, “we believe good men more 
fully and more readily than others: this is…absolutely true where exact certainty is 
impossible and opinions are divided” (¶ 3). Aristotle posited that credibility consists of 
three dimensions: intelligence, good will and character. Contemporary empirical 
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investigations of the credibility construct validated those dimensions (Hovland & Weiss, 
1951; McCroskey & Young, 1981; Ohanian, 1990; Petty & Wegener, 1998; Stiff & 
Mongeau, 2003). 
Over 50 years ago, Hovland, Janis and Kelly (1953) pioneered the contemporary 
and social scientific investigation of source credibility. They reasoned that credibility 
emanates from the source, and it consists of at least two dimensions: expertise and 
trustworthiness. They defined expertise as a source’s ability to formulate and deliver 
valid assertions, and trustworthiness as a source’s willingness to deliver valid assertions. 
Expert sources tend to be older, recognized leaders, and they hold a position relevant to 
their supposed expertise. Trustworthy sources are perceived as more objective and more 
similar to their audience. Hovland and Weiss (1951) experimentally demonstrated that 
credible sources are more persuasive than incredible sources. Their post-test-only 
experimental design manipulated the credibility of four speakers on two dimensions: 
trustworthiness and expertise. Subjects perceived expert and trustworthy sources as more 
persuasive than inexpert and untrustworthy sources. This finding was typical expression 
of Hovland and colleagues’ (1953) conception of credibility as source oriented. In other 
words, they conceived of credibility as a characteristic of the source, as opposed to a 
characteristic of the receiver’s perception of the source.  
In contrast, McCroskey (1966) offered a receiver-oriented measure of credibility. 
Whereas Hovland et al. (1953) manipulated credibility at the level of the source, 
McCroskey (1966) simply relied on receiver’s reports of what they considered credible. 
Holbert (2000) observed that a receiver perspective is a more complete measure of source 
influence. Still, McCroskey (1966) agreed with both Aristotle (1954) and Hovland et al. 
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(1953) on their division of credibility into two primary dimensions: competence (i.e., 
intelligence/expertise) and character (i.e., trustworthiness/good will). Stiff and Mongeau 
(2003) recently concluded that, even after 50 years, competence and character remain the 
most valid representations of “people’s judgments about source credibility” (p. 106). 
Both competence and character are useful yardsticks for measuring presidential 
candidates, but candidates are in a Catch-22 with respect to credibility. They must make a 
case for their candidacy, but theory and research show that audiences are suspicious of 
persons who speak on their own behalf. By definition, candidates are self-interested 
representatives of their own candidacies (Groenendyk & Valentino, 2002). Andreoli and 
Worchel (1978) found that, when communicator source was made salient, an active 
political candidate was perceived as less trustworthy and less persuasive than three more 
objective sources: a newscaster, a retired politician and a current member of Congress. 
With a trust-oriented measure of credibility, Groenendyk and Valentino (2002) found that 
issue-group advertisements were perceived as more credible than candidate 
advertisements, which suggests that the electorate equates advertising sponsorship with 
the advertisement’s source. The principal benefit for PSG advertisers is that the electorate 
may trust them more than it trusts candidate advertisers. 
This chapter compares the influence of candidate-sponsored versus PSG-sponsored 
political attack advertising. From a receiver-oriented perspective (McCroskey, 1966), it 
posits that PSG-sponsored advertising is perceived as more trustworthy and competent 
than candidate-sponsored advertising. Furthermore, this chapter posits that the enhanced 
credibility of PSGs enhances the persuasiveness of their advertising.  
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Perceived Credibility of PSG-Sponsored Advertising 
PSGs employ apparently non-partisan names to conceal their partisan intentions. 
The Swift Boat Veterans and POW’s for Truth (SBVT) used the very language and 
symbols of trust to enhance their credibility. Indeed, the word “truth” is in the 
organization’s name. Similarly, the Progress for America Voter Fund (PAVF) concealed 
their partisan intention to support Bush in the 2004 presidential campaign. By using the 
terms “America” and “progress”, the group gave the impression of inclusiveness, which 
is an implicit denial of its partisan intentions. The group also claimed the mantle of 
“progress”, which is a value closely tied to the Enlightenment assumptions on which 
America is founded (see Ellul, 1965). America Coming Together (ACT) was a liberal pro-
Kerry group, but it also concealed its partisan intentions behind a non-partisan moniker. 
ACT’s mission to bring Americans together resonates with the universal human need to 
belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995).  
Research and experience strongly suggest that candidate-sponsored political ads 
inspire less trust and are less persuasive than third-party-sponsored advertising. 
Groenendyk and Valentino (2002) reasoned that issue-group advertising is perceived as 
more trustworthy than individual sponsored advertising “because there is no single 
individual who would benefit” (p. 299). S. An, Jin and Pfau (2006) posited that, “issue 
advocacy ads, without phrases like ‘vote for me,’ or ‘vote against them,’ make ulterior 
motives less apparent and less accessible” (p. 10). Pfau, Holbert, Szabo and Kaminski 
(2002) found that third-party-sponsored ads bestowed more credibility on the implied 
source (i.e., the candidate who benefited from the ad) than candidate-sponsored ads. 
Research has not examined the relative influence of PSG versus candidate-sponsored 
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advertising, but Pfau, Haigh, Sims, and Wigley (2006) found that corporate front groups 
were perceived as highly credible. In fact, the preponderance of empirical evidence 
strongly supports the position that third-party-sponsored political advertising is perceived 
as more trustworthy than candidate-sponsored advertising (S. An, Jin, & Pfau, 2006; 
Groenendyk & Valentino, 2002; Pfau, Haigh, Sims, & Wigley, 2006; Pfau, Holbert, 
Szabo, & Kaminski, 2002). Because PSGs are essentially third parties, they might also be  
perceived as more trustworthy than candidate advertisers.   
Furthermore, PSG-sponsored political attacks might be perceived as more expert 
than candidate attacks. PSGs contrive names to enhance perceived expertise. Groups with 
names like the Economic Freedom Fund or Club for Growth cultivate the impression that 
they are economic think tanks or, at least, composed of economists. Such an impression 
would seem to elicit perceptions of their expertise. As Hovland and colleagues (1953) 
observed, expertise is enhanced when the source advocates an issue-relevant position. 
Compared to candidates, PSGs with relevant-sounding names may be perceived as 
relatively more credible. Groenendyk & Valentino (2002) reported that candidates “are 
usually forced to be ‘experts’ on a wide variety of issues. By contrast, interest groups 
attempt to foster a strong reputation on a narrower range of social concerns” (pp. 298-
299). Unfortunately, very little research has empirically investigated the influence of 
third-party sponsorship on the competence or expertise dimension of advertising, but 
what little exists is encouraging. Pfau and colleague’s (2002) found that soft-money-
sponsored advertising was perceived as more competent than candidate-sponsored 
advertising. If PSG advertisers are a species of third-party advertisers, they might be 
perceived as more competent than candidate advertisers.   
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H3: PSG-sponsored political attack advertising elicits a more favorable 
evaluation of the sponsor’s credibility than candidate-sponsored political 
attack advertising. 
PSG Credibility and Persuasion 
Credibility translates into persuasion. Early empirical investigations of the source 
credibility construct concluded that highly credible sources are more persuasive than low 
credibility sources (Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Patterson, 1966). Under the rubric of the 
ELM’s multiple roles hypothesis (Petty & Wegener, 1998), source credibility can operate 
as persuasive cue under either peripheral or central processing conditions. Chaiken and 
Eagly (1983) found that likeability was persuasive under heuristic condition. By contrast, 
Chaiken and Maheswaren (1994) revealed that credibility was operative under both 
systematic and heuristic processing.  
Credibility is a particularly relevant persuasive cue for candidates and issue 
advocates (Garramone, 1985; Garramone & Smith, 1984; Groenendyk & Valentino, 
2002). Garramone and Smith (1984) demonstrated that, for respondents who are highly 
dependent on political commercials, both sponsor trustworthiness and commercial 
evaluation mediated persuasiveness. In their comparison of third-party sponsored versus 
candidate-sponsored advertisements, Pfau and colleagues (2002) showed that, for 
unaffiliated voters, third-party ads elicited more favorable evaluations of the implied 
beneficiary in terms of global attitude, competence and character. Groenendyk and 
Valentino (2002) found that an anti-Bush ad was more credible when sponsored by the 
Sierra Club than when it was sponsored by Bush’s 2000 opponent Al Gore. Garramone 
(1985) also compared third-party and candidate sponsored political ads. She did not find 
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differences between the sponsors on trust, but she did find that the third-party advertising 
was more persuasive than the candidate advertising on four indices of influence: attitude 
toward the target, attitude toward the sponsor, intention to vote for the target and 
intention to vote for the sponsor. No study has heretofore addressed the influence of PSG 
advertising, but extant investigations of third-party ads and the logic of credibility 
suggest that PSG attacks may wield considerable more influence than candidate-
sponsored political attacks.   
H4a: PSG-sponsored attack advertising elicits a more favorable 
evaluation of its implied beneficiary than candidate-sponsored political 
attack advertising. 
H4b: PSG-sponsored political attack advertising elicits a greater intention 
to vote for the implied beneficiary than candidate-sponsored political 
attack advertising. 
H4c: PSG-sponsored political attack advertising elicits a less favorable evaluation 
of the targeted candidate than candidate-sponsored political attack advertising. 
H4d: PSG-sponsored political attack advertising elicits a lesser intention to vote 












For candidates, political attacks are risky (Allen & Burrell, 2002; Hill, 1989; 
Merritt, 1984). Their outcomes are unpredictable. Specifically, attacks might enhance 
support for the sponsoring candidate (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995), diminish it (Hill, 
1989; Merritt, 1984; Mutz & Reeves, 2005) or have no effect at all (Lau & Pomper, 
2004). For candidate campaigns, these indeterminacies must be troubling. Candidates 
strive to know when and under what conditions political attack advertising can enhance 
their support, and when it can degrade it. In other words, candidates need to know which 
attack strategies work. More importantly, they need to know how attacks can backfire. 
This dissertation attempts to locate an empirically supported expectation for advertising 
influence, like boomerang effects. This section argues that the content of attack 
advertising matters. Content can operate as intended. It can be ignored. It can even 
backfire against the sponsor and its argument (Kaid, 1981; Laswell, 1948). If the 
electorate must tolerate political attacks, they prefer attacks that are issue-based, two-
sided and civil. They do not appreciate attacks that are image-based (Pfau & Burgoon, 
1989; Shapiro & Rieger, 1992; Thorson, et al., 1991), one-sided (Meirick, 2002; 
Pinkleton, 1997, 1998) or uncivil (Brooks & Geer, 2007; Funk, 2001; Mutz, 2007; Mutz 
& Reeves, 2005). One-sided, image-based and uncivil attacks are the most extreme form 
of political attacks. This section discusses the deleterious influence of candidate-
sponsored extreme political attacks on support for the attacker, target and democratic 
political process (Hill, 1989; K. F. Kahn & Kenney, 1999; Mutz & Reeves, 2005).  
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The most extreme and most unrepentant sponsors of extreme negativity are the 
uncoordinated and unaccountable PSGs that have permeated recent presidential 
campaigns (Andres, 2006; Franz, et al., 2008). In 2004, about 75% of the ads sponsored 
by uncoordinated interest groups were purely negative, whereas only about 20% of the 
candidate ads were purely negative. Andres (2006) observed that 527 groups, like 
MoveOn.org and the SBVT, perpetrated the most vicious attacks of 2004. The extreme 
nature of this new brand of attack advertising deserves further study. This research posits 
that candidates are punished for extreme negativity, but PSGs may use such tactics with 
relative impunity.  
Candidate-Sponsored Extreme Attack Advertising 
The most extreme political attacks are one-sided, image-based and uncivil. A one-
sided attack is entirely negative and exclusively focused on the target. In contrast, a two-
sided attack conveys a combination of negative information about the target and positive 
information about the sponsor. Image attacks relate information about the target’s 
character, credibility or personal traits. Issue attacks communicate information about the 
target’s positions, record or policy promises. Uncivil attacks violate the norms and mores 
of face-to-face interaction. Civil attacks adhere to the standards of mutual respect and 
propriety. 
For good reason, candidates rarely employ the tactics of extreme negativity. 
Candidate-sponsored one-sided attacks are demonstrably less effective than two-sided 
attacks (Meirick, 2002; Pinkleton, 1997, 1998). Meirick (2002) found that one-sided 
attacks were less effective. They elicited more source derogations, less cognitive 
engagement and a less favorable perception of the advertisement. Two-sided attacks were 
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more effective. They elicited more favorable perceptions of both the sponsor and the ad; 
moreover, they were associated with more positive affective evaluations of the 
advertisement. In a similar series of investigations, Pinkleton (1997, 1998) manipulated 
the amount of negative information in two-sided attack messages. The most negative 
message consisted of six positive claims and six attacks. The moderately negative 
message consisted of the same six positive claims, but the number of attacks was reduced 
to four. The “least negative” message was actually a positive message. It consisted of six 
positive claims. Pinkleton (1997) revealed that greater levels of negativity were 
associated with more unfavorable assessments of the sponsor and more favorable 
assessments of the target. In another study, Pinkleton (1998) found that greater levels of 
negativity were associated with assessments of the sponsor as mean spirited.  
Image attacks are also less effective than issue ads (Pfau & Burgoon, 1989; Shapiro 
& Rieger, 1992; Thorson, et al., 1991). Pfau and Burgoon (1989) investigated candidate-
sponsored issue and image attacks. They found that image attacks elicited a less favorable 
attitude toward the candidate supported in the attack and a less favorable assessment of 
the message itself. Alternatively, issue attacks were more likely to stimulate turnout for 
the supported candidate. Thorson, Christ and Caywood (1991) found that image attacks 
elicited less favorable evaluations of ad, a less favorable evaluation of the ad’s sponsor 
and less willingness to behavioral support the sponsored candidate. In a similar 
investigation, Shapiro and Rieger (1992) showed that image attacks predicted less 
favorable evaluations of the sponsor and a greater intention to vote for the target, which is 
a backlash effect. The danger of the image-attack is its potential to promote sympathy for 
target, whom audiences may feel is treated unfairly. A prototypical illustration of this 
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backlash effect occurred in the 1993 Canadian federal election when the Progressive 
party ridiculed an opposition candidate for his facial paralysis. After seeing the ad, 
university students increased their support for the opposition candidate and reduced their 
support for the Progressive ad’s implied beneficiary (Haddock & Zanna, 1997).     
Voters reject uncivil candidates (Brooks & Geer, 2007; Funk, 2001; Mutz, 2007; 
Mutz & Reeves, 2005). Funk (2001) argued that political incivility consists of negative 
norm violations. Mutz and Reeves (2005) defined uncivil political discourse as consisting 
of gratuitous asides, a lack of respect, a frustration with the opposition and nonverbal 
cues, like raised voices and eye rolls. Brooks and Geer (2007) operationally defined 
political incivility as “inflammatory and superfluous” (p. 5) language. They found that 
exposure to uncivil image-based attack messages elicited less favorable evaluations of the 
message’s importance and informational value, as well as, less favorable evaluations of 
the sponsor’s tactics. Funk (2001) manipulated the level of civility in the transcript of a 
congressional debate. She found that exposure to the uncivil script was associated with 
more anger and disgust with politics. Mutz (2007) revealed that intimate camera shots 
enhanced the polarizing impact of incivility. In a similar study, Mutz and Reeves (2005) 
demonstrated that incivility in a televised political debate induced perceptions of the both 
candidates as more impolite, hostile, emotional, quarrelsome and agitated. Incivility in 
political debates also induced greater levels of experienced affect, as measured by skin 
conductivity.  
The electorate despises extreme tactics and will punish candidates who sponsor 
them. One-sided attacks elicit derogation of both message and source (Meirick, 2002; 
Pinkleton, 1997, 1998). Image-based attacks trigger a backlash against the candidate 
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supported in the message (Pfau & Burgoon, 1989; Shapiro & Rieger, 1992; Thorson, et 
al., 1991). More generally, political incivility produces a general disgust with both 
politics and politicians (Brooks & Geer, 2007; Funk, 2001; Mutz, 2007; Mutz & Reeves, 
2005). For candidates, extreme attacks almost guarantee a backlash. The combination of 
all three forms of extreme attack into a single political advertisement is certain to elicit 
unfavorable responses.   
H5a: Compared to no political attack advertising, candidate-sponsored 
political attack advertising backfires against the sponsoring candidate by 
eliciting a less favorable evaluation of the attack’s implied beneficiary.  
H5b: Compared to no political attack advertising, candidate-sponsored 
political attack advertising backfires against the sponsoring candidate by 
eliciting a lesser intention to vote for the implied beneficiary.  
H5c: Compared to no political attack advertising, candidate-sponsored 
political attack advertising also harms the targeted candidate by eliciting a 
less favorable evaluation of the targeted candidate.  
H5d: Compared to no political attack advertising, candidate-sponsored 
political attack advertising also harms the targeted candidate by eliciting a 
lesser intention to vote for the targeted candidate.  
PSG-Sponsored Extreme Attack Advertising 
Political attacks are risky for candidates, but they may work for PSGs. In fact, 
PSGs are the most consistent sponsors of the worst forms of extreme negativity (Andres, 
2006; Franz, et al., 2008). PSGs are the super surrogates of the political campaigns. Their 
legally-required independence might shield their implied beneficiaries from backlashes 
                                                                                                          
44 
 
against attacks, while the potency of those same attacks might corrupt perceptions of the 
opposition.  
Like all communication, the influence of political attacks is somewhat irreversible. 
Moreover, television amplifies the irreversibility of political attacks. Ansolabehere and 
Iyengar (1995) observed that, “the breadth of television’s reach makes it difficult to 
dispel rumors or counteract the effects of negative information” (p. 90). Jamieson (1996) 
observed that, even if a candidate responds quickly, strategically, appropriately and with 
the cooperation of the press, any “counterattack may simply legitimize false claims and 
magnify their impact” (p. xxii).  
PSG-sponsored negativity is particularly harmful for the target. Whereas candidate-
sponsors of extreme negativity share some of the blame for extreme negativity, the 
targets of PSG-sponsored advertising suffer directly from both the attack and indirectly 
from their opponent’s impunity. Benoit, Pier and Blaney (1997) theorized that campaigns 
are comparative: one candidate attempts to appear better than other competing 
candidates. According to that model, the potency of PSG attacks lies in their capacity to 
raise the negatives of the targeted candidate, while the implied beneficiary’s negatives 
remain static.  
The 2004 SBVT campaign against John Kerry illustrated how the credibility and 
elusiveness of a PSG attack can sully the target’s image, without doing harm to its 
implied beneficiary. In early August 2003, the SBVT launched a series of extreme attack 
advertisements against John Kerry. The one-sided attack messages did not identify 
George W. Bush but, as the only viable alternative to Kerry, he was the clear beneficiary. 
The ad campaign accused Kerry of treason, dishonesty, torture by proxy and incompetent 
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leadership (see ads in Swift Boat Veterans and POW's for Truth, 2008). The extreme 
nature of the ads was evident in their one-sidedness, focus on image and incivility. 
George W. Bush’s refused to specifically reject the SBVT, although he did condemn the 
electoral role of PSGs, like 527 organizations (Borger, 2004). Officials from the Kerry 
campaign complained that, “the president's remarks treated the veterans' claims as no 
worse than other attack ads by supposedly independent groups, questioning the group's 
source of finance rather than the substance of the ads” (in Borger, 2004).  
The SBVT campaign was demonstrably effective. The National Annenberg Election 
Study (2004, August 20) reported that 44% of independent voters believed the SBVT’s 
claims. Bolick (in Jones, 2006) used an intricately designed naturalistic experimental to 
show that, after the first SBVT ad aired, independent voters reduced their “enthusiastic 
support” for Kerry by 13%, from 42% to 29%. Furthermore, those “most likely” to 
support Kerry reduced their support from 37% to 10%, and the percentage of those who 
were “not sure” about Kerry rose from 0% to 28%. After the first SBVT ad, Kerry never 
regained his losses among independent voters. During the same period (i.e., from August 
1, 2004 to August, 25, 2004), a USA Today/CNN/Gallup poll revealed that Bush 
widened his lead over Kerry on several issue and image competencies: Iraq, terrorism, 
leadership, and capacity to be commander in chief (in Lawrence, 2004). Lawrence (2004) 
speculated that, “the encouraging signs for Bush came as Kerry's Vietnam War record 
was under attack by Swift Boat Veterans for Truth (SBVT). The attacks appear to have 
contributed to the slippage in Kerry's status on national security issues” (p. 6A). Not 
since the Willie Horton attack advertisements of the 1988 presidential campaign has an 
independently sponsored advertisement been so influential (Farhi, 2004).  
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Even when they violate normative standard of political discourse, PSG attacks have 
the potential to be uniquely effective. Given the anecdotal, logical and empirical 
evidence, it seems reasonable to posit that PSG extreme attack advertising works.  
H6a: Compared to no political attack advertising, PSG-sponsored political 
attack advertising elicits a more favorable evaluation of the implied 
beneficiary. 
H6b: Compared to no political attack advertising, PSG-sponsored political 
attack advertising elicits a greater intention to vote for the implied 
beneficiary.  
H6c: Compared to no political attack advertising, PSG-sponsored political 
attack advertising elicits a less favorable evaluation of the targeted 
candidate. 
H6d: Compared to no political attack advertising, PSG-sponsored political 
attack advertising elicits a lesser intention to vote for the targeted 
candidate. 
The Influence of Extreme Attack Advertising on Democratic Attitudes 
Attack advertising’s influence on democratic attitudes is hotly debated. Some 
advance a demobilization hypothesis, which posits that exposure to political attack 
messages elicits political inefficacy and less democratic participation (Ansolabehere & 
Iyengar, 1995; Ansolabehere, et al., 1999; Ansolabehere, et al., 1994b). Others promote a 
mobilization hypothesis, which posits that attack advertising induces greater issue 
knowledge, better attitudes toward democracy and more democratic participation (Finkel 
& Geer, 1998; Franz, et al., 2008; Geer & Lau, 1998; Geer, 2000, 2008; Goldstein & 
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Freedman, 2002). Representatives from both positions have generated volumes of 
competing scholarship; however, there is one point on which the two camps agree. The 
most extreme forms of negativity are demobilizing (Geer, 2008; K. F. Kahn & Kenney, 
1999). Even Geer (2008), who is one of the most passionate defenders of negativity, 
admitted that, “if a candidate gets into such fierce name-calling that the debate 
degenerates into a pointless exchange, then perhaps negativity does the damage its 
detractors fear” (p. 17). 
Indeed, existing research supports the claims that extreme negativity is 
demobilizing. With correlation-based data, Wattenberg and Brians (1999) demonstrated 
that complaints of extreme campaign negativity (i.e., mudslinging) predicted declines in 
voting behavior. The mean spiritedness of one-sided attack messages infects attitudes 
about the entire democratic process. Pinkleton (2002) examined the relative influence of 
three levels of negativity (i.e., pure negative, comparative and no negativity) on 
democratic attitudes. Exposure to more negative advertisements reduced the perceived 
utility of advertising, and it increased negativism toward campaigns. K.F. Kahn and 
Kenny (1999) found that campaigns characterized by mudslinging predicted more 
unfavorable attitudes towards democracy and lower levels of turnout. Mutz and Reeves 
(2005) revealed that, compared to a civil televised debate, the combination of verbal and 
semiotic (i.e., intimate camera angles) incivility predicted less trust in politicians, 
Congress and the entire democratic system. Using newspaper reports of campaign 
negativity, Lau and Pomper (2001) found a curvilinear relationship between levels of 
negativity and voter turnout; meaning moderate to low levels of negativity increased 
turnout, and high levels reduced it.   
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The most extreme attacks may be driving the debate concerning negativity’s 
deleterious influence on democratic attitudes (K. F. Kahn & Kenney, 1999; Lau & 
Pomper, 2001; Mutz & Reeves, 2005; Wattenberg & Brians, 1999). In other words, some 
forms of negativity might facilitate democratic engagement, while others depress it. 
Similarly, some forms of competition may inspire ambition, while others frustrate it. 
Much of the controversy surrounding the influence of attack advertising on democratic 
attitudes might be a product of failing to appropriately designate those tactics that 
mobilize voters versus those tactics that demobilize them (Dardis, Shen, & Edwards, 
2008). Candidates who combine video-mediated incivility with one-sided personal 
attacks sully their own campaign, their target and the entire political system. The 
electorate looks to politics and politicians to address those problems that inhibit their 
health, liberty or happiness (Jamieson, 1992; Patterson, 1993), but when politicians use 
extreme attack advertising to pursue their aims, the electorate loses interest or simply 
becomes hostile to the entire political process (K. F. Kahn & Kenney, 1999; Mutz, 2004; 
Mutz, 2007; Mutz & Reeves, 2005). Based on this reasoning and voluminous research, 
this dissertation posits that candidate-sponsored negativity demobilizes the electorate.  
H7a: Compared to no political attack advertising, candidate-sponsored 
political attack advertising elicits less democratic political efficacy.  
H7b: Compared to no political attack advertising, candidate-sponsored 
political attack advertising elicits less trust of American government.  
The influence of PSG-sponsored is more difficult to predict. The 2004 
presidential election witnessed an explosion of PSG activity (Franz, et al., 2008; 
opensecrets.org), and yet, political engagement did not appear to suffer. American 
National Election Survey (ANES) data from 2000 and 2004 shows that the percentage of 
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Americans who voted increased by 3%, from 74% in 2000 to 77% in 2004. The 2008 
race witnessed a similar level of both PSG activity and extreme negativity, and again, 
turnout did not suffer substantially. In fact, it was greater than in 2004 (Richardson, 
2006). Nevertheless, it is possible the effects of PSG-sponsored extreme negativity may 
have been concealed by other factors unique to both the 2004 and 2008 campaigns. One 
such confound may have been the extensive get-out-the-vote effort by groups like 
America Coming Together in 2004 (Federal Election Commission, 2007a). Another may 
have been the historic nature of the 2008 race. It offered the first black presidential 
nominee, the first female Republican vice-presidential candidate and a very dramatic 
Democratic primary fight.  
The extant findings provide equivocal guidance (S. An, et al., 2006; Pfau, et al., 
2002). S. An et al. (2006) found that exposure to third-party issue advertisements 
predicted greater levels of voter knowledge and turnout, but that study did not delineate 
the effects of negative versus positive issue advertising. Nor did it distinguish the 
influence of coordinated versus uncoordinated interest groups. In addition, Pfau et al., 
(2002) did not find a demobilizing effect for pre-BCRA soft-money-sponsored traditional 
(i.e., not extreme) attack ads. Ultimately, the extant research concerning the normative 
influence of third-party ads is equivocal. The absence of clear precedent cannot justify a 
prediction; therefore, this study posits a set of research questions.  
RQ2a: Compared to no attack advertising, what is the influence of PSG-
sponsored political attack advertising on democratic political efficacy? 
RQ2b: Compared to no attack advertising, what is the influence of PSG-
sponsored political attack advertising on trust in American government? 
 





Geer (2008) concluded that political attacks are a staple of American politics. 
America launched its Revolutionary War with a Declaration of Independence that 
rhetorically indicted the British Parliament and its King. Indeed, the Declaration may 
have been America’s first political attack advertisement. More followed. Americans so 
cherished their right to make political attacks that Federalist sponsorship of the 1798 
Sedition Act may have lost John Adams the presidency in 1800. The Sedition Act 
officially outlawed the “writing, printing, uttering or publishing any false, scandalous and 
malicious writing or writings against the government of the United States” (United States 
Congress, 1798, ¶ 2), but it did little to deter the vituperative rhetoric of the 1800 
presidential campaign. Boller (2004) reported that, “on both sides, handbills, pamphlets, 
and articles in party newspapers denounced, disparaged, damned, decried, denigrated, 
and declaimed” (p. 8). By today’s standards, those attacks seem apocalyptic. Jefferson 
was accused of being dead, and Adams was charged with importing the services of 
prostitutes from England! Jamieson (1992) observed that American politics has always 
been infused with hyperbolic, misleading and false political attacks. Even one of 
America’s greatest presidents – Abraham Lincoln – was attacked for his alleged pride, 
covetousness, lust, sloth, lunacy and hypocrisy. American political discourse has always 
been nasty and brutish. Now, political attack advertising makes it short. To be exact, 
contemporary political attacks are high-fidelity, 30-second sound-bites. Ansolabehere and 
Iyengar (1995) observed that, “television makes negativity more pervasive and 
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pernicious. Television spreads political messages much more quickly and much more 
widely than was ever possible with pamphlets, newspapers, or speeches” (p. 90).  
Television dominates, but it is not the exclusive medium for communicating 
political attacks. Quinn and Kivijarv (2005) reported that 2004 political media purchases 
were spread across nine categories of advertising and marketing communications, 
including broadcast television, cable television, radio, newspapers, the Internet, outdoor, 
magazines, direct mail and public relations/promotions. In 2004, television remained the 
primary vehicle for political advertising, but “spending on newspapers more than 
doubled…to $61.3 million compared to 2000 expenditures” (p. 136). Astonishingly, $2.6 
billion was spent on political advertising in 2008 (Seelye, 2008). Like 2004, that 
spending benefited a potpourri of media sectors (Stilson, 2007), including traditional 
forms of print advertising. Given this expanding diversification of political media buying, 
it behooves researchers to investigate the role that medium plays in the process of 
advertising effects. Kaid (1981) lamented that medium is a too little studied variable in 
political advertising effects research. This study may be the first to compare the influence 
of print versus video attack advertising. As such, it bases its predictions on medium 
theory (Meyrowitz, 1994) and the relatively small body of empirical medium effects 
literature (Andreoli & Worchel, 1978; Burns & Beier, 1973; Chaiken & Eagly, 1976, 
1983; A. A. Cohen, 1976; Keating & Latane, 1976; Pfau, 1990; Wilke, 1934; Worchel, et 
al., 1975).  
Medium theory asks “how do the particular characteristics of a medium make it 
physically, psychologically, and socially different from other media and from face to face 
interaction, regardless of the messages that are communicated through it” (Meyrowitz, 
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1994, p. 50). Medium theory posits that media are epistemic, which is to say that 
different media foster different ways of knowing (Chesebro, 1984; McLuhan, 1964: 
Meyrowitz, 1994; Ong, 1982; Postman, 1985). This is what McLuhan (1967) meant when 
he said that “the medium is the message” (p. 7). Chesebro (1984) proposed that media 
determine “what can be known and the way in which that knowledge is to be evaluated” 
(p. 116). In short, media foreground some modes of perception, while they background 
others. McLuhan (1995) posited that media “transform every sense ratio and thus 
recondition and restructure all our values and institutions” (p. 248).  
The epistemic media hypothesis is partially supported by investigations of transfer 
appropriate processing (Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 1977). Leshner and Coyle (2000) 
found conclusive evidence that conceptually-driven processing of television news is 
associated with implicit memory. They also found that data-driven processing of the 
news did not produce definitive results for explicit memory. Television appears to 
privilege conceptually-driven information processing. In other words, audio-visual media 
foreground conceptual information, as evidence by better performance on tests that 
measure outcomes associated with that form of processing.   
This study also compared the epistemic qualities and consequences of print versus 
video attack advertising. Because video effectively mimics interpersonal interaction 
(Caughy, 1984; Hart, 1999; Horton & Wohl, 1956; Meyrowitz, 1982), it has been shown 
to persuade through source considerations (Andreoli & Worchel, 1978; Beninger, 1987; 
Pfau, 1990; Pfau, et al., 2000; Worchel, et al., 1975). Video also influences the affective 
dimension of attitudes through emotionally evocative music (J. I. Alpert & Alpert, 1989; 
M. I. Alpert, Alpert, & Maltz, 2005; Bruner, 1990; Gorn, 1982; Oakes, 2007) and visuals 
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(Brader, 2005, 2006; Gross & Levinson, 1995; Elaine Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 
1994; Nabi, 2003).  Print, on the other hand, foregrounds semantic information 
(McLuhan, 1995; Ong, 1982; Schwartz, 1973), which enhances the persuasiveness of 
message content (Chaiken & Eagly, 1976; Petty & Wegener, 1998; Pfau, 1990). 
Ultimately, video is multi-modal. Print is uni-modal. Video provides a greater magnitude 
and variety of information about a depicted attitude object. Compared to print, video is 
multi-modal, more dynamic and closer to the life-world. In short, is more like real 
experience. 
The realism of video may make it more persuasive than print. Fazio and Zanna 
(1981) reported that direct experience, “make[s] more information…available to the 
individual than an indirect experience” (p. 186). As a form of direct experience, 
therefore, attitudes derived from video-mediated experience may be both stronger and 
more behaviorally consistent than those antecedent in print-mediated persuasion (Fazio & 
Zanna, 1978a; K. U. Millar & Tesser, 1989; M. G. Millar & Millar, 1996; Regan & 
Fazio, 1977). This dissertation posits that video political attack advertisements are source 
oriented, affective and directly experiential, whereas print political attack advertisements 
are message oriented, cognitive and indirectly experiential. Most comparisons of video 
and print-mediated persuasion conclude that the two media are equally persuasive; 
however their reliance on measures of attitude extremity may conceal real differences. In 
contrast, this comparison uses a dimensionalized operationalization of attitude, which 
might detect video political attack advertising’s relatively greater influence, in terms of 
source considerations, affect, attitude strength and attitude-behavior consistency.  
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Source versus Content Considerations in Video versus Print Attack Advertising 
Meyrowitz (1985) reasoned that any medium “can be analyzed in relation to those 
personal characteristics it transmits and those it restricts” (p. 273). When print and video 
are analyzed according to this principle, television transmits more personal information 
than video. Horton and Wohl (1956) observed that television, “makes available nuances 
of appearance and gesture to which ordinary social perception is attentive and to which 
interaction is cued” (p. 215). Some have argued that television presents an alternative 
social world, which is governed by many of the same principles of interpersonal 
influence that have been demonstrated in the orthosocial world of face-to-face 
communication (Beninger, 1987; Caughy, 1984; Meyrowitz, 1982, 1992; Schwartz, 
1973). Indeed, research consistently shows that source factors play an important role in 
the process of video-mediated influence (Keating & Latane, 1976; Pfau, 1990; Pfau, et 
al., 2000; Worchel, et al.). In recognition of this reality, the sponsors of political attack 
advertising often feature attractive or credible spokespersons in their ads (Jamieson, 
1992; West, 2004). This dissertation posits that, regardless of sponsor, video attack 
advertising exercises its influence through source considerations. Print advertisements, on 
the other hand, exercise their influence through message considerations.  
The influence of medium on communication outcomes is one of the oldest issues 
in communication studies (Allport, 1941; Andreoli & Worchel, 1978; Burns & Beier, 
1973; Chaiken & Eagly, 1976, 1983; McGinnies, 1965; Pfau, 1990; Pfau, et al., 2000; 
Wilke, 1934). Unfortunately, the earliest of these studies produced findings that were 
mutually contradictory (Allport, 1941; McGinnies, 1965; Wilke, 1934). While holding 
message factors constant, Wilke (1934) compared the influence of three media: a live 
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public speaker, a loudspeaker and print. Averaged across four message topics, the most 
persuasive medium was the live speaker, then the loud speaker, and the least persuasive 
medium was the disembodied print message. Wilke reasoned that experientially richer 
media are inherently more persuasive than less experientially rich media; however, other 
studies contradicted Wilke’s conclusion. McGinnies (1965) exposed participants to a 
print and audio version of Adlai Stevenson’s 1962 speech before the United Nations 
advocating a U.S. naval blockade of Cuba. The printed version proved to be more 
persuasive than the audio version. Allport (1941) compared the influence of a speech 
delivered in person versus the same speech delivered via loudspeaker. Astonishingly, 
results showed that the two versions were equally convincing. That finding contradicted 
both Wilke (1934) and McGinnies (1965). At first glance, these results seem inconsistent, 
but a closer look reveals the predictable influence of source factors.  
Media interact with source, such that highly credible sources are more persuasive 
via experientially rich media than experientially poor media (Andreoli & Worchel, 1978; 
Chaiken & Eagly, 1983; Pfau & Burgoon, 1990). Andreoli and Worchel (1978) found 
that a video message was most effective with a trustworthy source and least effective 
with an untrustworthy source. Chaiken and Eagly’s (1983) compared the influence of 
likeable and unlikable sources that delivered an identical message by print, radio or 
video. The video-mediated message was most persuasive with a likeable source and least 
persuasive with an unlikable source. Pfau (1990) used a receiver perspective to compare 
the mediating role of source factors across five media: print, audio, video, public address 
and interpersonal interaction. Although the media variable did not influence message 
effectiveness, perceptions of source credibility and relational communication mediated 
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the persuasiveness of interpersonal and video messages, whereas message content 
mediated the persuasiveness of the radio, print and public address messages. Pfau (1990) 
concluded that, “television, like interpersonal communication, elevates person variables 
in the process of influence” (p. 209). In other words, source factors interact with media 
such that highly attractive or credible sources are more persuasive in experientially rich 
media, and unattractive or incredible sources are less persuasive.   
Given that interaction, the contradictions between Wilke (1934), Allport (1941) 
and McGinnies’ (1965) can be explained by the confounding influence of source factors 
in studies of medium effects. The source of Wilke’s (1934) persuasive messages was 
himself, and his participants were his own students. Since they probably considered him 
to be credible, it can be inferred that the live speaker’s persuasiveness was driven by his 
own credibility. McGinnies’ (1965) findings also warrant revision. His subjects were 
Japanese students and the source was a high-ranking American diplomat. If the American 
was considered unlikeable, it makes sense the audio message was less persuasive than the 
printed message. Given that WWII was still in recent memory, the American source may 
have been perceived as less likeable. Interestingly, Allport’s (1941) findings may have 
been the only one among these three that was not confounded by source. His source was 
introduced as a “public speaker”. Because the source was not presented as particularly 
likeable, expert or trustworthy, it may have had the same effect as holding source 
constant across the media variables, which again confirms that source drives the 
influence of video on evaluative outcomes.   
Nowhere is the interaction between source and media more evident than in the 
political domain. The recent emphasis on candidate personality in American presidential 
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campaigns may be antecedent the rise of televised politics. The Pew Center reported that 
television is the most popular media for political information (Pew Research Center for 
the People and the Press, 2006). Hart (1999) blamed television for the recent rise in 
image-oriented presidential campaigns. Television transports presidential candidates into 
the electorate’s collective living room, which confounds the evaluation of a politician’s 
issue positions with his/her suitability as a house guest (Postman, 1985). Schwartz (1973) 
observed that, in the television age, voters evaluate politicians by how they make them 
feel. The electorate is both less able and less inclined to use the standards of reason and 
logic (Postman, 1985). After extensively studying the rhetoric of Ronald Reagan, Reid-
Gold (1988) concluded that television’s fidelity to interpersonal interaction empowered 
the 40th President to mollify his ideological enemies with genuine sincerity, a compelling 
sense of humor and an honestly felt patriotism. Jamieson (1988) observed that Reagan 
spoke in television’s natural language, meaning that he understood how to manifest 
abstract ideas in concrete narratives that resonate with the lives of everyday people. Even 
when Reagan failed to change people’s minds, he often changed their hearts, which in 
many cases was enough to change their votes (Lowi, 1985). 
Recent research has confirmed the position that television elevates the electoral 
relevance of candidate traits. Across six presidential elections (1964 – 1986), Keeter 
(1987) found that, compared to voters who relied on printed political information, voters 
who relied on television were more likely to base their vote preferences on a presidential 
candidate’s personality than on his policy positions. Keeter concluded that, “television 
has played a role in the gradual personalizing of American presidential elections” (p. 
354). Cho (2005) used 2000 NES data to draw similar conclusions about the relationship 
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between television, personality and presidential vote choice. Television changes the way 
Americans know their presidential candidates, meaning it changes how the public 
evaluates their competency for the office.  In other words, compared to print, television 
places greater emphasis on source considerations.    
Given the overwhelming evidence that television foregrounds source factors, it is 
reasonable to posit that televised attack advertising foregrounds both the relational and 
the credibility dimensions of the persona whom it features (Andreoli & Worchel, 1978; 
Chaiken & Eagly, 1983; Pfau, 1990). Television is perceived as an alternative social 
world (Caughy, 1984; Meyrowitz, 1982). When confronted with televised politicians, 
audiences respond experientially, as if they were engaged in a live conversation of 
gestures (Hart, 1999; Jamieson, 1988; Reid-Gold, 1988; Schwartz, 1973). Horton and 
Wohl (1956) speculated that, on television, “the most remote and illustrious men are met 
as if they were in the circle of one's peers” (p. 215). Nimmo (1974) observed that 
politicians garner votes by intentionally fostering pseudo-friendships with the viewing 
electorate. Empirical research also shows that television reinforces a candidate-trait 
orientation among the electorate (Cho, 2005; Keeter, 1987). Given both theory and 
research, it is reasonable to posit that televised political attack advertising exercises its 
influence through source factors and print advertising exercises its influence through 
content considerations.  
H8a: Evaluation of the sponsor’s credibility intervenes in the relationship 
between video- mediated political attack advertising and intention to vote 
for the targeted candidate.   
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H8b: Evaluation of the sponsor’s relational communication intervenes in 
the relationship between video-mediated political attack advertising and 
intention to vote for the targeted candidate.   
H8c: Argument evaluation intervenes in the relationship between print-
mediated political attack advertising and intention to vote for the targeted 
candidate.   
Affective and Cognitive Factors in Video versus Print Attack Advertising 
Video’s multi-modality elicits greater affect than print, and it does so more 
directly. Attitudes are demonstrably composed of cognitive, affective, behavioral 
(Breckler, 1984; Eagly & Chaiken, 1998; Rosenburg & Hovland, 1960) and strength 
related dimensions (Fazio & Zanna, 1981; Krosnick & Abelson, 1991; Krosnick, et al., 
1993), but existing comparisons of print and video-mediated persuasion have primarily 
employed measures of attitude extremity or simple valence (Allport, 1941; Chaiken & 
Eagly, 1983; McGinnies, 1965; Pfau, 1990; Wilke, 1934; Worchel, et al., 1975). This 
dissertation posits that video and printed political advertising differ on their capacity to 
elicit emotional responses to the candidates. Video naturally conveys human facial affect, 
which invokes emotional contagion (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1992; Hsee, 
Hatfield, & Chemtob, 1991). By sharing the emotions of televised others, one also comes 
to share their affective responses to various attitude objects. The process of assuming the 
attitude of the other is the fundamental process out of which mind, self and society arise 
(Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Mead, 1962).  
Parasocial interaction is the simulacrum of face-to-face communication with 
televised persona (Horton & Wohl, 1956). As such, it compels the same active role-
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taking behavior one experiences in live interpersonal communication. Horton and Wohl 
(1956) observed that parasocial interaction invites the audience to “make appropriate 
responses which are complementary to those of the persona” (p. 219). Berger and 
Luckmann (1966) observed that face-to-face interaction compels participation in 
another’s subjective attitude toward various attitude objects, including the self. Mead 
(1962) reasoned that significant human communication is an active process of taking the 
role of another towards one’s self. Meyrowitz (2005) speculated that “our sense of self is 
changed, as we gain new significant others – live or mediated – from whose vantage 
points we can view our own actions” (p. 11). This process of actively assuming the role 
of televised others was demonstrated by Caughy (1984), whose respondents reported 
evaluating their own lives from the perspective of their favorite television “friends”. The 
process of taking the role of the other is further facilitated by television’s capacity to 
entice pre-reflective affective sharing with televised others. Even through the glass of 
television’s window, the evident attitude of others, as expressed in their nonverbal 
behavior, compels participation in a form of emotional responding (Caughy, 1984; 
Hatfield, et al., 1992; Hsee, Hatfield, Carlson, & Chemtob, 1990). 
It is well established that humans pre-reflectively catch one another’s emotions 
(Hatfield et al., 1992, 1994). Berger and Luckman (1966) proposed that the earliest 
human communication was mediated by facial expressions and other nonverbal 
behaviors. This primitive pre-reflective exchange of affective subjectivity remains a vital 
component of human communication. Hatfield and colleagues (1992) reviewed a body of 
research demonstrating the persistence of primitive emotional contagion, which is the 
“tendency to automatically mimic and synchronize facial expressions, vocalizations, 
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postures, and movements with those of another person” (pp. 153-154). Emotional 
contagion is particularly amplified by television, which uses close up camera angles to 
situate viewers at intimate distances from the emotional displays of actors and media 
figures (Meyrowitz, 1982). Exposure to video-mediated facial affect is associated with 
congruent shifts in experienced affect within he audience (Dimberg, Thunberg, & 
Elmehed, 2000; Hsee, et al., 1990; Hsee, et al., 1991; McHugo, Lanzetta, Sullivan, 
Masters, & Englis, 1985; Whalen, et al., 1998).  
Emotional contagion is associated with video and photographically mediated 
affect displays. Hsee and colleagues (1990) found that exposure to video-only displays of 
people telling happy stories elicited subtle signs of happiness, whereas sad stories elicited 
subtle signs of sadness. Dimberg (1990) used electromyography (EMG) to show that 
subliminal exposure to happy faces is associated with zygomatic muscle activity 
(smiling), and subliminal exposure to angry faces is associated with corrugator supercilli 
muscle activity (frowning). Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), 
Whalen and colleagues (1998) found that subliminal exposure to fearful faces was 
associated with more amygdala activity than exposure to happy faces.  
Emotional contagion has even been demonstrated with mediated political 
candidates and leaders (Lanzetta, Sullivan, Masters, & McHugo, 1985; McHugo, et al., 
1985). McHugo and colleagues (1985) revealed that exposure to photographic affect 
displays of President Ronald Reagan elicited emotional contagion in Democrats, 
Republicans and Independents; however, Democrats experienced more negative affect in 
response to Reagan’s anger displays and less positive affect in response to his happy 
displays. In other words, party affiliation moderated the magnitude of emotional 
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contagion with Reagan, even if it did not moderate the valence. Even political enemies 
inspire congruent emotion with vivid affect displays. The contagiousness of Reagan’s 
affect displays was evident in both direct self report (McHugo, et al., 1985) and indirect 
EMG measures (McHugo, et al., 1985). By feeling the emotions of political figures and 
others featured in political advertising, viewers are invited to vicariously experience the 
mutual role taking and sharing of subjectivity that resonates with actual face-to-face 
interaction.  
The content and formal conventions of televised political advertising are designed 
to enhance the emotional quality of one’s attitude toward political figures. Jamieson 
(1992) observed that political attack advertising employs several conventions that define 
a grammar of mood, including “quick cuts, use of black and white, dark colors, shadowed 
lighting, stark contrasts, videotape, the voice of a seemingly “neutral” announcer, and 
ominous music” (p. 51). Political practitioners are well aware of television’s unique 
power to bypass reasoning and strike at the electorate’s emotional core (Brader, 2005; 
Gore, 2007; Hart, 1999; Postman, 1985; Westen, 2007). Based on his over 30 years in 
political office, former Vice President Al Gore (2007) speculated that, “the visceral 
vividness portrayed on television triggers instinctual responses similar to those triggered 
by reality itself – and without being modulated by logic, reason, and reflective thought” 
(p. 19). Westen (2007) posited that emotion is the crucial ingredient of all successful 
televised political television advertising (Westen, 2007).  
Elicited affect is a reliable outcome of video exposure (Gross & Levinson, 1995; 
Nabi, 2003; Pfau, Houston, & Semmler, 2007). Gross and Levenson (1995) examined the 
influence of 78 film clips chosen for their thematic and emotional content. Fourteen of 
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the clips reliably induced seven discrete emotional states: amusement, anger, 
contentment, disgust, fear, sadness, surprise and no emotion. For example, a clip from 
The Shining elicited fear, whereas a clip from When Harry Met Sally reliably induced 
amusement. Nabi (2001) used video of animal cruelty to elicit highly arousing and 
unpleasant affect. Video conveys affect. Some studies have shown that video’s aural 
channel is a crucial ingredient of that capacity.  
Commercial advertising uses music to create emotional associations with their 
featured products. Music is an enormously reliable method of instilling affect (Balch, 
Myers, & Papotto, 1999; Sousou, 1997). Sousou (1997) used classical music selections to 
induce both happy and sad mood states. He found that sad music elicited sadness and 
happy music elicited happiness, but sad music was the stronger induction. Balch and 
colleagues (1999) used classical music selections to successfully elicit both emotional 
valence (pleasant/unpleasant) and magnitude (low arousal/high arousal). Alpert and 
Alpert (1989) manipulated the musical background in commercial advertisements. They 
too found that sad music elicited a sad mood better than happy music elicited a happy 
mood, but both conditions were more effective than controls. Even at short durations and 
in the multi-modal environment of commercial advertising, music significantly influences 
affect.  
Evidence also shows that commercial music influences persuasive outcomes, like 
purchase intention (Bruner, 1990; Oakes, 2007). Gorn (1982) posited that the influence of 
commercial music is the product of classical conditioning. He found that products 
associated with pleasant music were chosen at a significantly greater rate than products 
associated with unpleasant music. Alpert and Alpert (1989) found that sad background 
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music was a better predictor of greeting card purchases than happy background music. In 
another study, Alpert and colleagues (2005) revealed that happy music sold celebratory 
greeting cards and sad music sold sympathy cards. Music is a consistent and reliable 
predictor of potentially-biasing affect (Balch, et al., 1999; Sousou, 1997), and when it is 
embedded in the background of commercial advertising, it translates into attitudinal and 
behavioral influence (J. I. Alpert & Alpert, 1989; M. I. Alpert, et al., 2005; Bruner, 1990; 
Gorn, 1982; Oakes, 2007).  
Although music and visuals in political advertising have rarely been studied, 
political commercials regularly recruit both music and evocative visuals to make an 
emotional connection with their targeted candidate(s) (Brader, 2005, 2006; Jamieson, 
1992; Westen, 2007). Brader (2005) posited that political spots are more than just words: 
“They are full of pictures, sound, and music” (p. 4). His content analysis of over 1400 
television ads found that ads invoking fear were more likely to use dark colors and visual 
cues of death, decay and desolation. He further revealed that fearful ads employed 
tense/somber music or discordant sound effects. Brader concluded that the least 
emotionally evocative advertisements were simple talking head appeals, which are the 
kinds of audiovisual presentations typically employed in experimental comparisons of 
video and print (Chaiken & Eagly; Worchel, et al., 1975). Rather, research should 
compare video and print with richer forms of video and print content. Although talking 
head appeals transfer affect through facial cues, their focus on semantic information 
draws them too close to print for adequate comparisons with video, which is 
experientially richer.  
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Print’s emphasis on semantic information limits its ability to convey affect, while 
video heightens the role of affect. Print asks “is it true?”, but video asks, “how does it 
feel?” (Schwartz, 1973).  McLuhan (1995) observed that print instills a dispassionate, 
reflective and detached outlook. Indeed, the ability to control one’s emotional reactions is 
a form of discipline fostered by reading. Postman (2001) posited that reading is content-
focused, serious and rational. Gore (2007) praised print for its logic, reason and ability to 
induce reflection. He lamented television’s “visceral vividness…[and]…capacity to 
trigger instinctual responses” (p. 19). Pfau et al. (2007) found that self-reported exposure 
to televised presidential campaign advertisements predicted greater affect toward those 
candidates. Krugman (1971) demonstrated that television and print are associated with 
distinct mental processes. He argued that television activates the right hemisphere of the 
brain, which is more emotional (Krugman, 1980). Appel, Weinstein and Weinstein 
(1979) provided additional evidence for Krugman’s argument. They explained that 
television viewing begins as a left-brain activity, but it quickly shifts to the right brain. In 
summary, substantial amounts of empirical evidence shows that video elicits affective 
responses (M. I. Alpert, et al., 2005; Brader, 2005; Gorn, 1982; Gross & Levinson, 1995; 
Hatfield, et al., 1992; Hsee, et al., 1990). Therefore, it seems reasonable to posit that 
video attack advertising elicits more extreme affective responses than print attack 
advertising.  
H9a: Compared to exposure to print-mediated attack advertising, video-
mediated attack advertising elicits greater positive affect toward the 
supported candidate.   
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H9b: Compared to exposure to print-mediated attack advertising, video-
mediated attack advertising elicits greater negative affect toward the 
targeted candidate.  
The Experiential Qualities of Print versus Video Attack Advertising 
The conditions under which an attitude is formed influence its strength and its 
relationship to consistent behavior (Fazio & Zanna, 1978a; K. U. Millar & Tesser, 1989; 
Regan & Fazio, 1977). Regan and Fazio (1977) summarized the important role of attitude 
strength:  
This implies that two individuals having the same attitude, as determined 
by conventional measures, may differ considerably in the degree to which 
they will act consistently with the attitude. The person whose attitude is a 
product of direct interaction with the attitude object will be more likely, in 
general, to behave consistently with that attitude than someone whose 
attitude was formed in a less direct manner. (p. 31) 
Attitudes formed under conditions of direct experience are composed of more 
information than attitudes formed under indirect experience. Because video contains 
more information than print (i.e., more visual, more musical and equivalent semantic 
information), it provides a more direct experience than print. Therefore, video elicits 
greater levels of attitude strength (Fazio & Zanna, 1978a, 1978d, 1981; Regan & Fazio, 
1977) and attitude-behavior consistency (Fazio & Zanna, 1981; K. U. Millar & Tesser, 
1989; Regan & Beverley, 1978).  
Direct and indirect experiences represent opposite poles on a common continuum 
of experiential quality, in which one pole is designated a direct experience and the other 
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pole is designated as an indirect experience (Fazio & Zanna, 1981; Regan & Fazio, 
1977). The most basic distinction between direct and indirect experience is the amount 
senses employed in the experience. A directly experienced object demands the attention 
of the entire range of senses. An indirectly experienced object may invoke only one 
sense. Like the directness of experience, media technology can be distinguished by the 
number of senses they extend (McLuhan, 1967). Because video excites more senses, it is 
more directly experiential than print.  
The fidelity of audio-visual media technology is apparent in the reactions of those 
encountering it for the first time. In the early days of film, American and European 
audiences were often overwhelmed by the “train effect”, which was the “anxious or 
panicky reaction to films of approaching vehicles” (Bottomore, 1999, p. 177). Audiences 
often flinched, gasped, screamed, fainted or even panicked at the filmic approach of 
trains or horses. Bottamore explained that the train effect was the product of a 
psychological phenomena called looming - a reflexively evasive reaction to objects in 
one’s field of vision that appear to rapidly grow, as though they were a quickly 
approaching danger (Regan & Beverley, 1978). Conscious awareness of a film’s fictional 
quality can obviate the looming response, but even in fictional depictions, the looming 
response can be excited by surprising events. Horror films often exploit the looming 
response by directing the audience’s attention to one scenic location, while a menacing 
force surprisingly bursts into the action from another location. The atomic explosion in 
the Daisy Ad may have invoked a similar reaction. The capacity to trick the mind into 
suspending its disbelief is a knack that print cannot easily accomplish. Gore (2007) 
observed that, “the simulation of reality accomplished in the television medium 
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is…astonishingly vivid and compelling compared with the representations of reality 
conveyed by printed words” (p. 19).  
Print is an abstract experience, and video is a concrete experience. The former is 
indirect. The latter is direct. Meyrowitz (1994) observed that television transforms the 
word into a sensory event that competes “with abstract print knowledge” (p. 58). As a 
concrete medium, television organizes reality with material or tangible objects. 
Alternatively, print represents reality abstractly, meaning it accomplishes communication 
without reference to a particular example or object. Saussure (1959) vividly articulated 
the separation between print and reality. He observed that language is an indirect form of 
experience. The signifier is merely an arbitrary empirical sign pointing toward something 
concrete. It is three steps removed from experience. The signified is two steps removed 
from experience. It is the mental picture conjured by the signifier. At the final step, the 
signifier and the signified meet concrete experience at the level of the referent: the 
tangible object to which a single word refers. Television bypasses the signified by 
collapsing the signifier into the referent (Olson, 1988). Williamson (1978) reasoned that 
televised advertising conveys the impression that “an advertisement is simply a 
transparent vehicle for the ‘message’ behind it” (p. 17). Whereas print’s manufactured 
quality is evident in its straight lines and uniformity, the televised experience is 
comparatively natural. Schwarz (1973) observed that, “many of our experiences with 
electronic media are coded and stored in the same way they are perceived. Since they do 
not undergo a symbolic transformation, the original experience is more directly 
available” (p. 25).  
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Concrete experiences predict both stronger and more behaviorally consistent 
attitudes than abstract/ representational experiences (Fazio & Zanna, 1978a; Regan & 
Fazio, 1977). Regan and Fazio (1977) found that students who directly experienced a 
college housing shortage demonstrated more attitude-consistent behaviors regarding 
housing policy than students who merely heard about the shortage second hand. The two 
groups held similar attitudes, but the direct experience group was more willing to sign a 
petition and organize to support their attitude. In a similar study, Fazio and Zanna 
(1978a) compared students who had actually participated in psychological research to 
students who had no such experience. The experienced participants who positively 
evaluated research participation were more willing to volunteer for a future research 
project than the inexperienced participants who negatively evaluated research 
participation. The housing and research participation paradigms provide convincing 
evidence that direct experience predicts attitude-behavior consistency, but the inability of 
either study to randomly assign subjects mitigates the certainty of their findings (Regan 
& Fazio, 1977). Fazio and Zanna (1977) resolved the problem of random assignment 
with an experiential research paradigm using a set of intellectual puzzles. Rather than 
employing existing experiences, the researchers contrived an indirect and direct 
experience condition with a set of intellectual puzzles. Direct experience participants 
were given the chance to directly work the puzzles, whereas indirect experience 
participants merely reviewed puzzles that were already solved. After evaluating the 
puzzles, participants were given a chance to “play” with the puzzles. Compared to 
indirect participants, direct experience participants were more likely to play with the 
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puzzles they evaluated most highly. Direct experience participants also played with their 
preferred puzzles for a longer period of time than indirect experience participants.  
Fazio and Zanna (1978b, 1978c, 1981) reasoned that direct experiences influence 
attitude-behavior consistency through attitude strength. Both the contrived (i.e., puzzles) 
and existing experience (i.e., housing shortage and research participation) paradigms 
demonstrated that direct experience predicts stronger attitudes than indirect experience 
(Fazio & Zanna, 1978a). More specifically, direct experience predicts attitude that are 
held with greater certainty and confidence (Fazio & Zanna, 1978a, 1981). Fazio and 
Zanna (1978a) further demonstrated that attitude strength mediated the relationships 
between direct experience and attitude-behavior consistency. Fazio and Zanna (1981) 
argued that direct experience’s attitude strengthening affect on attitudes might be due to 
the greater magnitude of information provided by a direct experience and the greater 
attitude accessibility that affords. They cited research by Fazio and Chen (in Fazio & 
Zanna, 1981) that corroborated their reasoning. Extant research empirically supports the 
conclusion that providing copious information about an attitude object increase attitude 
accessibility, strength and behavioral consistency.  
If video political attack advertising provides a more direct experience than print 
political attack advertising, it too should predict stronger and greater attitude-behavior 
consistency. Fazio, Zanna and Cooper (1978) found that a video-mediated task produced 
more attitude-behavior consistency when the task was combined with affective empathy 
for the person who was depicted performing the task. Given televised political attack 
advertising’s ability to convey affect (Brader; Gore, 2007; Jamieson, 1992; Westen, 
2007), it might operate like the direct experience in Fazio et al. (1978). Furthermore, the 
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accumulation of reviewed findings and theorizing suggests that televised political attack 
advertising is a more direct experience than print political attack advertising. Compared 
to print, television provides a more concrete (Meyrowitz, 1994), natural (Schwartz, 1973) 
and affective (Gore, 2007; Postman, 2001) experience. Television provides more 
information about an attitude object than print does, and the information that television 
provided is more dynamic. Jamieson reasoned that television’s power is Svengalian; it 
reconstitutes “’reality’ in ways that heighten the power of the visceral appeal” (p. 10). 
Therefore, it is reasonable to posit that, compared to print-mediated political attack 
advertising, exposure to video-mediated political attack advertising provides a more 
direct experience, which elicits greater attitude-behavior consistency.  
H10a: Compared to print-mediated political attack advertising, video-
mediated political attack advertising elicits greater attitude-behavior 
consistency with respect to evaluation of the initially supported candidate 
and vote intention. 
H10b: Compared to print-mediated political attack advertising, video-
mediated political attack advertising elicits greater attitude-behavior 
consistency with respect to evaluation of the initially opposed candidate 











 Studies of mass communication have often invited the fallacious inference that 
media influence is uniform (see Gerbner & Gross, 1976). The hypodermic model of 
media effects was conventional wisdom until the 1960’s (Martin, 1976), when it became 
clear to just about everyone that mass communication effects are highly conditioned by 
individual differences (Klapper, 1960; McGuire, 1986; McLeod & Reeves, 1980). For 
many researchers, however, that realization had come much sooner. The Payne Fund 
studies found that movies influenced “different children in different ways” (in McDonald, 
2004, p.  186). Cantril’s famous study of public reactions to Orson Welles’ radio 
broadcast of The War of Worlds found that those who were more suggestible, fatalistic 
and uncritical were the most likely to panic (in McDonald, 2004). McLeod and Reeves 
(1980) argued that mass media effects are contingent upon the situation and 
characteristics of individual receivers. Now, receiver variables are a common factor in 
mass media effects research (Laswell, 1948; McGuire, 1969; Petty & Wegener, 1998).  
Concern with the contingent effects of individual characteristics is especially 
evident in studies of political communication effects (Martin, 1976). Correlation-based 
investigations of political advertising’s influence fastidiously track and control receiver 
differences (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; Ansolabehere, et al., 1999; Franz, et al., 
2008; Goldstein & Freedman, 2002; Lau & Pomper, 2004), and experimental 
investigations use random assignment to wash out idiosyncratic receiver influences 
(Keppel & Wickens, 2004). In other situations, receiver influences may actually drive 
political advertising’s effects. In fact, it can be illuminating to treat receiver differences 
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as an independent factor. For example, strength of partisan identification can be an 
influential conditional factor of political communication effects (Bartels, 2000; Berelson, 
et al., 1954; Campbell, et al., 1960; Popkin, 1994). This chapter reviews the conditioning 
effect of political partisanship on attack advertising effects. This chapter also discusses 
using college students as a subject population. Researchers have questioned the validity 
of using this population (see Pinkleton, 1997, 1998); however, those concerns may be 
unwarranted (Berkowitz & Donnerstein, 1982; Greenberg, 1987).  
Political Partisanship 
 Political partisanship is an important force in American politics (Patterson, 2002). 
It influences who turns out to vote and for whom they vote (Bartels, 2000; Berelson, et 
al., 1954; Campbell, et al., 1960; Popkin, 1994). Berelson and colleagues’ (1954) study of 
the 1948 election was one of the first to find that partisan loyalties predicted voter 
preferences. Campbell et al. (1960) concluded that partisanship shapes voter’s attitudes 
toward the candidates and issues in any given election. Forty years later, Bartels (2000) 
restated the importance of partisanship to presidential voting behavior. He revealed that, 
from 1956 to 1996, about 75% of the voting public identified themselves as strong 
partisans. Patterson (2002) observed that partisanship influences democratic behavior. 
Popkin (1994) extended Down’s (1957) explanation that partisanship reduces the costs of 
voting by reducing the informational burdens of vote choice. Given partisanship’s 
powerful and independent influence on democratic behaviors and decision-making, any 
evaluation of political attack advertising should either control for partisanship or directly 
manipulate its influence.  
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Political partisanship is an important moderator of political attack advertising 
effects (Kaid, 1981). Basil, Schooler and Reeves (1991) statistically removed the 
influence of partisanship from their experimental evaluation of attack advertising effects. 
Matthews and Dietz-Uhler (1998) revealed a greater backlash against political attack 
advertising when the sponsor and viewer shared the same political party affiliation. The 
attacks may have been perceived as a norm violation, which then warranted the backlash 
as a form of in-group norm enforcement. Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995) revealed that 
attack advertising turns weak partisans into strong partisans, although that greater degree 
of commitment was not reflected in behavioral intentions. Rather, exposure to the attacks 
elicited reduced levels of political efficacy, regardless of their level of commitment. 
Other studies produced contrary results. Dardis, Shen and Edwards (2008) found that 
partisanship did not condition the influence of attack advertising exposure on political 
cynicism or self efficacy. In sum, it seems that attack advertising reinforces party loyalty, 
but its influence on democratic attitudes and behavior is less clear. Therefore, it seems 
reasonable to posit a hypothesis with respect to the partisanship’s influence on candidate 
support and a research question with respect to its influence on democratic values.  
H11a: Compared to the control condition, candidate-sponsored political 
attack advertising elicits a more favorable evaluation of the implied 
beneficiary for non-partisans than for partisans. 
H11b: Compared to the control condition, candidate-sponsored political 
attack advertising elicits a greater intention to vote for the implied 
beneficiary for non-partisans than for partisans. 
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H11c: Compared to the control condition, candidate-sponsored political 
attack advertising elicits a less favorable evaluation of the targeted 
candidate for non-partisans than for partisans. 
H11d: Compared to the control condition, candidate-sponsored political 
attack advertising elicits a lesser intention to vote for the targeted 
candidate for non-partisans than for partisans. 
RQ3a: How does candidate-sponsored political attack advertising 
influence democratic political efficacy for non-partisans versus partisans? 
RQ3b: How does candidate-sponsored political attack advertising 
influence trust of American government for non-partisans versus 
partisans? 
Few studies have investigated interaction between partisan strength and political 
attack advertising effects. Even less research has examined interactions between strength 
of partisanship and political attack sponsorship. Because independent sponsorship seems 
to enhance the credibility of attack advertising (Garramone, 1985; Groenendyk & 
Valentino, 2002; Pfau, et al., 2002), it should mitigate backlash effects; however, this 
effect may not translate for strong versus weak political partisans. These uncertainties 
and contradictions may explain why Franz and colleagues (2008) dropped the 
partisanship interaction term from their study of advertising tone effects. They “failed to 
find an authoritative story to the question of whether exposure to political ads matters for 
different types of voters” (p. 135); but they also concluded that, “such questions represent 
the next stage of the scholarly search for advertising effects” (p. 135). Given the lack of 
clear direction in existing research, this dissertation posits the following research 
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questions with respect to the moderating role of partisanship on the influence of PSG-
sponsored attack advertising.  
RQ4a: Compared to the control condition, how does PSG-sponsored 
political attack advertising influence evaluations of the implied beneficiary 
for non-partisans versus partisans? 
RQ4b: Compared to the control condition, how does PSG- sponsored 
political attack advertising influence intention to vote for the implied 
beneficiary for non-partisans versus partisans? 
RQ4c: Compared to the control condition, how does PSG-sponsored 
attack advertising influence evaluations of the targeted candidate for non-
partisans versus partisans? 
RQ4d: Compared to the control condition, how does PSG-sponsored 
political attack advertising influence intention to vote for the targeted 
candidate for non-partisans versus partisans? 
RQ5a: Compared to the control condition, how does PSG-sponsored 
political attack advertising influence democratic political efficacy for non-
partisans versus partisans? 
RQ5b: Compared to the control condition, how does PSG-sponsored 
political attack advertising influence trust in American government for 
non-partisans versus partisans? 
Justification for Studying Young Voters 
Young voters have become an important group of politically active citizens 
(Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement and Rock the 
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Vote, 2008c; CNN, 2004; Harvard University Institute of Politics, 2007; Marcelo, Lopez, 
Kennedy, & Barr, 2008). In the 1990’s, the typical young person was individualistic, 
alienated, self-focused and politically uninterested (Harwood Group, 1993). Until the 
2004 general presidential election, turnout among America’s 18 to 29 year olds was 
declining steadily since its peak in 1972 (Marcelo, et al., 2008). In 2000, only 40% of 
young voters cast a general election ballot. By 2004, that number increased to 49%. Exit 
polls showed that young people voted in greater numbers than those over 65 (CNN, 
2004). Even when the percentage of young voters dropped to 25% in the 2006 mid-term 
elections, that was still an increase from the 2002 mid-term, when only 22% of young 
people voted (Marcelo, et al., 2008). The 2006 mid-term proved that youth voters could 
be influential. They provided winning margins for the Senate races in Virginia and 
Montana (Harvard University Institute of Politics, 2007). Two Democratic Senators owe 
their election to youth turnout in their states.  
Young voters also flexed their electoral muscle in the 2008 presidential election. 
In particular, their impact on the primaries was huge. Compared to 2004, double and 
triple the number of young people participated in primaries or caucuses across the nation 
(Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement and Rock the 
Vote, 2008c). A perfect storm of aggressive get-out-the-vote efforts, issues that mattered 
to young people (e.g., the economy and the Iraq War) and several contested elections 
motivated young people to become politically engaged. Now, it is up to researchers and 
practitioners to determine how to keep them involved in 2010.  
Getting and keeping young people interested in politics is crucial for the health of 
our democracy (Harvard University Institute of Politics, n.d.). Obviously, young people 
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are the largest source of new voters (Marcelo, et al., 2008). Nearly two-thirds of new 
voters in 2004 were 18 to 29 year old. As a coherent group, with identifiable interests, the 
youth vote is crucial. In 2004, 20.1 million young people gave their votes to the 
presidential candidates. In 2006, they gave 10.8 million votes to the congressional 
candidates. Youth voters substantially influenced the 2008 presidential primary campaign 
(Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement and Rock the 
Vote, 2008c). In Iowa, they came out at three times the rate that they did in 2004 (Center 
for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement and Rock the Vote, 
2008a). Saul (2008) reported that, young voters were a major factor in Obama’s Iowa 
victory. They also showed up in the general election. Richardson (2008) reported that, in 
the 2008 general election, Obama won over 60% of young voters. Before Obama, Reagan 
held the record for the largest percentage of young voters at 54%.   
Campaigns need young people for more than just their votes. The Harvard 
Institute of Politics (n.d.) reported that, “young people have the energy, optimism, and 
time to devote to a campaign” (p. 4). During the run up to the 2004 general election, 
college students showed their support for campaigns by attending campaign rallies, 
volunteering and even contributing money. As a group, young people represented 36% of 
campaign volunteers, 15% of volunteers and 16% of all political contributors.  
Some have questioned the ecological validity of using college students to test and 
evaluate political communication effects. Pinkleton (1997, 1998, 2001) warned that using 
students jeopardizes external validity. In their landmark study of Going Negative, 
Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995) went to great expense to avoid using college students. 
Nevertheless, college students are the principle participants in the vast majority of 
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experimental studies concerning attack-advertising effects (Meirick, 2002; Pfau, et al., 
2002; Pinkleton, 1997, 1998).  
This dissertation embraces college student participants. Even if one grants they 
are unrepresentative of the larger voting population, their growing influence justifies their 
relevance as a unique and important demographic. The Center for Information and 
Research on Civic Learning and Engagement and Rock the Vote (2008c) reported that 
about 60% of college students voted in 2004, compared to about 45% of non-students. 
Given the size and homogeneity of the young voters, it seems prudent to better 
understand their response to political communication. Furthermore, experimental 
research is designed to edify theoretical processes that, according to Greenberg (1987), 
require “the use of investigations that are internally valid and not diluted with real world 
features” (p. 159). Since homogenous populations (e.g., college students) limit 
confounding variations between subjects, using them contributes to claims of internal 
validity (Berkowitz & Donnerstein, 1982). On two fronts, therefore, this dissertation 
justifies its use of a student population. If one focuses on their systematic differences, 
student participation is justified by their growing influence (Center for Information and 
Research on Civic Learning and Engagement and Rock the Vote, 2008c; CNN, 2004; 
Harvard University Institute of Politics, 2007; Marcelo, et al., 2008). On the other hand, 
the homogeneity of the college-student experience enhances the internal validity of using 
college students in experiments (Berkowitz & Donnerstein, 1982; Greenberg, 1987). 
Either way, young voters are worthy experimental participants. 
 
 




INOCULATION AGAINST PSG AND CANDIDATE-  
SPONSORED ATTACK ADVERTISING 
 The unpredictability and potency of PSG-sponsored extreme attack advertising 
poses a serious challenge for candidates. Conventional campaign communication may not 
be sufficient to defend against their influence. Political campaigns generally execute three 
advertising strategies: attacks, acclaims and/or refutations (Benoit, et al., 1997), but a 
post-hoc refutational strategy may be ineffective against extreme political attacks. 
Several studies by Pfau and colleagues have shown that a preemptive defensive refutation 
strategy is more effective against political attacks than a post-hoc refutation strategy (C. 
An, 2003; Pfau & Burgoon, 1988; Pfau & Kenski, 1990; Pfau, Kenski, Nitz, & Sorenson, 
1990). This chapter posits that a preemptive refutational strategy is effective against 
candidate and PSG-sponsored extreme attack advertising. The inoculation theory of 
resistance to persuasion offers the most comprehensive prescription for such a strategy 
(Compton & Pfau, 2005b; Pfau, 1997; Szabo & Pfau, 2002). Eagly and Chaiken (1993) 
called inoculation the “grandparent theory of resistance to attitude change” (p. 561). This 
chapter posits that inoculation advertisement appeals are capable of surrounding political 
attitudes with a shield of protection against PSG-sponsored extreme attack advertising. In 
addition, this chapter makes the case that inoculation can defend democratic values 
against the demobilizing influence of candidate-sponsored extreme attacks. Ultimately, 
this chapter posits that a preemptive inoculation strategy can defend the electorate from 
the worst effects of both PSG and candidate-sponsored political attack advertising.  
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 This is the first study to construct and test inoculation appeals that reach voters as 
video or print-mediated political advertisements. Prior investigations of inoculation have 
relied on essays (C. An, 2003; Pfau & Burgoon, 1988; Pfau & Kenski, 1990; Pfau, et al., 
1990; Pfau, Park, et al., 2001). This study adapts the inoculation essay strategy to the 
format of political advertising. In part, this study translates the theory of inoculation into 
the reality of presidential campaign communication. To maximize inoculation’s electoral 
impact, it should be adapted for the dominant mode of political discourse, which is 
advertising (Geer, 2008). This chapter argues that both print and video inoculation 
advertisements protect political attitudes, although they accomplish their effects through 
distinct processes. In addition to demonstrating the practicality of inoculation against 
extreme political attacks, this dissertation also illuminates critical mechanisms in the 
video and print inoculation processes.   
The Inoculation Construct 
The inoculation message strategy was inspired by studies of two-sided message 
effects (Hovland, Lumsdaine, & Sheffield, 1949; Lumsdaine & Janis, 1953). Lumsdaine 
and Janis (1953) revealed that one and two-sided messages were equally persuasive; 
however, attitude change elicited by a two-sided message was significantly more resistant 
to subsequent counterpersuasion than attitude change elicited by a one-sided message. 
The authors reasoned that the two-sided messages “inoculated” participants against 
counterpersuasion.  
McGuire (1961a, 1964, 1970) developed Lumsdaine and Janis’ (1953) inoculation 
analogy into a complete theory of resistance to persuasion. Fearing social psychologists 
had over emphasized social influence, McGuire (1970) redirected his research to 
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developing and testing “ways to immunize people against persuasion” (p. 90). His 
inoculation theory of resistance to persuasion relies on a biological analogy that elegantly 
summarizes and explains its central assumption (McGuire, 1964):  
In the biological situation, the person is typically made resistant to some 
attacking virus by pre-exposure to a weakened dose of the virus. This mild 
dose stimulates his defenses so he will be better able to overcome any 
massive viral attack to which he is later exposed. (p. 200) 
Therefore, just as the human immune system recruits antibodies to neutralize threatening 
viruses, the human belief system recruits counterarguments to neutralize threatening 
arguments. 
Taken together, threat and counterargumentation are at the core of conventional 
inoculation (Compton & Pfau, 2005b). Traditional inoculation messages are delivered in 
two stages. First, they elicit threat with a forewarning of potent and imminent counter-
persuasion (McGuire, 1962b). Second, they elicit counterargumentation with refutational 
pretreatments, which present a combination of weakened counterattitudinal attacks and 
strong refutations of those weakened attacks (Pfau, et al., 1997). Taken together, threat 
and counterargumentation are the core mechanisms of the basic inoculation model 
(Compton & Pfau, 2005a); however, threat is widely considered to be the more 
indispensable component (Compton & Pfau, 2005a; McGuire, 1962b; Pfau, 1997; Pfau & 
Kenski, 1990).  
Until recently, elicited threat was indirectly inferred from the presence of 
successful resistance to persuasion (Pfau, 1997; Pfau, Holbert, Szabo, & Kaminski, 
2002). McGuire and Papageorgis (1962a) inferred the existence of elicited threat when 
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they found that the combination of forewarning and a refutational pretreatment conferred 
greater resistance to persuasion than a refutational pretreatment alone. In another study, 
Anderson and McGuire (1965) inferred that elicited threat was operative when the 
combination of normative reassurances and refutational pretreatments conferred less 
resistance to persuasion than refutational pretreatments alone. In yet another study, 
McGuire (1964) directly manipulated threat levels by varying the number of threatening 
arguments relative to the number of refutations. Results confirmed that the highest threat 
condition (four counterarguments and no reassuring refutations) conferred greater 
resistance than the lowest threat condition (i.e., two counterarguments and no reassuring 
refutations). The most convincing inference of threat is derived from the relative 
effectiveness of refutational-same and refutational-different pretreatments (Pfau, 1997). 
Refutational-same pretreatments present and refute the same arguments appearing in a 
subsequent attack message, whereas refutational-different pretreatments present and 
refute arguments different from those appearing in a subsequent attack message (Pfau, et 
al., 2002). Papageorgis and McGuire (1961) found that refutational-different and 
refutational-same pretreatments conferred equivalent levels of resistance to persuasion; 
therefore, they inferred that the success of refutational different pretreatments is 
explained by a motivation to generate counterarguments, since participants had not been 
exposed to those counterattacks. Eventually, researchers developed and successfully 
tested a direct measure of threat (M. Burgoon, Cohen, Miller, & Montgomery, 1978; 
Miller & Burgoon, 1979), which consistently confirmed threat’s instrumental role in the 
inoculation process (Pfau, Park, et al., 2001; Pfau, Szabo, et al., 2001; Pfau, et al., 1997). 
Pfau (1997) reasoned that the motivational component of inoculation spreads “a broad 
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blanket of protection” (pp. 137-138) against an indefinite number and variety of specific 
threats to one’s existing beliefs.  
Traditional inoculation’s “blanket of protection” is cut from the cloth of 
substantive counterargumentation. Pfau and Compton (2005b) observed that, “inoculation 
treatments build an arsenal of argumentation” (p. 101) that strengthens attitudes against 
strong attacks. In other words, inoculation motivates receivers to generate an array of 
substantive counterarguments to potential arguments against their targeted belief(s). 
However, the theory’s founders merely inferred that counterargumentation was 
responsible for resistance to persuasion. In all of McGuire’s inoculation research, only 
one study attempted to directly measure counterargumentation (Papageorgis & McGuire, 
1961). Unfortunately, the study did not reveal significant differences between the 
refutational pretreatment and control conditions. Inoculation advocates have since 
attributed that failure to a poorly conceived measure of counterargumentation (Compton 
& Pfau, 2005b). In fact, inoculation demonstrably elicits a wide variety of belief-
bolstering materials like active generation of counterarguments (Pfau & Burgoon, 1988; 
Pfau, et al., 2004; Pfau, et al., 1990; Pfau, Szabo, et al., 2001; Pfau, et al., 1997; Pfau, 
1992), recognition of counterarguments (Pfau, Compton, et al., 2006; Pfau, et al., 2004), 
and even the construction of elaborate associative networks (Pfau, et al., 2005). 
Inoculation also confers resistance to persuasion through non-traditional processes, like 
attitude accessibility (Pfau, et al., 2004; Pfau, et al., 2003), affect (Pfau, et al., 2008; Pfau, 
Szabo, et al., 2001), involvement (Pfau, et al., 1997), and attitude certainty (Pfau, et al., 
2004; Pfau, Ivanov, et al., 2005; Pfau, et al., 2003). 
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Regardless of the particular processes, inoculation’s capacity to confer resistance 
to novel counterattacks makes it one of the most practically useful social influence 
theories. Initially, that utility was limited to cultural truisms, which was a byproduct of 
over reliance on the biological analogy. McGuire (1964) reasoned that only those “beliefs 
maintained in so monolithic an ideological environment would analogize to the health 
status of an organism raised in a germ-free environment” (p. 201). Therefore, inoculation 
theory was originally used to protect only the most widely agreed-upon beliefs, which 
were almost all related to the health domain, like regularly brushing one’s teeth and faith 
in penicillin (McGuire, 1964). Although the basic inoculation model was built by 
protecting truisms, such beliefs are actually quite rare (McGuire, 1970), which limited the 
theory’s early development. Inoculation has since been used to protect controversial 
beliefs in a variety of domains: commercial marketing (Godbold & Pfau, 1998; Pfau, et 
al., 2004; Pfau, 1992), public relations (M. Burgoon, Pfau, & Birk, 1995; Pfau, Haigh, 
Sims, et al., 2006), academic honesty (Pfau & Compton, 2008), anti-smoking campaigns 
(Pfau, Van Bockern, & Kang, 1992), support for the Iraq War (Pfau, Haigh, Fifrick, et al., 
2006) and various public policy issues, like marijuana legalization and gun control (Pfau, 
et al., 2008). Now, inoculation theory is widely recognized as a general theory of social 
influence (Compton & Pfau, 2005a; Pfau, et al., 2002). Regardless of the domain, 
however, the inoculation message strategy is apt for reinforcing existing beliefs against 
anticipated counterinfluence. In particular, inoculation is a useful means of protecting 
political attitudes (C. An & Pfau, 2004a, 2004b;  Pfau & Burgoon, 1988; Pfau & Kenski, 
1990; Pfau, et al., 1990). 
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 Protecting Candidates from PSG-Sponsored Advertising 
Inoculation may preempt potent PSG-sponsored attack advertising. In many 
cases, political advertising is the most reliable means of communication between 
candidates and voters (Geer, 2008); however, candidates are not the sole sponsors of 
political advertising (S. An, et al., 2006; Franz, et al., 2008; opensecrets.org, 2007; Pfau, 
et al., 2002; Pfau, Park, et al., 2001). Presidential campaign advertising is sponsored by a 
wide variety of organized interests, like the political parties, political action committees 
and, of course, PSGs. Moreover, non-candidate sponsors of advertising are more willing 
to “go negative” (Franz, et al., 2008), especially at the presidential level (Ansolabehere & 
Iyengar, 1995, p. 132). Candidates are more circumspect about using negative tactics. 
Fearing a backlash from the voters, they sparingly employ attacks in their advertising 
(West, 2004). In fact, there appears to be a negative relationship between accountability 
to the voters and willingness to go negative. Less accountable groups sponsor more 
voluminous and more vicious attacks. And, the least accountable groups are those that 
hide their donor’s identities and partisan intentions (e.g., 527 and 501c) (Center for 
Public Integrity, 2007b; Public Citizen, 2004b, 2005). As noted earlier, PSGs, like the 
Swift Boat Veterans for Truth (SBVT) and MoveOn.org, have been called the stealth front 
groups of political campaigns (Public Citizen, 2004b, p. 4). Like well-funded covert 
special operatives, PSGs can nimbly attack anyone, anywhere, anytime and they do so 
with very little accountability. PSGs are the shock troops of negative campaigning. As 
such, they wreak havoc on a presidential candidate’s campaign. This chapter posits that 
inoculation may be able to obviate their influence (C. An & Pfau,  2004a, 2004b; Pfau & 
Burgoon, 1988; Pfau & Kenski, 1990; Pfau, et al., 1990; Pfau, Park, et al., 2001)  
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When dealing with the powerful negativity of PSGs, a defensive post-hoc strategy 
is simply inadequate. Even against the most conventional forms of political attack 
advertising, such a strategy is risky (Jamieson, 1996; Pfau & Kenski, 1990; West, 2004). 
Pfau and Kenski (1990) recognized that refutations and rebuttals may not do “much more 
than to minimize the damage already done by an attack message” (p. 70). Some political 
attacks, no matter how outrageous, inevitably bias the electorate.  Television especially 
amplifies the irreversibility of political attacks. Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995) 
observed that, “the breadth of television’s reach makes it difficult to dispel rumors or 
counteract the effects of negative information” (p. 90). Jamieson (1996) observed that, 
even if a candidate responds quickly, strategically, appropriately and with the cooperation 
of the press, any “counterattack may simply legitimize false claims and magnify their 
impact” (p. xxii). A further complication is that voters generally perceive counterattacks 
as mean spirited, which can incite a backlash against the sponsoring candidate (West, 
2004). The cycle of attack and response can quickly spiral out of control, leaving both 
candidates damaged (Allen & Burrell, 2002; Basil, et al., 1991; Funk, 2001) and the 
public disenchanted with the democratic process (Allen & Burrell, 2002; Ansolabehere, 
et al., 1999; Ansolabehere, Iyengar, Simon, & Valentino, 1994; K. F. Kahn & Kenney, 
1999). The risk of such a spiral forces all but the most desperate candidates to moderate 
both the quantity and the incivility of their attacks. PSG-sponsored attacks are not so 
constrained.  
A defensive strategy against PSGs leaves candidates vulnerable when they are the 
least able to respond to an attack. Such periods occur when the campaign is nearing an 
end, or when candidates have already spent most or all of their ad budgets. Research and 
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recent experience demonstrate that un-refuted political attacks can take on a form of 
reality that, albeit not actually real, becomes real in its consequences (Jamieson, 1992). In 
part, Kerry’s need to save resources for the late-October advertising blitz compelled his 
ambivalent response to the SBVT early attacks (Thomas, 2004). His team’s hesitation was 
a crucial factor in the success of the SBVT campaign. The Democratic consultant James 
Carville argued that, by the time the Kerry team struck back, it was already too late (in 
Thomas, 2004).  
American political campaigns are not immune from Lenin’s proverbial 
observation that, “a lie told often enough becomes truth”. A positive appeal is the least 
effective response to an attack (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995). Therefore, defense-
oriented candidates must counterattack, but PSG do not offer a clear target. 
Counterattacking against an unaffiliated group incurs all the costs of attacking and few of 
the benefits. An initial cost is embedded in the inherent disadvantages of attacking, which 
almost always damages the attacker’s public image (Merritt, 1984; Pinkleton, 1997, 
1998; Shapiro & Rieger, 1992; Thorson, et al., 1991) and demobilizes the persuadable 
members of the electorate (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995). Even strong supporters may 
punish their own candidate for going negative (Matthews & Dietz-Uhler, 1998).  
The legally mandated independence of PSG attackers further complicates the 
situation for a candidate who chooses a post-hoc defensive strategy. The implied 
beneficiary of PSG-sponsored such attacks can credibly disavow the group’s activities, 
even while he or she is elected on the shoulders of its claims. For the embattled 
candidate, the time spent responding to PSGs increases the defending candidate’s 
negatives, while his/her opposition remains unscathed and above the fray. Even if the 
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defending candidate manages to irrevocably damage an aggressive PSGs credibility, the 
group’s covert donors can simply move their money into another aggressively negative 
front group. Furthermore, the decentralized character of PSGs makes them unpredictable. 
They can massively attack, selectively attack or alternate strategies to keep defending 
candidates constantly off balance and off message. Multiple attacks quickly overextend 
the defensive capacities of even the most efficient campaigns. Political campaigns are 
substantially weakened by fighting on multiple fronts. 
Given the complexity of defending against PSG attacks, the best strategy is 
preventative. Inoculation is an effective preemptive strategy against corporate stealth 
groups (Pfau, Haigh, Sims, et al., 2006), and it might also be useful against PSGs. More 
generally, inoculation is an effective method of preempting a variety of political attacks 
(for examples, see C. An & Pfau, 2004a, 2004b; Pfau & Burgoon, 1988, 1990; Pfau & 
Kenski, 1990; Pfau, et al., 1990).  
Pfau and Burgoon (1988) were the first to use inoculation in a political context. 
During the last month of a closely contested Senate campaign, they used refutational-
same and refutational-different inoculation pretreatments to protect voter attitudes against 
counter-persuasion. Both same and different-inoculation treatments conferred resistance 
to persuasion. Inoculated participants expressed more favorable evaluations of their 
initially preferred candidate, greater intention to vote for that candidate and less favorable 
evaluations of the attacking source’s composure and extroversion.  
In another study, Pfau and colleagues (1990) demonstrated inoculation’s 
usefulness in presidential politics. They used the 1988 race between Dukakis and Bush to 
contrast inoculation (same and different) versus post-hoc refutation on their ability to 
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protect attitudes against direct-mail attack messages. Both same and different-inoculation 
treatments conferred resistance to persuasion, and they both elicited a greater intention to 
vote for the candidate targeted by the attack. Furthermore, inoculation was more effective 
than post-hoc refutation for strong partisans and independents, although results for weak 
partisans were more complex. Pfau and colleagues (1990) concluded that, “in the first 
direct comparison of the two alternative strategic responses to political attacks, the 
inoculation strategy generally proved more effective than post-hoc refutation in 
combating the influence of political attacks” (p. 39). Still, neither of these studies 
examined the influence of inoculation against televised political attack messages, which 
are the most dominant source of political attacks (Brader, 2005; Geer, 2008; Jamieson, 
1992; West, 2004).  
Two studies have addressed inoculation’s ability to preempt televised political 
attack messages (C. An, 2003; C. An & Pfau, 2004). During the 2002 mid-term elections, 
C. An (2003) tested inoculation against opposition-sponsored television political attack 
advertising. Compared to controls, inoculation was associated with more favorable 
evaluations of the candidate targeted by the attack. Inoculation also protected 
participatory behavioral support of the targeted candidate, like contributing to the 
campaign, donating time, recruiting others and vote likelihood. Results further revealed 
that inoculation’s effectiveness was substantially enhanced when the source of the 
inoculation message conveyed high credibility. In another study, C. An and Pfau (2004) 
investigated the potential of inoculation to preempt the influence of attacks made during a 
2002 televised general election debate between Senatorial candidates. Participants who 
received an inoculation-different pretreatment evaluated their initially preferred candidate 
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more favorably than those in a control condition. Unlike the advertising study (C. An, 
2003), the inoculation effect was not significant for partisan behavioral intentions (e.g., 
voting, volunteering or donating money for the preferred candidate). The authors 
reasoned that inadequate power might have limited the results. Surprisingly, no other 
studies have examined inoculation’s capacity to protect candidate preferences against 
political attack advertising. This is the first study to test inoculation against televised 
attack ads during an ongoing presidential contest.  
This is also the first study to compare specific and generic inoculation messages. 
Over a decade ago, Pfau (1997) observed that inoculation’s “broad blanket of protection” 
is particularly useful in political campaigns (Pfau & Burgoon, 1988, 1990; Pfau & 
Kenski, 1990; Pfau, et al., 1990). Since then, candidate-specific inoculation has 
demonstrated its worth (C. An, 2003; C. An & Pfau, 2004a); however, a new generation 
of inoculation appeals broadens the “blanket of protection” to include entire classes of 
persuasion. These generic inoculation appeals have protected attitudes against soft-money 
sponsored attack ads (Pfau, Park, et al., 2001), corporate-front-group stealth campaigns 
(Pfau, et al., 2007) and print news photographs (Pfau, Haigh, Fifrick, et al., 2006). While 
both specific and generic inoculation appeals are demonstrably effective, no study has 
compared them within the same context.  
This dissertation redresses that deficit. Within the context of the 2008 presidential 
campaign, it tests the quality of both candidate-specific and generic inoculation appeals. 
Whereas specific inoculation appeals must be constructed for each candidate, a single 
generic inoculation appeal confers protection across candidates, which makes it more 
efficient than specific inoculation. Research suggests that both will be effective; however, 
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no precedent or theory exists on which to base an estimation of their relative capacity. 
Therefore, this dissertation offers two sets of hypotheses that predict each technique’s 
individual effectiveness and one research question that asks which one is more effective.   
H12a: Compared to the inoculation-control condition, generic inoculation against 
all political attack advertising elicits greater resistance to PSG-sponsored political 
attack advertising in terms of a more favorable evaluation of the targeted 
candidate. 
H12b: Compared to the inoculation-control condition, generic inoculation 
against all political attack advertising elicits greater resistance to PSG-
sponsored political attack advertising in terms of a greater intention to 
vote for the targeted candidate. 
H12c: Compared to the inoculation-control condition, generic inoculation 
against all political attack advertising elicits greater resistance to PSG-
sponsored political attack advertising in terms of a less favorable 
evaluation of the supported candidate. 
H12d: Compared to the inoculation-control condition, generic inoculation 
against all political attack advertising elicits greater resistance to PSG-
sponsored political attack advertising in terms of a lesser intention to vote 
for the supported candidate. 
H13a: Compared to the inoculation-control condition, candidate-specific 
inoculation elicits greater resistance to PSG-sponsored political attack 
advertising in terms of a more favorable evaluation of the targeted 
candidate. 




H13b: Compared to the inoculation-control condition, candidate-specific 
inoculation elicits greater resistance to PSG-sponsored political attack 
advertising in terms of a greater intention to vote for the targeted 
candidate. 
H13c: Compared to the inoculation-control condition, candidate-specific 
inoculation elicits greater resistance to PSG-sponsored political attack 
advertising in terms of a less favorable evaluation of the supported 
candidate. 
H13d: Compared to the inoculation-control condition, candidate-specific 
inoculation elicits greater resistance to PSG-sponsored political attack 
advertising in terms of a lesser intention to vote for the supported 
candidate. 
RQ6a: Do generic and candidate-specific inoculation differ with respect 
to their ability to elicit a more favorable evaluation of the candidate 
targeted in PSG-sponsored political attack advertising?   
RQ6b: Do generic and candidate-specific inoculation differ with respect 
to their ability to elicit a greater intention to vote for the candidate targeted 
in PSG-sponsored political attack advertising? 
RQ6c: Do generic and candidate-specific inoculation differ with respect to 
their ability to elicit a less favorable evaluation of the candidate supported 
in PSG-sponsored political attack advertising?  
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RQ6d: Do generic and candidate-specific inoculation differ with respect 
to their ability to elicit a lesser intention to vote for the candidate 
supported in PSG- sponsored political attack advertising? 
H14a: Compared to the inoculation-control condition, generic inoculation 
elicits greater resistance to candidate-sponsored political attack advertising 
in terms of a more favorable evaluation of the targeted candidate. 
H14b: Compared to the inoculation-control condition, generic inoculation 
elicits greater resistance to candidate-sponsored political attack advertising 
in terms of a greater intention to vote for the targeted candidate. 
H14c: Compared to the inoculation-control condition, generic inoculation 
elicits greater resistance to candidate-sponsored political attack advertising 
in terms of a less favorable evaluation of the supported candidate. 
H14d: Compared to the inoculation-control condition, generic inoculation 
elicits greater resistance to candidate-sponsored political attack advertising 
in terms of a lesser intention to vote for the supported candidate. 
H15a: Compared to the inoculation-control condition, candidate-specific 
inoculation elicits greater resistance to candidate-sponsored political 
attack advertising in terms of a more favorable evaluation of the targeted 
candidate. 
H15b: Compared to the inoculation-control condition, candidate-specific 
inoculation elicits greater resistance to candidate-sponsored political 
attack advertising in terms of a greater intention to vote for the targeted 
candidate. 
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H15c: Compared to the inoculation-control condition, candidate-specific 
inoculation elicits greater resistance to candidate-sponsored political 
attack advertising in terms of a less favorable evaluation of the supported 
candidate. 
H15d: Compared to the inoculation-control condition, candidate-specific 
inoculation elicits greater resistance to candidate-sponsored political 
attack advertising in terms of a lesser intention to vote for the supported 
candidate. 
RQ7a: Do generic and candidate-specific inoculation differ with respect 
to their ability to elicit a more favorable evaluation of the candidate 
targeted in candidate-sponsored political attack advertising?   
RQ7b: Do generic and candidate-specific inoculation differ with respect 
to their ability to elicit a greater intention to vote for the candidate targeted 
in candidate -sponsored political attack advertising? 
RQ7c: Do generic and candidate-specific inoculation differ with respect to 
their ability to elicit a less favorable evaluation of the candidate supported 
in candidate -sponsored political attack advertising?  
RQ7d: Do generic and candidate-specific inoculation differ with respect 
to their ability to elicit a lesser intention to vote for the candidate 
supported in candidate - sponsored political attack advertising? 
Protecting Democratic Values from Candidate-Sponsored Extreme Negativity 
Inoculation may be the best way to protect the electorate from the demobilizing 
effects of extreme attack advertising. Although the demobilizing influence of political 
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attack advertising is generally controversial (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; Brooks & 
Geer, 2007; Franz, et al., 2008; Jamieson, 1992; West, 2004), scholars agree that extreme 
negativity substantially harms the electorate’s faith in democracy (Brooks & Geer, 2007; 
K. F. Kahn & Kenney, 1999; Lau & Pomper, 2001). Extreme attack advertising is one-
sided, image-oriented and uncivil. Each dimension of candidate-sponsored extreme 
advertising discourages voters: one-sided attacks (Meirick, 2002; Pinkleton, 1997, 1998), 
personal attacks (Pfau & Burgoon, 1989; Shapiro & Rieger, 1992; Thorson, et al., 1991) 
and uncivil language (Brooks & Geer, 2007; Funk, 2001; Mutz, 2007; Mutz & Reeves, 
2005). Some have suspected that campaigns occasionally employ extreme attacks to 
intentionally demobilize voters who would otherwise support the opposition 
(Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995). This dissertation posits that candidates and democratic 
activists can employ either generic or candidate-specific inoculation appeals to preempt 
the detrimental influence of extreme attacks on the electorate’s faith in democracy and 
willingness to participate in politics.  
When the electorate complains about too much negativity in political advertising, 
they may be complaining about the most extreme negativity, like one-sided attacks ads. 
One-sided attacks are purely negative, meaning they are entirely focused indicting an 
opponent’s record, competence or general fitness for office. Two-sided political attacks, 
on the other hand, compare the relative merits of one candidate against another. The 
electorate generally prefers two-sided to one-sided information about politicians 
(Meirick, 2002; Pinkleton, 1997, 1998). Two-sided political ads mimic the kind of 
engagement that “enables audiences to determine which argument has the greater force” 
(Jamieson, 1992, p. 216). Purely negative or one-sided political attacks, however, simply 
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give the impression all politicians are at best inept and at worst, corrupt. The most 
extreme forms of attacks harm attitudes toward both the sponsoring candidate and the 
targeted candidate (Funk, 2001; Mutz, 2007; Mutz & Reeves, 2005). Furthermore, direct 
comparisons between one and two-sided attacks show that one-sided political ads are less 
favorably evaluated (Meirick, 2002; Pinkleton, 1998), and they may be more 
demobilizing (K. F. Kahn & Kenney, 1999). One-sided messages appear manipulative 
and make it hard for the public to compare candidates on the criteria they find important. 
The electorate is turned off by political communication that does not facilitate its ability 
to evaluate politicians on their issue positions, promises and ability to govern (Patterson, 
1993).  
Political attacks focusing on personalities may disillusion and demobilize the 
electorate (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Patterson, 1993). Image-oriented political 
advertising focuses on candidates’ personality or superficial personal characteristics 
(Kaid & Johnston, 1991). Issue-oriented advertising, on the other hand, emphasizes the 
“candidates’ stands on the campaign issues” (Johnston & Kaid, 2002). The electorate 
prefers issue to image-oriented advertising (Brooks & Geer, 2007; Finkel & Geer, 1998; 
Pfau & Burgoon, 1989; Thorson, et al., 1991). The implicit message of image-oriented 
attack ads is that politicians are disappointing, incompetent and the government they run 
is unresponsive (Hart, 1999). Issue-oriented advertising, on the other hand, channels the 
electorate’s need for policy information, which reinforces faith in democracy, facilitates 
engagement and welcomes democratic participation (Jamieson, 1992). For much of the 
electorate, personal attacks are simply unpleasant (Thorson, et al., 1991) and a clear 
violation of civility (Mutz, 2007).   
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Uncivil political attacks are an inappropriate and demobilizing form of political 
discourse (Brooks & Geer, 2007; Funk, 2001; Mutz, 2007; Mutz & Reeves, 2005). The 
electorate is disappointed and disgusted by political discourse that would otherwise be 
inappropriate in civil society. Uncivil political discourse is simply defined as 
quarrelsome, impolite and unfriendly (Mutz, 2007). It tends to employ inflammatory 
language and superfluous observations (Brooks & Geer, 2007). In the high stakes world 
of political competition, civility is often the first casualty. In fact, the dangers of incivility 
are explicitly acknowledged by deliberative bodies, which intentionally maintain a strict 
system of order and decorum (e.g., Roberts Rules of Order). Paid political advertising is 
not so formally constrained, and history is replete with illustrations of uncivil political 
attack advertising (e.g., the SBVT accusations against John Kerry and MoveOn.org’s 
indictment of General David Patraeus as the one who ‘betrayed us’). The empirical 
evidence converges on a single conclusion: uncivil political discourse damages the 
public’s confidence in politicians and political institutions (Brooks & Geer, 2007; Funk, 
2001; K. F. Kahn & Kenney, 1999; Mutz, 2007; Mutz & Reeves, 2005).When uncivil 
tactics combine with one-sided image-oriented attacks, the preponderance of evidence 
points to an almost certain demobilizing effect. 
Inoculation may provide an effective means of preempting the deleterious 
influence of extreme advertising on democratic attitudes. Inoculation is a demonstrable 
effective method for protecting democratic values from televised political attacks (Pfau, 
et al., 2002). C. An and Pfau (2004) attempted to use candidate-specific inoculation to 
defend democratic values from attacks conveyed during a televised Senate debate, but 
they found that, “candidate attacks initiated in debates do not undermine participatory 
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attitudes, therefore muting inoculation’s effect on normative outcomes” (p. 432). In an 
earlier study, Pfau and colleagues (2002) used generic inoculation to protect democratic 
values from the deleterious influence of soft-money sponsored issue advertising. The 
generic inoculation obviated harmful effects for Republicans but not for Democrats or 
Independents. Nevertheless, those findings are encouraging. This dissertation posits that 
both candidate-specific and generic inoculation appeals may protect democratic values 
from the deleterious influence of extreme political attack advertising. It also poses a 
research question concerning the relative influence of candidate versus generic 
inoculation. 
H16a: Compared to the inoculation-control condition, candidate-specific 
inoculation elicits greater resistance to political attack advertising in terms 
of greater trust in American government.  
H16b: Compared to the inoculation-control condition, candidate-specific 
inoculation elicits greater resistance to political attack advertising in terms 
of greater democratic political efficacy.  
RQ8a: Do generic and candidate-specific inoculations against political 
attack advertising differ with respect to their protection of trust in 
American government? 
RQ8b: Do generic and candidate-specific inoculations against political 
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Print and Video’s Influence on the Inoculation Process 
The multi-mediated nature of contemporary presidential campaigns provides a 
good context in which to study how the medium of presentation affects the inoculation 
process. Today’s presidential campaigns communicate through multiple media. In a 
technique called bracketing (Overby, 2007), campaigns simultaneously broadcast  
thematically-related political messages through a variety of mediated outlets, like  
television, radio, newspapers, magazines and direct mail. This multi-mediated reality of 
contemporary presidential campaigns raises practical and theoretical questions related to 
inoculation’s effectiveness and its processes. One such question concerns the capacity of 
inoculation to confer resistance when a refutational pretreatment is presented in one 
medium (e.g., video), and the attack is presented in another (e.g., print). Previous 
research shows that both medium-different (Holbert, 2000; Pfau, Haigh, Fifrick, et al., 
2006; Pfau, Park, et al., 2001) and medium-same inoculation treatments (McGuire, 1964, 
1970; Pfau & Burgoon, 1988; Pfau, Haigh, Sims, et al., 2006; Pfau & Kenski, 1990; Pfau, 
Szabo, et al., 2001; Pfau, et al., 2002; Pfau, et al., 2003) successfully confer resistance; 
however, no study has directly compared their relative effectiveness (Pfau, et al., 2000). 
This dissertation fills that gap in the literature. It posits that differences between the 
processes elicited by each media are substantial enough to influence the relative 
effectiveness of medium-same and medium-different inoculation. This argument is 
supported by medium theory’s contention that media communicate through distinct 
processes (Chaiken & Eagly, 1983; Pfau, 1990; Pfau, et al., 2000; Worchel, et al., 1975). 
The most extreme form of this claim posits that media are epistemic (Chesebro, 1984; 
Meyrowitz, 1994). For example, it is generally accepted that audiovisual media persuade 
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via source cues, whereas print media persuade via semantic content (Chaiken & Eagly, 
1983; Keating & Latane, 1976; Meyrowitz, 1982; Pfau, 1990; Worchel, et al., 1975). This 
dissertation seeks to replicate that finding, but it also embarks on a more adventurous 
expedition into the radical proposition that media are epistemic (Chesebro, 1984; Ong, 
1982; Postman, 1982). Specifically, it tests the proposition that audiovisual media 
persuade through directly experiential processes (e.g., affect, attitude strength and attitude 
accessibility), whereas print media persuade through indirectly experiential processes 
(e.g., counterarguing). The directness of experience with an attitude object influences 
affect toward the attitude object (Fazio, et al., 1978; M. G. Millar & Millar, 1996), 
attitude strength (Fazio & Zanna, 1978b, 1978c; Regan & Fazio, 1977) and attitude 
accessibility (Fazio & Zanna, 1981). 
Inoculation confers resistance regardless of which media are enlisted for the 
refutational preemption or the persuasive attack messages (see C. An & Pfau, 2004; 
McGuire, 1962b; Pfau, Haigh, Fifrick, et al., 2006; Pfau, Park, et al., 2001). Most 
inoculation research demonstrates resistance by pairing print-mediated refutational 
pretreatments with print-mediated attack messages (McGuire, 1961; McGuire, 1962b; 
McGuire, 1964, 1970; McGuire & Papageorgis, 1961; Pfau & Burgoon, 1988; Pfau & 
Kenski, 1990; Pfau et al., 2008; Pfau, et al., 2003), but print-mediated refutational 
pretreatments are also effective against video-mediated attacks (C. An & Pfau, 2004; 
Pfau, Park, et al., 2001). And, video-mediated refutational pretreatments are effective 
against print-mediated attacks. Furthermore, video-mediated refutational pretreatments 
confer resistance to video-mediated attacks (Godbold & Pfau, 1998), and one study 
showed that video-mediated refutational pretreatments confer resistance against attacks 
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mediated by peer pressure (Pfau, et al., 1992). Indeed, regardless of the medium of 
refutational pretreatment or the medium of attack, inoculation is an effective method of 
protecting existing attitudes. Therefore, it is a simple matter to infer that print and video 
inoculation treatments confer resistance to the influence of political attack advertising.  
However, if media are epistemic (Chesebro, 1984; McLuhan, 1967; Ong, 1982), 
variations in media must influence the way in which inoculation hardens attitudes against 
counterpersuasion. Several studies of belief and attitude change demonstrate that media 
are epistemic. That is, they demonstrate that distinct media are more effective with some 
types of evidence and less effective with other types (Chaiken & Eagly, 1976; Keating & 
Latane, 1976; Pfau, 1990; Pfau, et al., 2000; Worchel, et al., 1975). For example, a 
persuasive message conveyed by a highly credible source is more effective on television 
than in print (Chaiken & Eagly, 1983; Pfau, 1990; Worchel, et al., 1975). On the other 
hand, a well-argued print message is equally persuasive whether the source is likeable or 
not (Chaiken & Eagly, 1983). The decisive factor for transforming mere information into 
belief is an attractive or highly credible source, which is to say that television’s principle 
epistemic criteria are interpersonal. Print, on the other, transforms mere information into 
belief with cogent and well-supported arguments, which is to say that print’s epistemic 
criteria are propositional or semantic. When conveyed by these media, inoculation may 
both confer resistance, even if they do so by different processes. In other words, video 
inoculation may be mediated by source considerations and print inoculation may be 
mediated by content considerations.  
Pfau and colleagues (2000) compared the processes by which video versus print 
inoculation confer resistance to persuasion. They found that video inoculation highlighted 
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source considerations in the process of resistance to persuasion. More specifically, the 
source considerations of similarity/depth, character and receptivity/trust were operative. 
Therefore, this study expected to find a similar result.  
H17a: Compared to print-mediated inoculation, video-mediated 
inoculation elicits a more favorable evaluation of the inoculation sponsor’s 
source credibility. 
H17b: Compared to print-mediated inoculation, video-mediated 
inoculation elicits a more favorable evaluation of the inoculation sponsor’s 
relational communication. 
In keeping with the assumption that print is more cognitive than video (Gore, 
2007; Krugman, 1971; Postman, 1985), Pfau et al. (2000) posited that print inoculation 
confers more counterarguing output than video inoculation. That hypothesis was not 
confirmed; instead, video inoculation was non-significantly associated with more 
counterargumentation. Even more interesting was that, compared to the control condition, 
print failed to produce statistically significant levels of counterarguing output, whereas 
video’s output was statistically significant. The authors (Pfau, et al., 2000) suggested that 
the video may have been more involving than they had assumed (see Worchel, et al., 
1975). This dissertation extends that logic. It posits that video is more like a lived 
experience than print (Keating & Latane, 1976; Worchel, et al., 1975).  
Video recreates high fidelity live experience. Print only represents it. Video can 
be understood with the untrained human senses (McLuhan, 1967; Schwartz, 1973). Print 
requires years of training, and even then, it remains a relatively impoverished and highly 
contrived form of experience. Fazio and Zanna (1981) observed that direct experience 
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makes “more information about the object available to the individual than an indirect 
experience” (p. 186). When matched against one another, video provides more access to 
potential attitude objects than print; therefore, it is a more direct experience. Of course, 
both media contain a semantic channel, but video’s semantic channel conveys the 
additional dimension of paravocalic communication, which carries substantial 
connotative and emotional meaning (Scherer, 1986). Video’s aural channel is further 
capable of recruiting music to directly elicit emotion (Balch, et al., 1999; Jamieson, 1992; 
Sousou, 1997). Video’s visual channel is particularly able to convey emotion, which it 
accomplishes through two conceptual paths: contagious affect displays (Hatfield, et al., 
1992) and emotionally evocative scenes (Jamieson, 1992), like fear or enthusiasm 
(Brader, 2005). Ultimately, the real advantage of video is its ability to strengthen attitude 
accessibility and enhance attitude certainty, which are each independent mediators of 
inoculation’s capacity to confer resistance to persuasion (Pfau, et al., 2005). In short, 
video is more emotional and experiential (Gore, 2007; Hart, 1999; Schwartz, 1973), 
whereas, print is more cognitive and reflective (Gore, 2007; Ong, 1982; Postman, 1982; 
Schwartz, 1973).  
Video’s capacity to elicit emotion is further enhanced by the presentation of vivid 
emotional cues, which are transferred through emotional contagion. Emotional contagion 
is the vicarious “catching” of another’s emotions from subtle cues embedded in affect 
displays, posture and/or paravocalics (Hatfield, et al., 1992). Although it is traditionally 
considered an interpersonal phenomenon, research shows that emotional contagion also 
operates through video and photographic depictions of emotionally charged others 
(Elaine Hatfield, et al., 1994; Hsee, et al., 1990; Hsee, Hatfield, & Chemtob, 1992; 
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Lanzetta, et al., 1985; McHugo, et al., 1985). The potency of emotional contagion is 
further enhanced by intimate camera distances (i.e., 6 to 18 inches), which are commonly 
employed on television (Meyrowitz, 1982, 1992) and in televised political discourse 
(Mutz, 2007). Research has even demonstrated emotional contagion through photos 
and/or videos of presidents (Lanzetta, et al., 1985; McHugo, et al., 1985). 
More broadly, political advertising uses both emotionally evocative visuals and 
music to elicit emotion. Televised political advertising is particularly capable of using 
visuals to create persuasive emotional connections (Brader, 2005, 2006; Jamieson, 1992). 
Westen (2007) argued that the most effective and memorable political advertisements 
provoke a symphony of emotions. For example, the Daisy Ad is replete with emotionally 
enticing visuals, like the vulnerable child and the atomic blast, which may invoke 
feelings of contentment, surprise, fear, anxiety or even anger. Music and sound effects 
are another important source of video’s power to elicit emotion (Brader, 2006; Jamieson, 
1992). In commercial advertising, emotionally evocative music influences attitudes 
toward the advertised products (Bruner, 1990; Gorn, 1982; Oakes, 2007), and substantial 
reasoning demonstrates that music in political advertising is persuasive (Jamieson, 1992).  
Unlike music, print is more likely to invoke reflection than impulsive emotional 
reactions (Gore, 2007; Postman, 1985; Schwartz, 1973). Some research shows that 
merely processing printed information mitigates the emotional consequences of affective 
phenomena, like the mere exposure effect (Zajonc, 2001). Moreover, video’s emotionally 
charged visual and aural channels are simply absent in print. Whereas print may convey 
emotion indirectly by implicating cognitive motivational relational themes (Lazarus, 
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1991b), visuals convey affect directly and even, non-consciously (Dimberg, et al., 2000; 
Elaine Hatfield, et al., 1994; Hsee, et al., 1992; Whalen, et al., 1998).  
Emotion can be elicited directly or indirectly. Emotionally evocative visuals 
(Brader, 2005; Jamieson, 1992) elicit emotion through non-cognitive processes. On the 
other hand, cognitive awareness of the relationship between one’s goals and the 
environment elicit emotion through the mediating process of cognition (Lazarus, 1991a, 
1991b). Both evocative visuals and relational themes have elicited emotion in inoculation 
research (Nabi, 2003; Pfau et al., 2008; Pfau, Szabo, et al., 2001; Pfau & Compton, 
2008). Pfau et al. (2001) compared cognitive, affective-happiness and affective-anger 
inoculation messages. The cognitive manipulation was a traditional refutational 
preemption message (McGuire, 1964), whereas the affective-happiness and affective-
anger manipulations elicited emotion with goal attainment and goal inhibition themes 
(Lazarus, 1991a, 1991b). Results showed that the affective-anger and cognitive 
treatments conferred the most resistance to persuasion. Structural equation models further 
revealed that the emotional inoculation treatments conferred resistance through both 
traditional (e.g., inoculation  threat  counterarguing  resistance) and non-
traditional processes (e.g., inoculation  threat  anger  resistance). Using similar 
inoculation treatments to Pfau et al. (2001), Pfau and colleagues (2008) revealed that 
counterarguing output was both affective and cognitive, even if cognitive counterarguing 
output dwarfed the affective counterarguing output. Nabi (2003) embedded emotionally 
evocative visuals directly into refutational preemption messages. Her results justified the 
conclusion that, “visuals can influence degree of inoculation conferred through their 
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affective level and placement within an inoculation video, above and beyond any 
argumentative or emotional impact of a message’s text” (p. 218).  
Given the capacity of video to elicit affect and print’s capacity to elicit cognitive 
reflection, it seems reasonable to posit that the former induces an affective process of 
resistance to persuasion, whereas the latter stimulates a cognitive process. Such a finding 
might help explain Pfau and colleague’s (2000) finding that video inoculation elicited 
greater threat and counterarguing output than print. Those differences, albeit slight, might 
have been the product of the additional emotional stimulation provided by the video’s 
affective content. Pfau, et al. (2001) explained that elicited anger enhances the motivation 
to defend one’s beliefs in the face of imminent counterpersuasion; therefore, Pfau and 
colleague’s (2000) video inoculation treatment may have elicited anger, which then 
manifested itself as greater threat. However, Pfau and colleagues (2000) employed a 
relatively impoverished video manipulation. It did not convey evocative visuals or 
emotional music. Given a more robust video manipulation, video may elicit greater levels 
of affect and threat.  
H18a: Compared to print-mediated inoculation, video-mediated 
inoculation elicits more inoculation-phase positive affect for the initially 
supported candidate.   
H18b: Compared to print-mediated inoculation, video-mediated 
inoculation elicits more affective associative network content about the 
initially supported candidate.    
H18c: Compared to print-mediated inoculation, video inoculation elicits 
more threat in the process of resistance to political attack advertising. 
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In terms of counterarguing, Pfau at al’s (2000) finding that video produced more of it 
may mean that video inoculation produced both affective and cognitive 
counterargumentative content, while print only produced cognitive output. That 
difference may have created a superficial impression that counterargumentation was 
greater for video. Therefore, it seems reasonable to posit that a sensitive measure, which 
can delineate affective from cognitive bolstering content, might effectively demonstrate 
that video confers resistance through affective processes, while print confers resistance 
through cognitive processes.  
H18d: Compared to print-mediated inoculation, video-mediated 
inoculation elicits less counter argumentation against potential attacks on 
the initially supported candidate. 
H18e: Compared to video-mediated inoculation, print-mediated 
inoculation elicits more cognitive associative network content.  
H18f: Compared to video-mediated inoculation, print-mediated 
inoculation elicits a less favorable evaluation of political attack 
advertising. 
As a form of direct experience, video-mediated inoculation confers resistance to 
persuasion by enhancing attitude confidence and certainty.1 Compared to attitudes 
formed with indirect experience, attitudes formed with direct experience are held with 
more certainty and confidence (Fazio & Zanna, 1978b, 1978c, 1981; Regan & Fazio, 
1977). If one accepts that direct and indirect experiential media are differentiated by the 
amount of information they convey (Fazio & Zanna, 1981), video is a more direct 
                                                 
1 See Chapter Five for a complete discussion of the argument that print is a form of indirect experience and 
video is a form of direct experience.  
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experience than print, and as such, it may operate like direct experience with respect to its 
influence on attitude strength. Therefore, it seems reasonable to posit that, compared to 
print inoculation, video inoculation is associated with greater attitude confidence and 
greater attitude certainty.  
H18g: Compared to print-mediated inoculation, video-mediated 
inoculation elicits greater phase-two attitudinal confidence regarding the 
initially supported candidate. 
H18h: Compared to print-mediated inoculation, video-mediated 
inoculation elicits more phase-two attitudinal confidence regarding the 
evaluation of the political attack advertising. 
Furthermore, existing research has demonstrated that attitude certainty is a distinct, albeit 
non-traditional, mechanism by which inoculation treatments confer resistance to 
persuasion. Given a close relationship between attitude certainty and attitude confidence, 
all three forms of elicited attitude strength might mediate the relationship between video 
inoculation and conferred resistance to persuasion.  
Finally, attitudes strengthened by video-mediated inoculation may also be 
associated with more attitude-behavior consistency than attitudes strengthened by print. 
Research has consistently demonstrated that direct experience with an attitude object 
enhances attitude-consistent behavior (Fazio & Zanna, 1978b, 1978c, 1981; M. G. Millar 
& Millar, 1996; Regan & Fazio, 1977). As would be expected, the mechanism of that 
process is attitude strength, which was frequently predicted by attitude confidence and 
certainty (Fazio & Zanna, 1978b). Since video is a more direct experience than print, 
video inoculation may be a better protector of attitude-consistent behavior.  
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H18i: Compared to print-mediated inoculation, video-mediated 
inoculation elicits more inoculation-phase attitude-behavior consistency 
between evaluation of the initially supported candidate and intention to 
vote for that candidate. 
H18j: Compared to print-mediated inoculation, video-mediated 
inoculation elicits more inoculation-phase attitude-behavior consistency 
between evaluation of the initially opposed candidate and intention to vote 
against that candidate. 
Fazio and Zana (1981) offered an attitude accessibility explanation for direct and 
indirect experience’s ability to strengthen attitudes and enhance attitude-behavior 
consistency. They reasoned that, “the more salient or available an attitude is, the more 
likely it is that the individual will access that attitude on observation of the attitude 
object” (p. 189). Fazio and Chen (in Fazio & Zanna, 1981) tested the attitude 
accessibility explanation with a response-latency paradigm. Results showed that attitudes 
formed under direct experience were more accessible than attitudes formed under indirect 
experience. Using a thinking and talking measure of attitude accessibility, at least two 
studies demonstrated an attitude accessibility explanation for inoculation’s ability to 
confer resistance to persuasion (Pfau, et al., 2004; Pfau, et al., 2003). Fazio and Chen (in 
Fazio & Zanna, 1981) found that direct experience produced an immediate increase in 
attitude accessibility. Interestingly, Pfau and colleague’s (2000) finding that video 
produced immediate resistance to persuasion might be explainable by demonstrating that 
video, like direct experience, elicits immediate attitude accessibility.  
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H18k: Compared to print-mediated inoculation, video-mediated 
inoculation elicits more phase-two attitude accessibility with respect to the 
2008 general election.   
H18l: Compared to print-mediated inoculation, video-mediated 
inoculation elicits more phase-two attitude accessibility with respect to the 
initially-supported candidate.   
H18m: Compared to print-mediated inoculation, video-mediated 
inoculation elicits more phase-two associative network content regarding 
the initially-supported candidate.   
H18n: Compared to print-mediated inoculation, video-mediated 
inoculation elicits more strongly accessible associative network content 
regarding the initially-supported candidate.   
If the aforementioned hypotheses regarding the relative processes of print and video-
mediated inoculation are validated, it stands to reason that inoculation is a more effective 
strategy when the refutational pretreatment medium matches the medium in which 
attacking counterpersuasion will appear. Media represent distinct informational 
environments (Meyrowitz, 1985; Postman, 1982), but they also represent distinct 
epistemologies or ways of knowing (Chesebro, 1984; Ong, 1982). Whether in terms of 
affect (Gore, 2007; Postman, 1985) or source considerations (Chaiken & Eagly, 1983; 
Keating & Latane, 1976; Pfau, 1990; Worchel, et al., 1975), video and print elicit distinct 
processes of influence. These distinctions have also been evidenced in inoculation 
research (Pfau, et al., 2000); however, no research has directly compared medium-same 
inoculation and medium-different inoculation. However, if distinct media highlight 
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distinct forms of information (e.g., direct experience, indirect experience, affect or source 
considerations), an inoculation medium that highlights one constellation of information 
should be more effective against attacks that highlight the same constellation of 
considerations. Therefore, to the extent that print and video inoculations operate through 
distinct processes, medium-same inoculation should confer more resistance to persuasion 
than medium-different inoculation.  
H19a: In terms of a more favorable evaluation of the targeted candidate, 
print-mediated inoculation confers more resistance to printed attacks than 
to video-mediated attacks. 
H19b: In terms of a greater intention to vote for the targeted candidate, 
printed inoculation confers more resistance to printed attacks than to 
video-mediated attacks. 
H19c: In terms of a less favorable evaluation of the implied beneficiary of 
the attack, print-mediated inoculation confers more resistance to print-
mediated attacks than to video-mediated attacks. 
H19d: In terms of a greater intention to vote for the implied beneficiary of 
the attack, print-mediated inoculation confers more resistance to printed 
attacks than to video-mediated attacks. 
H20a: In terms of a more favorable evaluation of the targeted candidate, 
video-mediated inoculation confers more resistance to video-mediated 
attacks than to printed attacks.  
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H20b: In terms of a greater intention to the vote for the targeted candidate, 
video-mediated inoculation confers more resistance to video-mediated 
attacks than to printed attacks. 
H20c: In terms of a less favorable evaluation of the implied beneficiary of 
the political attack, video-mediated inoculation confers more resistance to 
video-mediated attacks than to printed attacks. 
H20d: In terms of a lesser intention to vote for the implied beneficiary of 
the political attack, video-mediated inoculation confers more resistance to 




















This study evaluated the content of 2008 presidential advertising, its influence on 
potential voters and the potential for an inoculation message strategy to obviate that 
influence. A content analysis of the 2008 general election advertising and a three phase 
experimental study answered nearly 100 research questions and hypotheses. This section 
conveys the study’s method and procedures. It proceeds in two broad sub-sections. The 
first articulates the content analysis of over 300 political advertisements from three 
sponsors: presidential candidates, FEC-compliant political advocates and PSGs (PSG). 
The second sub-section provides a detailed account of the research design and measures 
used to estimate the effects of candidate versus PSG-sponsored attack advertising and 
generic versus candidate-specific inoculation.  
Content Analysis of 2008 Presidential Political Advertising 
The functional theory of campaign discourse (Benoit, 2006; Benoit, et al., 1997) 
was used to content analyze the 2008 televised presidential advertising. The functional 
theory assumes that vote choice is determined by a simple algorithm, which compares a 
candidate’s negative traits to her positive traits. It predicts that voters choose the 
candidate with the most positive traits and the least negative traits. It further predicts that 
campaign organizations use communication to maximize perceptions of both their own 
candidates’ positive traits and their opponents’ negative traits. Across sponsors, 
campaigns and media, the functional theory’s predictions have explained the content of 
presidential campaign advertising (Airne & Benoit, 2005; Benoit, 2000, 2001, 2003, 
2004b; Benoit & Stein, 2005). Therefore, the functional theory was deemed an 
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appropriate lens through which to evaluate the magnitude and form of negativity present 
in 2008 general election presidential spots.  
The ads for this analysis were downloaded and transcribed from The Ad Wars 
(Scheinkman, Xaquin, McLean, & Weitberg, 2009a), which is an online database of the 
presidential spots aired in the top 100 media markets from April 3, 2008 through 
November 5, 2008. The list of ads used to populate the database was created by the 
Campaign Media Analysis Group (CMAG), which uses sophisticated satellite tracking 
technology to record every political ad aired in the nation’s largest media markets 
(Campaign Media Analysis Group, 2009). A total of 19 ads were excluded because they 
were in Spanish; however, many of those were simple translations of English ads. Table 1 
displays the final sample of 325 political spots from three sponsors: candidates (171), 
PSGs (44) and FEC-compliant third parties (110). The operational definition of PSGs 
was organizations engaged in political advocacy that were not registered with the FEC. 
Federal Election Commission compliant groups, on the other hand, were those registered 
with the FEC. Ads sponsored by both the national political party and the candidate were 
considered party ads and were coded as FED-compliant ads. The candidate spots were 
those funded and created by the major party candidate’s campaign organization. The 
candidate’s campaign organizations were registered with the FEC.  
Before providing the ads to coders, the researcher unitized their semantic content 
into individual themes, which are “the smallest units of discourse that are capable of 
expressing a complete idea” (Benoit, 2000, p. 248). A single ad typically communicates 
multiple themes. For example, the McCain campaign’s ad entitled Served conveyed five 
themes: 
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[McCain Speaking] I’ve served my country since I was seventeen years old and 
spent five years longing for her shores. I came home dedicated to a cause greater 
than my own. [Theme 1] We can grow our economy, [Theme 2] we will cut 
government waste. [Theme 3] Don’t hope for a stronger economy, [Theme 4] vote 
for one. [Theme 5] 
The final sample of 325 spots was divided into 1546 themes: candidates (1043), FEC-
compliant third parties (363) and PSGs (140).  
Themes were content analyzed for their function. Thematic functions are attacks, 
acclaims or defenses (Benoit, 2006; Benoit, et al., 1997). An attack portrays “the 
opposing candidate or opposing candidate's political party in an unfavorable light” 
(Benoit, et al., 1997, p. 9). In an ad entitled Savagery, Defenders of Wildlife attacked 
Governor Sarah Palin: “As Alaska governor, Palin promotes the vicious aerial killing of 
wolves. With no chance to escape, riddled with gun shots, it's a brutal death.” In contrast 
to an attacking theme, “an acclaim portrays the sponsoring candidate or the candidate's 
political party in a favorable light” (p. 9). In an ad entitled Charlie Christ, the Republican 
National Committee acclaimed Senator John McCain: “[Governor Charlie Christ 
speaking] John McCain is uniquely qualified to lead our nation through a crisis.” Finally, 
a thematic defense “responds to a prior attack on the candidate or the candidate's political 
party” (p. 9). In an ad entitled McCain Say Anything, Obama’s campaign defended their 
candidate from an attack by Senator John McCain:   
His [i.e., McCain] defense spending attack: it’s a lie. Here’s what McCain’s own 
military advisor Robert Kagen said: ‘Obama wants to increase defense spending. 
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He wants to add 65000 troops to the Army and recruit 27000 more Marines to 
fight terrorism’. 
Finally, non-functional themes are those that do not provide an explicit reason to vote for 
or against a candidate (Benoit, 2000).  
The 2008 presidential spots were also content analyzed for topic. Functional 
themes attack, acclaim or defend with reference to one of two topics: character or policy. 
A character theme “addresses characteristics, traits, abilities, or attributes of the 
candidates” (Benoit, 2000, p. 281). In an ad entitled Surgeon, the Republican National 
Committee attacked Senator Barack Obama’s character in terms of his lack of 
experience:  
[Male Announcer] Would you get on a plane with a pilot who has never flown? 
Would you trust your child with a person who has never been with children? 
Would you go under with a surgeon who has never operated? Can you hand your 
nation to a man [Obama] who has never been in charge of anything?  
A policy theme concerns “government action or problems amendable to such action” (p. 
281). In an ad entitled Timeline, MoveOn.org attacked Senator John McCain on his 
policy position concerning Iraq: “He [McCain] will spend hundreds of millions of dollars 
more to keep our troops in Iraq for years and years.” 
Four graduate student coders identified the functions and topics conveyed by the 
sample of 2008 presidential political spots. After two coder training sessions, the team of 
content analysts articulated a single set of coding guidelines used to analyze a 10% 
sample of themes. Table 2a displays the final coder rules. Intercoder reliability was 
calculated with J. Cohen’s kappa (1960), which accounts for chance agreement between 
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coders. According to standard set forth by Landis and Koch (1977), coders achieved 
almost perfect reliability (ĸ = .92) on function and substantial reliability (ĸ = .71) on 
topic. Table 2b displays the complete reliability statistics. Upon reaching a reliable level 
of agreement, the remaining 90% of themes were divided between the four coders, who 
completed the analysis in less than two weeks.    
Political Attack Advertising and Inoculation Studies 
Participants 
Participants for both the advertising effects and the inoculation study were 
recruited from eligible voters among the undergraduate students at The University of 
South Dakota. Respondents were given class time to complete phase 1 of the study. In 
exchange for their participation, students earned course credit. Of the 387 students who 
began the study at phase 1, 383 completed phase 2 and 370 completed all three phases (a 
96% retention rate). Ultimately, another 16 respondents were dropped from the analysis 
due to substantial omissions or confounding assignment errors. The final retention rate 
was 91%.  
Research Design 
 Examination of the political advertising and the inoculation effects was 
accomplished with a three-phase pre-post randomized experimental design. The data 
collection period ran from 09/29/2008 through 11/03/2008. At phase 1, respondents 
reported their initial attitudes, feelings and behavioral intentions toward the 2008 major 
presidential candidates. Throughout the study, respondents were exposed to messages 
targeting the candidate they supported at phase 1. Therefore, the inoculation messages 
singled out impending attacks against the candidate whom the participant initially 
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supported at phase 1, and the attack messages targeted the same initially supported 
candidate. Cells were balanced so they contained about equal number of Obama and 
McCain supporters. At inoculation-phase, participants were randomly assigned to a 
media (print or video) and an inoculation condition (control, candidate-specific and 
generic). Respondents in the inoculation-control conditions (i.e., print and video) were 
further divided into attack conditions (control, candidate-sponsor and PSG-sponsor). All 
of the cells were balanced with respect to strength of party identification. Each contained 
about 1/3 weak identifiers, 1/3 moderate identifiers and 1/3 strong identifiers. A total of 
16 cells were created and statistically analyzed. On the administrative level, however, 
there were 96 cells: 2 (print versus video) by 3 (inoculation control, candidate-specific 
inoculation and generic inoculation) by 3 (attack control, candidate-sponsored and PSG-
sponsored attack) x 2 (McCain supporter and Obama supporter) x 3 (weak, moderate and 
strong partisanship). The administrative cell structures and the final cell sizes are 
displayed in Appendix 1.  
Phase One: Procedure 
 Phase1 was identical for all respondents. Public speaking instructors at The 
University of South Dakota escorted students to a large lecture hall where the researcher 
presented the study, consent materials and initial survey to respondents. The phase 1 
instrument is displayed in Appendix 2. Students expected to receive course credit in 
exchange for their participation in all three phases of the research. Students who did not 
want to participate could obtain course credit for participating in other research or by 
completing a short written assignment. Those who consented to participate were told the 
research concerned the processing of print versus video media. The phase 1 instrument 
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contained several items that confirmed the cover story. Respondents reported their 
demographic information, media use, level of consumer materialism and parasocial 
interaction with favorite television personalities. These items are currently under analysis 
in a distinct cross-sectional study of parasocial interaction’s association with consumer 
materialism. For this study, however, the relevant phase 1 questions concerned the 
respondent’s initial candidate preference and strength of partisan identification. Both 
instruments are explained in the measurement section.  
Inoculation Phase: Procedure  
 Approximately one week after completing phase 1, respondents reported for 
phase 2. Phase 2 was conducted in a conference room at The University of South 
Dakota’s temporary student union. At the start of phase 2, the researcher randomly 
assigned participants to a media and an inoculation condition. The media conditions were 
print and video. The inoculation conditions were control (i.e., no inoculation), candidate-
specific inoculation and generic inoculation. Respondents assigned to control condition 
were further divided between the attack conditions, which were to be administered at 
phase 3. All 16 cells were balanced so they contained an approximately equal number of 
respondents from each of five categories: McCain supporter, Obama supporter, weak 
partisan, moderate partisan and strong partisan. Once respondents were assigned to a 
condition, they were given a phase 2 survey and a print or video set of two inoculation 
messages. Appendix 3 displays an exemplary phase 2 instrument. Participants were 
instructed to read or watch the messages before beginning the survey. Respondents in the 
video condition were given a Zenith-brand seven inch wide LCD portable DVD player 
(model # DVP615) and a set of Koss over-the-head headphones with a frequency 
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response of 80Hz-18kHz. The researcher inserted the condition-specific DVD into the 
player, but the respondents were free to adjust the volume to a comfortable level. 
Respondents in the print condition were given two print inoculation advertisements in 
plastic slip covers. At the completion of phase 2, participants were told to return for 
phase 3 in approximately one week.  
Inoculation Phase: Messages 
Print. The print experimental materials strove for mundane realism. All 
respondents were exposed to two full-color print advertisements. Respondents in the print 
control condition were exposed to traditional commercial advertisements. Respondents in 
the inoculation conditions saw inoculation messages that were contrived to look like 
traditional print advertisements. The layout for those ads was borrowed from an Ogilvy 
(1985) design. Their semantic content was adapted from messages used in previous 
political campaign inoculation research (Pfau & Burgoon, 1988; Pfau, et al., 1990), and 
the photos in those ads were captured from screen prints of televised political advertising. 
A total of six printed inoculation ads were produced: two Obama-specific ads, two 
McCain-specific ads and two generic ads.  
The candidate-specific inoculation ads singled out the opposition candidate and 
two salient campaign issues. The threat component warned respondents of coming attacks 
from the opposition candidate, and the refutational preemption content concerned energy 
or taxes. A USA/Today Gallup poll, from early September, 2008 showed that two-thirds 
of Americans rated energy prices and the economy as the most important issues of the 
presidential campaign (Page, 2008). In fact, the economy remained the most salient issue 
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through the end of the campaign, and energy remained among the top five most important 
issues (Polling Report Incorporated, 2009).  
Except for mentioning the major party candidates, generic print inoculation ads 
did not focus on the particular discursive contours of the 2008 campaign. The generic 
threat component warned participants about the coming assault of effective attack ads, 
but they did not single out a single sponsor of those advertisements. In addition, their 
refutational preemption content derogated all forms of political attack advertising. The 
only link between the generic ads and the 2008 campaign were photos of the candidates, 
which were intended to remind respondents of the attitude object which would be 
attacked by political advertising. Excepting the 2008-specifc photos, these ads were 
intended to work for any electoral contest in which political attack advertising is an 
important mode of campaigning.  
Both the candidate-specific and the generic inoculation print advertisements were 
sponsored by a fictional political action group called Citizens for an Informed Electorate, 
which has been used in previous inoculation research (Pfau, et al., 1990). Each 
inoculation message, regardless of its content, was constructed with a similar format, 
similar visuals and a similar word count. Burgoon and colleagues (1978) recommended 
that message content across conditions should be as similar as possible. Both the 
candidate-specific and the generic inoculation print advertisements were created with 
Microsoft Publisher. Along with the control advertisements, all of the print inoculation 
ads are included in Appendix 4.  
Video. Formal inoculation messages have not been presented in a conventional 
video advertising format. Video inoculation messages have typically consisted of an 
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onscreen narrator, who is shot at a medium distance and who simply reads a typical print 
inoculation message (Pfau, et al., 2000). While some video inoculation messages have 
provided visual illustrations (Godbold & Pfau, 1998; Nabi, 2003; Pfau, et al., 1992) or 
musical background (Pfau, et al., 1992), none have employed the entire symphony of 
television advertising conventions, including music, memorable semantic content and 
compelling visuals. West (2004) reported that the Clinton team used the logic of 
inoculation in the 1992 and the 1996 presidential campaigns. In reality, the Clinton team 
employed threat messages in their speeches, but their ads consisted of nothing more than 
contrast appeals or what West called “positive attack ads” (p. 149). This study may 
provide the first illustration of a “commercialized” inoculation appeal.   
The content of the video inoculation materials in this study paralleled the content 
in the print materials. As in the print condition, the video control advertisements were 
traditional advertisements. Both control and inoculation ads were not embedded. Most 
importantly, both the semantic content and the flow of the print and video inoculation ads 
were identical. The principal investigator used Adobe’s Premier Elements 4.0 to combine 
the semantic content of the print inoculation advertisements with publicly available video 
content, photos and music. The final product was six professional looking video-
mediated inoculation advertisements. The ads were burned onto DVD’s and labeled 
according to their condition. 
The principle difference between the print and video inoculation advertisements 
was due to the inherent differences between the media. In other words, the video ads 
included narration, music and dynamic visual content. The semantic content was identical 
to the print ads, but for the video ads, it was narrated by a female colleague in department 
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of communication studies at The University of South Dakota. Furthermore, each ad 
conveyed a nearly identical musical score that emotionally punctuated each element of 
the inoculation message: threat and refutational preemption. Each ad announced its 
relationship to the presidential campaign with easily recognizable segments of Hail to the 
Chief - a synecdoche for the American presidency. Soon after, the threat component was 
reinforced with generically ominous music. Threat was followed by America the 
Beautiful, which introduced and punctuated the refutational preemption portion of the 
inoculation message. Video content was consistent with the thematic content of both the 
semantic and aural channels. An American flag waved while Hail to Chief played. 
During the threat component, short excerpts of 2008 presidential advertising were shown, 
with each excerpt separated by televised snow. The intended effect was to mimic a TV 
flipping from channel to channel only to find one negative ad after another. Visually, the 
transition between the threat and refutational preemption segments was accomplished 
with a depiction of the television turning off to reveal a white screen and the fade in of 
black text displaying the name of the ad’s sponsor: Citizens for an Informed Electorate. 
While the refutational preemption was announced in the vocal channel, “Informed 
Citizens” were shown in the viewer’s social space (for a discussion of para-proxemics, 
see Meyrowitz, 1982). The video inoculation ads can be viewed on the principal 
investigator’s You Tube Channel. Specific links to each ad are provided in Appendix 5.    
Attack Phase: Procedure  
 Respondents who completed phase 1 and phase 2 qualified to participate in phase 
3. Assignment at phase 2 facilitated the efficient administration of phase 3, which 
occurred approximately one week after phase 2. The researcher provided participants 
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with the appropriate experimental materials and survey instruments. He further instructed 
the respondents to carefully read or watch the experimental messages before beginning 
and completing the survey instrument. Upon completion of the phase 3 survey 
instrument, participants were given a debrief script and thanked for their participation. A 
phase 3 instrument is displayed in Appendix 6.  
Attack Phase: Measures 
 Video. To maintain mundane realism, experimental materials were embedded into 
television programming typically enjoyed by 18 to 24 year olds. The participants viewed 
an episode of the popular sitcom Scrubs, which “focuses on the bizarre experiences of 
fresh-faced medical intern John ‘J.D.’ Dorian (Zach Braff) as he embarks on his healing 
career in a surreal hospital crammed full of unpredictable staffers and patients” (tv.com, 
2009b). The particular episode used in this study is entitled My Big Brother (Hobert & 
Spiller, 2002): “J.D.'s older brother Dan is in town. Turk is thrown out of a patient's 
funeral for not knowing his name and feels even worse because earlier he made a bet with 
Dr. Cox over another patient's life” (tv.com, 2009a). Scrubs was syndicated on several 
cable and network channels, and it typically aired between 5 and 7 PM, which Freedman 
and colleagues (2004) report is a time slot during which political advertisements are often 
aired. A section of the Scrubs episode can be accessed through Appendix 5. 
The researcher cut two commercial breaks into the episode’s content. Each break 
consisted of three commercials. The first and third commercials were not manipulated. 
They were included to enhance the sense of mundane realism. In each break, the 
experimental commercials were placed in between the traditional spots. The control 
conditions conveyed three traditional commercial spots in each break.  
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A realistic variety of traditional commercials were used for the mundane and 
control commercials. Four commercials advertised products and two were anti-drug 
public service announcements. Appendix 5 provides a link to one of the commercial 
breaks used in the study. It displays both the flow of the break and two of the six 
mundane/control commercials.  
Each political attack condition contained two distinct advertisements that varied 
with the target of the attack. The ads targeting Obama were taken from the campaigns of 
two PSGs: Let Freedom Ring and American Issues Project. The ad sponsored by Let 
Freedom Ring attacked Obama for his ostensibly inconsistent policy positions, and the 
American Issues Project ad attacked Obama for his association with William Ayers – a 
60’s radical and violent protestor. In the PSG-sponsored condition, these ads were aired 
in their original form. In the candidate-sponsored condition, the PSG logo and disclaimer 
were edited out and replaced with a McCain disclaimer. The ads targeting McCain were 
also taken from the campaigns of two PSGs: MoveOn.org and Campaign to Defend 
America. The ad sponsored by MoveOn.org attacked McCain for his association with a 
political advisor who worked for several authoritarian regimes around the world. The ad 
sponsored by Campaign to Defend America attacked McCain for his association with 
George W. Bush and the 43rd president’s policy positions. In the PSG-sponsored 
condition, these ads were aired in their original form. In the candidate-sponsored 
condition, the PSG disclaimer was edited out and replaced with an Obama disclaimer. 
Ultimately, eight experimental ads were communicated across the attack conditions at 
phase 3. Links to the experimentally manipulated political attack ads are provided in 
Appendix 5. 
                                                                                                          
127 
 
Print. To maintain the sense of mundane realism conveyed in the video condition, 
the printed experimental ads were embedded within a series of soft-news stories taken 
from popular magazines. A total of four stories were used to approximate the effect of the 
entertaining television content in the video condition. The first story concerned an 
exposition of Jennifer Love Hewitt’s personal body image (Jessen, 2008). The second 
related to Michael Phelps’ appearance on the Kellogg’s Corn Flakes cereal box (Boehm, 
2008). The third was an explanation of mouth jewelry’s harmful influence on dental 
health (Science Daily, 2008), and the fourth was a story about Jerry Seinfeld’s pending 
appearance in a series of Microsoft ads (Vranica & Guth, 2008). A total of three pages of 
entertaining print content were separated by two sets of print advertisements. Each break 
in the print content contained three commercials. In both breaks, the first and third ads 
were mundane, and the second was the experimental advertisement. The mundane ads 
consisted of two movie ads and two anti-drug public service announcements. The control 
ads were also mundane. One advertised Hewlett Packard printers and the other advertised 
Wonder-Soft brand toilet tissue.  
The experimental print ads were adaptations of the video experimental ads. The 
adaptation was accomplished with the Ogilvy (1985) layout. In each case, an effort was 
made to preserve both the semantic and visual content of the advertisements. For each 
condition, sponsorship of the printed ads was manipulated by altering the text, logos and 
disclaimers appearing at the bottom of the attacks. Appendix 7 displays the experimental 
printed attack ads and the printed control ads.  
 
 




Initial candidate preference. Respondents nominally reported which candidate 
they initially supported. Most expressed a definitive preference, but a substantial minority 
was undecided. For them, global evaluations of the two candidates were summed 
mathematically and compared to determine which presidential candidate they preferred 
most. Global evaluation (Burgoon, Cohen, Miller, & Montgomery, 1978) was measured 
with six, 7-interval, bipolar adjective pairs: wrong/right, negative/positive, 
unfavorable/favorable, unacceptable/ acceptable, foolish/wise and bad/good. In the final 
sample, 139 respondents were considered McCain supporters and 215 were considered 
Obama supporters. With respect to the candidates, other items assessed emotions, 
behavioral intentions and attitude strength, but those measures were not directly used in 
this study’s analysis. Therefore, reliability and normality statistics were not calculated for 
those measures.  
Strength of party identification. Strength of party identification was expected to 
directly influence some of the dependent variables examined in this study, including 
attitudes toward democracy (Patterson, 2002), turnout (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995) 
and willingness to behaviorally support a particular candidate (Bartels, 2002; Campbell, 
et al., 1960). It was also expected to interact with the attack advertising conditions. 
Therefore, participants at phase one were asked to report their political party affiliation: 
Democratic (0 = no / 1 = yes), Republican (0 = no / 1 = yes) or independent (0 = no / 1 = 
yes) and their strength of partisan identification (0 = no affiliation / 7 = strong party 
affiliation). The final sample consisted of 124 Republicans, 129 Democrats and 100 non-
affiliated respondents. For non-affiliates, strength of party identification was scored as no 
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affiliation (i.e., zero). Using an approximately tripartite split, a relatively equal number of 
weak, moderate and strong partisans were assigned to each experimental message and 
control conditions. For data analytic purposes, however, a median split was used to divide 
the subjects into weak and strong partisanship conditions. Using those criteria, 177 
respondents were classified as weak partisans and 177 were classified as strong partisans. 
 Sponsor credibility. Two dimensions of sponsor credibility (McCroskey, 
Holdridge, & Toomb, 1974; McCroskey & Jensen, 1973) were measured as dependent 
variables. Competence was measured with three, 7-interval bipolar adjective pairs: 
unintelligent/intelligent, unqualified/qualified and incompetent/competent. Character was 
measured with three, 7-interval bipolar adjectives: selfish/unselfish, bad/good and 
dishonest/honest. Competence and character are common measures of credibility in both 
political communication (Pfau, Diedrich, Larson, & Van Winkle, 1993) and inoculation 
research (C. An, 2003; Pfau, Park, et al., 2001). In this study, the two dimensions were 
measured with respect to the inoculation sponsor at phase 2 and the attack sponsor at 
phase 3.  
Inoculation sponsor credibility. Respondents were asked to rate the credibility of 
the inoculation sponsor: Citizens for an Informed Electorate. Principal components 
analysis (PCA) was used to simplify inoculation sponsor credibility. Eigenvalues greater 
than one were used to determine the number of components to extract. In one iteration, 
the analysis revealed that the two credibility dimensions represented a single factor, 
which explained 68% of the variance. No variables were removed for low commonalities, 
and overall factorability was commendable (MSA = .865 and Bartlett’s Test of 
Sphericity, X2 [df = 15] = 1529, p < .001). Furthermore, all six variables loaded on a 
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single component, with the no loadings less than .76. Finally, the six-item index 
measuring inoculation sponsor credibility was highly reliable (alpha = 90.67, N = 354).  
Attack sponsor credibility. Respondents rated the credibility of the attack sponsor 
at phase 3. Principal components analysis (PCA) was used to simplify attack sponsor 
credibility. Eigenvalues greater than one were used to determine the number of 
components to extract. After a single iteration, the analysis revealed that the two 
credibility dimensions represented a single factor, which explained 76.92% of the 
variance. No variables were removed for low commonalities. In fact, the lowest 
commonality was .71, and overall factorability was commendable (MSA = .90 and 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity, X2 [df = 15] = 1183, p < .001). Furthermore, all six variables 
loaded on a single component, with the no loadings less than .84. Ultimately, the six-item 
index measuring inoculation sponsor credibility was highly reliable (alpha = 95.25, N = 
354).  
Relational communication. Relational communication (J. Burgoon & Hale, 
1987) is a useful way to measure pseudo-interpersonal interaction with mediated others 
(Pfau, 1990; Pfau et al., 2000). This study measured three dimensions of relational 
communication: immediacy/ affection, receptivity/trust and similarity/depth. Immediacy/ 
Affection was measured with four, 7-interval, Likert items, where 1 meant strongly 
disagree and 7 meant strongly agree with the following phrases: “the sponsor 
communicated a sense of warmth”; “the sponsor seemed enthusiastic in communicating 
with me”; “the sponsor seemed interested in communicating with me”; “the sponsor 
seemed involved in the communication”. Similarity/Depth was measured with four, 7-
interval, Likert items, where 1 meant strongly disagree and 7 meant strongly agree with 
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the following phrases: “the sponsor made me feel he/she was similar to me”; “the sponsor 
seemed friendly to me”; “the sponsor appeared to care whether or not I liked him or her”; 
and “the sponsor acted as if he/she would like to get to know me better”. 
Receptivity/Trust was measured with four, 7-interval, Likert items, where 1 meant 
strongly disagree and 7 meant strongly agree with the following phrases: “the sponsor 
seemed like the kind of person who would be willing to listen to me”; “the sponsor 
seemed sincere in communicating to me”; “the sponsor appeared interested in 
communicating with me”; and “the sponsor communicated a sense of honesty”.  
Relational communication was measured with respect to the Citizens for an Informed 
Electorate, who constituted the sponsor of the inoculation messages. The three-
dimensional construct was also measured with respect to the attack advertising sponsors 
at phase 3.   
 Inoculation sponsor relational communication. Respondents evaluated the 
inoculation sponsor’s (i.e., Citizens for an Informed Electorate) relational communication 
at phase 2. Principal components analysis (PCA) was used to simplify the factorability of 
the relational communication construct. Eigenvalues greater than one were used to 
determine the number of components to extract. A single iteration revealed that the three 
relational communication dimensions represented a single factor, which explained 
61.42% of the variance. No variables were removed for low commonalities, although two 
variables dipped just below .50.  Among all 12 variables, however, overall factorability 
was excellent (MSA = .94 and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity, X2 [df = 66] = 3091, p < 
.001). Furthermore, all 12 variables loaded on a single component, with the no loadings 
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less than .45. The 12-item index measuring inoculation sponsor relational communication 
was highly reliable (alpha = 90.67, N = 354).  
Attack advertising sponsor relational communication. Respondents evaluated 
the attack advertising sponsor’s relational communication at phase 2. Principal 
components analysis (PCA) was used to analyze the factorability of the attack sponsor’s 
three dimensions of relational communication. Eigenvalues greater than one were used to 
determine the number of components to extract. A single iteration revealed that the three 
relational communication dimensions represented a single factor, which explained 
76.92% of the variance. No variables were removed for low commonalities. In fact, the 
lowest communality was .50. Among all 12 variables, however, overall factorability was 
excellent (MSA = .94 and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity, X2 [df = 66] = 2205, p < .001). 
Furthermore, all 12 variables loaded on a single component, with the no loadings less 
than .71. The 12-item index measuring inoculation sponsor relational communication was 
highly reliable (alpha = 95.54, N = 354).  
Positive affective evaluation. Affective evaluations represent one of four 
attitudinal dimensions (Breckler, 1984; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, 1998; Krosnick, et al., 
1993; Rosenberg & Hovland, 1960). This study’s three-item index of positive emotion 
was developed by Dillard and colleagues (Dillard, Plotnick, Godbold, Freimuth, & Edgar, 
1996; Smith & Dillard, 1997). Respondents were asked to report the extent to which a 
particular attitude object made them feel happy, cheerful or content, where one meant 
none of the feeling and seven meant a lot of the feeling. This scale has been used in other 
inoculation research examining the role of emotion in the process of resistance to 
persuasion (Pfau et al., 2008; Pfau, Szabo, et al., 2001). It has also been used in medium 
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theory research examining the distinct influences of printed words versus vivid 
photographs (Pfau, Haigh, Fifrick, et al., 2006). At phase 2, participants reported their 
level of positive affect for their initially supported candidate (alpha = 92.26, N = 354). At 
phase 3, they reported their level of positive affect for the candidate whom they initially 
opposed (alpha = 91.74, N = 354). 
Negative affective evaluation. This study’s three-item index of negative emotion 
was developed by Dillard and colleagues (Dillard, et al., 1996 Freimuth, & Edgar, 1996; 
Smith & Dillard, 1997). Respondents reported the extent to which a particular attitude 
object made them feel irritated, annoyed and angry, where one meant none of the feeling 
and seven meant a lot of the feeling. This scale has been used in other inoculation (Pfau 
et al., 2008; Pfau, Szabo, et al., 2001) and medium theory research (Pfau, Haigh, Fifrick, 
et al., 2006). At phase 3, participants reported their level of negative affect for the 
candidate whom they opposed at phase 1 (alpha = 95.26, N = 354).  
Associative network content. Associative networking captures “the structure of 
meaning for a given subject” (Novak, 1990, p. 227). The technique was designed as an 
educational tool, but it works in any domain (Novak, 1998), and more specifically, it has 
been used in inoculation research (Pfau, et al., 2005). To capture the structure of 
participants’ attitudes about their initially preferred candidate, they were asked to create 
an associative network based on an illustrative example. Such a network consists of 
circles (i.e., nodes) displaying concisely worded thoughts or feelings, which are 
connected to one another with a spider-like web of associative lines. See Appendix 3 to 
view an exemplary concept map. After viewing that example, participants were prompted 
to construct a concept map depicting their own associations with the candidate whom 
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they supported at phase 1. Associative network content was evaluated for the number of 
nodes (N = 354) and the number of links (N = 353) respondents generated.  
Associative network accessibility. Associative network content was evaluated for 
its strength of perceptual fluency. Participants were asked to rate the strength of each 
node on scale of one to seven, where one meant very weak and 7 meant very strong (N = 
354).      
Affective and cognitive associative network content. The respondent’s 
associative network content was finally evaluated for its relative cognitive and affective 
content. That effort was accomplished with the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count 
(LIWC) dictionary and computerized content analysis program, which has successfully 
categorized cognitive and affective content in a variety of contexts (Dijikic, Oatley, & 
Perterson, 2006; Handelman & Lester; J. H. Kahn, Tobin, Massey, & Anderson, 2007; 
Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 2001).  LIWC (Pennebaker, et al., 2001) also 
distinguished the level of emotion in writings by physicists versus fiction writers (Dijikic, 
et al., 2006) and suicide completers and attempters (Handelman & Lester, 2007). LIWC 
has even delineated the subtle emotional differences in writings of those who recently 
viewed an amusing, as opposed to, a sad film clip (J. H. Kahn, et al., 2007). LIWC 
operates by comparing a computer text file to its dictionary of over 78 word categories, 
including positive affect, negative affect and cognition. For any text file, LIWC provides 
a percentage of affective words and a percentage of cognitive words. By using 
percentages, as opposed to absolute numbers, LIWC allows comparisons of files 
consisting of unequal word lengths (Pennebaker et al., 2001). LIWC was used to assess 
the affective and cognitive content of the associative networks. For each associative 
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network, LIWC provided an affective and a cognitive value, which was expressed on a 
scale of 0 to 100. The affective and cognitive content of each of these categories was then 
averaged and summed to provide a summative cognitive and affective value for each 
participant’s networks. 
Counter argumentation. Counterargumentation is considered a core inoculation 
process (Pfau, 1997; Pfau et al., 2008; Pfau, et al., 1997). As others have (Pfau, et al., 
2000; Pfau, et al., 1997), this study operationally defined counterarguing with a thought 
listing exercise inspired by Brock (1967) and Greenwald (1968). Participants generated a 
list of counterarguments they considered while completing the attitude measures. 
Subsequently, participants were instructed to generate responses to each of the listed 
counterarguments. Counter argumentation was assessed by summing the number of 
counter arguments with their responses. Unfortunately, several participants failed to 
complete the counter argumentation measure, or they completed incorrectly. They were 
eliminated from the analysis (N = 339).  
Attitude confidence. Attitude confidence is a dimension of attitude strength 
(Krosnick & Abelson, 1991). Participants rated the confidence of their attitudes with 
four, 7-interval, bipolar adjectives: right/wrong; confident/not confident; 
certain/uncertain; negative/positive; sure/unsure (M. Burgoon, et al., 1978). At phase 2, 
respondents reported the confidence of their attitudes regarding negative political 
advertising (alpha = 92, N = 354), the initially supported candidate (alpha = 90.93, N = 
354) and the initially opposed candidate (alpha = 94.53, N = 354).   
Global evaluation. Cognitive evaluations represent one of the four attitudinal 
dimensions (Breckler, 1984; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, 1998; Krosnick, et al., 1993; 
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Rosenberg & Hovland, 1960). They were assessed as global (Burgoon, Cohen, Miller, & 
Montgomery, 1978) toward several specific attitude objects across phases 2 and 3. The 
concept was measured with six, 7-interval, bipolar adjective pairs: wrong/right, 
negative/positive, unfavorable/favorable, unacceptable/ acceptable, foolish/wise and 
bad/good. At phase 2, respondents reported their global evaluation of negative political 
advertising (alpha = 91.85, N = 354), their initially supported candidate (alpha = 92.26, N 
= 354) and the initially opposed candidate (alpha = 95.05, N = 354). At phase 3, 
respondents reported their global evaluation of the arguments presented in attack 
advertising (alpha = 96.79, N = 354), their initially supported candidate (alpha = 96.57, N 
= 354) and the initially opposed candidate (alpha = 95.67, N = 354).  
Attitude accessibility. Attitude accessibility is a dimension of attitude strength 
(Krosnick, et al., 1993).  It refers to the amount of time it takes to conjure an attitude 
from memory (Fazio, Chen, McDonel, & Sherman, 1982). Typically, it is measured with 
timed response latency measures; however, Krosnick and colleagues (1993) found that a 
simple thinking and talking paradigm correlated highly with response latency. This study 
used the thinking and talking paradigm, which included two, 7-interval, Likert-type 
items, where one meant “rarely” and seven meant “often” in response to two questions. 
The first asked participants, “Compared to other issues, how often do you think about the 
issue of presidential politics?” The second question asked, “Compared to other issues, 
how often do you discuss with friends, family members, or others the issue of presidential 
politics?” Inoculation research has often used the thinking and talking paradigm to assess 
attitude accessibility (Pfau & Compton, 2008; Pfau, et al., 2004; Pfau, et al., 2003). At 
phase 2, attitude accessibility was evaluated with respect to the 2008 presidential election 
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(alpha = 92.03, N = 354), the initially supported candidate (alpha = 92.13, N = 354) and 
the initially opposed candidate (alpha = 93.46, N = 354).    
Vote intention. Behavioral intentions represent one of four attitudinal dimensions 
(Breckler, 1984; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, 1998; Rosenberg & Hovland, 1960). In this 
study, behavioral intention was assessed with a single, 7-interval, Likert-type item, where 
1 meant very unlikely and 7 meant very likely that the respondent would “go to the polls 
and vote for the candidate on Election Day”. This measure has been used as a behavioral 
indicator in both inoculation (C. An & Pfau, 2004a) and general political communication 
research (Pfau, et al., 2007; Pfau, Park, et al., 2001). At phase 2, vote intention was 
measured with respect to the initially supported candidate (N = 354) and the initially 
opposed candidate (N = 351). At phase 3, it was also measured with respect to the 
initially supported candidate (N = 354) and the initially opposed candidate (N = 350).  
Threat. Threat was measured at phase 2. Threat is an essential component of 
inoculation process (Pfau, 1997; Szabo & Pfau, 2002). Participants were asked to 
“respond to the prospect that they could come into contact with persuasive messages that 
might cause them to rethink their position on the issue in questions”. Available responses 
included five, 7-interval, bipolar adjective pairs: unintimidating/intimidating, 
safe/dangerous, not harmful/ harmful, non-threatening/threatening, and not risky/risky. 
For nearly 30 years, this measure has validated threat’s central role in the inoculation 
process (Pfau & Burgoon, 1988; Pfau, et al., 2008; Pfau, Szabo, et al., 2001; Pfau, et al., 
1997). It was measured at phase 2 (alpha = 92.77, N = 354). 
Democratic political efficacy. For more than 50 years, democratic political 
efficacy has been measured by the ANES (The American National Election Studies, n.d.). 
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This study used two items from that scale. Those Likert items asked participants to rate 
their agreement with two statements, where one meant strongly disagree and seven meant 
strongly agree: “people like me don’t have any say in what the government does” and 
“public officials don’t care much what people like me think”.  The NES external political 
efficacy measures have been used in previous research estimating the influence of 
advertising tone on democratic process variables (Finkel & Geer, 1998). Democratic 
political efficacy was measured at phase 3 (alpha = 76.47, N = 354). 
Trust in American government. Trust in the officials and institutions enacting 
American government is an important indicator of political legitimacy. The ANES has 
measured trust in American government since the late 1950’s. This study borrowed four 
items from that measure. The Likert items asked participants to rate their agreement with 
four statements, where one meant strongly disagree and seven meant strongly agree: “I 
can always trust the government in Washington to do what is right”; “the government is 
pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves. It is not run for the 
benefit of all people”; “the government wastes a lot of money we pay in taxes”; and 
“quite a few people running the government are crooked”.  Similar measures have been 
used in a variety of studies examining negative advertising’s demobilizing influence 
(Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; Ansolabehere, et al., 1994a; Dardis, et al., 2008). Trust 









ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Data analysis was performed with a variety of strategies tailored to their particular 
research questions or hypotheses. Chi-square tests for independence evaluated the content 
of 2008 presidential campaign advertising. Between-subject factorial univariate analyses 
of variance and independent sample t-tests estimated the influence of attack advertising 
and the inoculation effects. Significant omnibus results were followed up with pairwise 
or interaction contrast analyses. In cases requiring path analytic examinations of process 
variables, regression-based mediation analyses were employed (Baron & Kenny, 1986; 
Kenny, 2008). And, comparisons between partial correlations were tested with Fischer’s r 
to z transformations (J. Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). 
Data Assumptions 
Missing data. An examination of individual items within the three questionnaires 
revealed that no item contained more than 5% missing data, and in fact, most items did 
not contain any missing data (N = 354). Missing data was truly random. Every subject 
provided at least two responses on every scale; therefore, missing data was replaced with 
the mean of nearby points within subject and within the scale from which the data was 
missing. This approach was justified by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) who reported that 
less than 5% missing data is “less serious and almost any procedure for handling missing 
values yields similar results” (p.63).  
Outliers. Using +/- 4 standard deviations from the mean as the criteria, each 
variable was examined for outlying cases. Because outliers were significantly different 
from the rest of the sample, they were excluded from the final analysis. Indeed, the 
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chance that outliers belonged to the same population as other respondents was 1:31,574 
or less than 0.00003%. Excepting the associative network and counter-argumentation 
variables, a total of 8 outliers were discovered. Those cases were excluded from any 
analyses involving the variables in which the outliers appeared. A similar procedure was 
applied to the associative network and counter-argumentation variables. Those three 
variables (i.e., affective associative network content, cognitive associative network 
content and total counter-argumentation) yielded a total of 10 cases with outliers. Again, 
the outliers were simply excluded. An unreported analysis revealed that these deletions 
did not substantively influence the final results.   
Normality. Skew and kurtosis statistics for the examined variables are displayed 
in Table 4b. Several variables were significantly skew or kurtosis. As per the 
recommendations of Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), several transformations were applied 
to the offending variables, but the overall distributions were not substantially improved. 
Therefore, the original data was used for the final analysis.   
General Analysis Strategies 
An assortment of independent sample t-tests and between-subjects univariate 
factorial analyses of variance evaluated most of the hypotheses and research questions. 
The independent variables for these tests were inoculation condition (control, inoculation 
against candidate-sponsored attack ads and generic inoculation against all political attack 
ads), attack (control, candidate-sponsored attack ads and PSG-sponsored attack ads), 
media (print versus video), media match (media match versus media mismatch) and/or 
partisanship (weak versus strong). Although the configuration of independent factors 
varied from test to test, three groups of dependent variables remained intact across three 
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groups of mean comparisons: inoculation-phase inoculation processes, attack-phase 
attack outcomes and attack-phase inoculation outcomes. Table 4 displays these variable 
sets.   
When ANOVA omnibus results revealed significant effects or interactions, 
contrast analyses examined specific differences. Critical values for those contrasts were 
calculated with the t-table, as opposed the F-table. This method of calculating contrast 
analyses accommodates heterogeneous variance and unequal cell sizes. It relies on 
standard errors of the implicated means, as opposed to the omnibus error term (Keppel & 
Wickens, 2004). Because using these variances alters the assumptions of the normal t-
distribution, the critical value approximation required an adjusted degree of freedom 
value (Satterthwaite, 1941, 1946). Formulas for the contrast analyses are displayed in the 
included footnote.2  
This study also employed a regression-based mediation analysis strategy (Baron 
& Kenny, 1986; Kenny, 2008). Kenny’s (2008) procedure is based on three distinct 
regression equations. The first regresses the outcome variable on the antecedent variable 
(path c1). The second regresses the intervening variable on the antecedent variable (path 
a), and the third regresses the outcome on both the antecedent and the intervening 
variables (paths [c2] and [b]). Results from these regression analyses produce four signs 
needed to determine an intervening variable’s role in the relationship between an 
                                                 
2 The t value of the modified contrast analyses was calculated by dividing the contrast value by an 
estimate of the local standard error. The formulas used to perform the calculations relied on the 
properties of the groups involved in the contrast:   /  and ∑ /  . Keppel and 
Wickens (2004) reported that “the unequal variances give the test statistic a sampling distribution that 
differs from the normal t distribution” (p. 157). Thus, a modified sampling distribution was examined 
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antecedent and an outcome variable. The first is the relationship between the antecedent 
and outcome variable (path c1). The second is the relationship between the antecedent 
variable and the intervening variable (path a). The third is the relationship between the 
intervening variable and the outcome variable, while controlling for the influence of the 
antecedent variable (path [b]). The fourth sign is the relationship between the antecedent 
and the outcome variable, after controlling for the influence of the intervening variable 
(path [c2]). Three conditions must be met to make a strong case for intervention. First, the 
relationship between the antecedent and the intervening variable must be substantial and 
ideally, it should be significant. Second, the relationship between the antecedent and 
outcome variable must be substantially altered by the addition of the intervening variable, 
and third, the difference between paths c1 and paths [c2] must be significantly different as 
determined by some statistical measure (e.g., Sobel, 1982).  If path [c2] is significantly 
smaller than path c1, then the process variable is said to mediate the relationship between 
the antecedent and the outcome variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Judd & Kenny, 1981). 
Alternatively, if path [c2] is significantly larger than path c1, the process variable is said 
to suppress the relationship between the antecedent and the outcome variable 
(MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002). 
The Fischer’s r to z transformation was used as a test of significant difference 
between two independent correlations (J. Cohen, et al., 2003). This test transforms r 
values into z values and divides the difference by their shared variation. The resulting z 
value maps onto the standard normal distribution. If it is greater than 1.96, the two 
correlations are significantly different.  
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Thematic Content of Political Attack Advertising 
Functions of PSG versus Candidate Advertising Content: Hypothesis H1a  
Hypothesis 1a predicted that 2008 PSG (PSG) sponsored advertising was more 
negative than candidate-sponsored political advertising. A chi-square test for 
independence between advertising sponsorship (PSG versus candidate) and ad function 
(acclaim versus attack) revealed that the thematic content of 2008 general election 
advertising depended on sponsorship, χ2(1, N = 1094) = 46.94, p < .001, V = .21. 
Candidates attacked less (51%) than PSGs (82%). Therefore, H1a was confirmed.3 In the 
2008 general presidential election, PSG-sponsored political advertising was 
proportionately more negative than candidate-sponsored political advertising. Table 5a 
provides complete descriptive statistics for the functional themes of candidate and PSG-
sponsored advertising.   
Functions of FEC Approved versus PSG Advertising Content: H1b  
 Hypothesis 1b posited that 2008 PSG-sponsored political was more negative than 
FEC-approved third-party political advertising. A chi-square test for independence 
revealed that the relationship between advertising sponsorship and ad function was 
significant, 2(1, N = 471) = 3.79, p = .05, V = .09. PSG-sponsored ads (82%) attacked 
more than FEC approved third-party ads (73.6%). Thus, H1b received strong support. 
Table 5b provides descriptive statistics for the PSG and FEC functional themes of 2008’s 
general election presidential advertising content. 
Relative Topics of PSG, Candidate and FEC Advertising Content - H2a, H2b and 
RQ1  
                                                 
3 To avoid redundancy, I henceforth refrain from using the terms “significantly’ and “non-significantly”; 
rather, I highlight differences and lack of differences. In rare instances, I use those terms when significance 
levels are controversial (e.g., when a test is significant by a marginal or one-tailed standard). 
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 Hypotheses 2a, H2b and RQ1 concerned the topics of attacking themes in the 
content of 2008 presidential political advertising. A single chi-square test of 
independence evaluated the relationship between attack advertising sponsorship (PSG, 
FEC-compliant and candidate-sponsored) and attacking topic (policy versus character). 
Sponsorship was related to the thematic topic, X2(2, N = 844) = 29.13, p < .001, V = .19. 
PSG attacks emphasized character more than policy (55%). In contrast, the attacks of 
FEC-compliant organizations (54%) and candidates (69%) emphasized policy more than 
character. This pattern validated the expectations of H2a and H2b, which posited that 
candidate-sponsored attack advertising emphasized policy more than character and PSG-
sponsored attacks emphasized character more than policy. In response to RQ1, the 
analysis showed that FEC-compliant third-party ads emphasized policy more than 
character. Table 5c displays the complete descriptive statistics for the analysis of H2a, 
H2b and RQ1.   
Attack-Phase Attack Outcomes 
Inoculation Phase: Sponsor Credibility - H3 
 Hypothesis 3 posited that PSG-sponsored attack advertising elicits a more 
favorable evaluation of the sponsor’s credibility than candidate-sponsored attacks. A 
three-way between-subjects factorial analysis of variances estimated the influence of 
attack sponsorship (PSG versus candidate), media (print versus video) and partisanship 
(low versus high) on sponsor credibility. Omnibus results are displayed in Table 6a. 
There was no main effect for the attack condition, F(1, 76) = .61, p = .44, η2 = .008. 
Therefore, H3 was not confirmed. The influence of attack advertising on sponsor 
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credibility did not differ between the sponsorship conditions (candidate: M = 2.83, SD = 
1.19, N = 42 versus PSG: M = 3.03, SD = 1.32, N = 42).  
Inoculation Phase: Global Evaluation of the Implied Beneficiary - H4a, H5a, H6a, 
H11a and RQ4a  
Hypotheses 4a, 5a, 6a, 11a and RQ4a posited that political attack advertising 
sponsorship influences global evaluation of the message’s implied beneficiary. All 
inoculation conditions were deselected for this analysis, so only the attack conditions 
were considered. This approach is typical for inoculation research examining both the 
independent influence of particular attacks and inoculation’s ability to obviate that 
influence (see Pfau, Park, Holbert and Cho, 2001).  
A three-way between-subjects analysis of variance evaluated the influence of 
political attack advertising (none, candidate and PSG), media (print versus video) and 
partisanship (weak versus strong) on global evaluation of the implied beneficiary of the 
attacks. Table 6b displays the omnibus findings from the analysis. There was no main 
effect for the attack condition, F(2, 118) = .04, p = .96, η2 = .0007, which is to say that 
the attacks did not influence global evaluation for their implied beneficiary. Contrary to 
the expectation of H4a, PSG-sponsored advertising (M = 3.18, SD = 1.32, N = 42) did not 
elicit a more favorable evaluation of the implied beneficiary than candidate-sponsored 
attacks (M = 3.07, SD = 1.40, N = 42). In addition, the analysis also failed to confirm H5a 
and H6a. Neither the candidate nor the PSG-sponsored attacks were more influential than 
the control condition (M = 3.07, SD = 1.32, N = 24). Results were similarly disappointing 
for H11a. There was no attack by partisan interaction, F(2, 118) = .20, p = .82, η2 = .003. 
The influence of candidate-sponsored attacks did not differ between weak (M = 3.53, SD 
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= 1.19, N = 24) and strong partisans (M = 2.45, SD = 1.45, N = 18). Finally, the answer to 
RQ4a was that the influence of PSG-sponsored attacks did not differ between weak (M = 
3.69, SD = 1.06, N = 26) and strong (M = 2.35, SD = 1.30, N = 16) partisans.  
Inoculation Phase: Intention to Vote for the Implied Beneficiary - H4b, H5b, H6b, 
H11b and RQ4b  
 Hypotheses 4b, 5b, 6b, 11b and RQ4b posited that the attack advertising 
conditions elicit differing intentions to vote for the implied beneficiary of the attack. A 
three-way between-subjects univariate analysis of variance evaluated the influence of 
attack (none, candidate and PSG), media (print versus video) and partisanship (weak 
versus strong) on intention to vote for the implied beneficiary. Omnibus results are 
displayed in Table 6c. There was not an attack main effect, F(2, 118) = 1.08, p = .34, η2 = 
.019. The control (M = 1.40, SD = .93, N = 46), candidate (M = 1.59, SD = 1.08, N = 42) 
and PSG (M = 1.76, SD = 1.21, N = 42) sponsored conditions did not significantly differ. 
Therefore, H4b’s prediction that PSG attacks are more influential than candidate attacks 
was not  confirmed; H5b’s expectation that candidate-sponsored attacks are more 
influential than no attack was not confirmed; and H6b’s claim that PSG attacks are more 
influential than the control condition was not confirmed. Furthermore, attack did not 
interact with partisanship, F(2, 118) = .98, p = .38, η2 = .016. Contrary to H11b, the 
influence of the candidate-sponsored attack did not differ between weak (M = 2.04, SD = 
1.27, N = 24) and strong (M = 1.00, SD = 1.00, N = 18) partisans. Hypotheses 4b, 5b, 6b 
and 11b were not confirmed, and the answer to RQ4b was that the influence of PSG-
sponsored attacks on intention to vote for the implied beneficiary did not differ between 
weak (M = 1.96, SD = 1.28, N = 26) and strong (M = 1.28, SD = 1.26, N = 16) partisans.   
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Inoculation Phase: Global Evaluation of the Targeted Candidate - H4c, H5c, H6c, 
H11c and RQ4c  
Collectively, H4c, H5c, H6c, H11c and RQ4c posited that the advertising 
conditions differ on their association with global evaluation of the targeted candidate. A 
three-way between-subjects univariate ANOVA evaluated the influence of attack (control 
none, candidate and PSG), media (print versus video) and partisanship (weak versus 
strong) on phase three global evaluation of the targeted candidate. Table 6d displays 
omnibus findings for the analysis. There was not an attack main effect, F(2, 118) = 1.17, 
p = .31, η2 = .02. PSG (M = 5.24, SD = 1.30, N = 42) attack advertising was not more 
influential than candidate (M = 5.04, SD = 1.12, N = 42) attack advertising, and neither 
the candidate nor the PSG-sponsored attack conditions were more influential than the 
control condition (M = 5.40, SD = 1.24, N = 46). Therefore, H4c’s prediction that PSG 
attacks are more influential than candidate attacks was not confirmed; H5c’s expectation 
that candidate-sponsored attacks are more influential than the control condition was 
unconfirmed; and H6c’s claim that PSG attacks are more influential than the control 
condition was not confirmed. Furthermore, attack did not interact with partisanship, F(2, 
118) = .80, p = .45, η2 = .01. Contrary to H11c, the influence of the candidate-sponsored 
attacks did not differ between weak (M = 4.72, SD = 1.11, N = 24) and strong (M = 5.73, 
SD = 1.08, N = 18) partisans. None of the hypotheses were confirmed, and the answer to 
RQ4c is that the influence of PSG-sponsored attacks on global evaluation of the targeted 
candidate does not differ between weak (M = 4.78, SD = 1.23, N = 26) and strong (M = 
5.99, SD = 1.07, N = 16) partisans.   
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Inoculation Phase: Intention to Vote for the Targeted Candidate - H4d, H5d, H6d, 
H11d and RQ4d  
Hypotheses 4d, 5d, 6d and 11d claimed that the attack conditions elicit differing 
intentions to vote for the targeted candidate. A three-way between-subjects univariate 
ANOVA calculated the influence of attack (none, candidate and PSG), media (print 
versus video) and partisanship (weak versus strong) on intention to vote for the targeted 
candidate. As revealed in Table 6e, there was no main effect for the attack condition, F(2, 
118) = .90, p = .41, η2 = .015. The control (M = 5.46, SD = 1.92, N = 46), candidate (M = 
4.73, SD = 2.38, N = 42) and PSG (M = 4.86, SD = 2.15, N = 42) sponsored attack 
advertisements did not differ on their association with intention to vote for the targeted 
candidate. Therefore, H4d’s prediction that PSG attacks are more influential than 
candidate attacks was not confirmed; H5d’s expectation that candidate-sponsored attacks 
are more influential than the control condition was unconfirmed; and H6d’s claim that 
PSG attacks are more influential than the control condition was not confirmed. 
Furthermore, the attack by partisanship interaction was not significant, F(2, 118) = .42, p 
= .66, η2 = .007. Hypothesis 11d was unconfirmed. The influence of candidate attacks ads 
did not differ between weak (M = 3.83, SD = 2.37, N = 24) and strong (M = 5.94, SD = 
1.83, N = 18) partisans. Ultimately, H4d, H5d, H6d and H11d were not confirmed, and 
the answer to RQ4d is that the influence of PSG-sponsored attacks on intention to vote 
for the targeted candidate does not differ between weak (M = 4.04, SD = 2.14, N = 26) 
and strong (M =6.19, SD = 1.38, N = 16) partisans.   
Inoculation Phase: Democratic Political Efficacy - H7a RQ2a, RQ3a and RQ5a  
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 Hypothesis 7a, RQ2a, RQ3a and RQ5a posited claims and questions about the 
relationship between the attack condition and democratic political efficacy. A three-way 
between-subjects univariate analysis of variance was calculated to examine the influence 
of attack (control, candidate and PSG), media (print versus video) and partisanship (weak 
versus strong) on democratic political efficacy. The omnibus results are displayed in 
Table 6f. They show there was not a main effect for attack condition, F(2, 118) = 1.17, p 
= .31, η2 = .019. No differences were found between the candidate (M = 3.77, SD = 1.28, 
N = 42) PSG (M = 3.58, SD = 1.49, N = 42) and control (M = 3.99, SD = 1.53, N = 46) 
conditions. Therefore, H7a was not confirmed. Compared to the control condition, 
candidate-sponsored attack advertising does not elicit less democratic political efficacy. 
In addition, the answer to RQ2a is that PSG-sponsored attacks do not influence 
democratic political efficacy. Furthermore, the attack by partisan interaction was not 
significant, F(2, 118) = .02, p = .98, η2 = .0003. Thus, the answer to RQ3a is that 
candidate-sponsored attacks do not elicit differing levels of democratic efficacy for weak 
(M = 4.40, SD = 1.02, N = 24) versus strong (M = 4.63, SD = 1.06, N = 18) partisans. 
Finally, the answer to RQ5a is that PSG-sponsored attacks do not elicit different levels of 
democratic efficacy for weak (M = 4.35, SD = 1.05, N = 26) versus strong (M = 4.22, SD 
= .82, N = 16) partisans. 
Inoculation Phase: Trust in American Government - H7b, RQ2b, RQ3b and RQ5b  
Hypothesis 7b, RQ2b, RQ3b and RQ5b examined the relationship between the 
attack condition and trust in American government. A three-way between-subjects 
univariate analysis of variance was calculated to examine the influence of attack (control, 
candidate and PSG), media (print versus video) and partisanship (weak versus strong) on 
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trust of American government. The omnibus results are displayed in Table 6g. They show 
that the attack conditions did not differ, F(2, 118) = 1.42, p = .25, η2 = .02. Neither the 
candidate (M = 4.49, SD = 1.03, N = 42) nor the PSG (M = 4.29, SD = .96, N = 42) 
sponsored attack conditions differed from control (M = 4.13, SD = 1.06, N = 46) on trust 
in American government. Therefore, H7b was not confirmed, and the answer to RQ2b is 
that exposure to PSG-sponsored attack advertising does not influence trust in American 
government. Furthermore, the attack by partisan interaction was not significant, F(2, 118) 
= .39, p = .68, η2 = .006. Thus, the answer to RQ3b is that candidate-sponsored attacks do 
not elicit differing levels of democratic trust for weak (M = 4.39, SD = 1.02, N = 24) 
versus strong partisans (M = 4.63, SD = 1.06, N = 18). Finally, the answer to RQ5b is that 
PSG-sponsored attacks do not elicit differing levels of democratic trust between weak (M 
= 4.35, SD = 1.05, N = 26) and strong (M = 4.22, SD = .82, N = 16) partisans. 
Relative Processes of Print versus Video-mediated Attack Advertising Influence: 
H8a-H8c  
Hypothesis 8a. Hypothesis 8a posited that evaluation of sponsor credibility 
intervenes in the process of video-mediated attack advertising’s influence on intention to 
vote for the targeted candidate. The print and inoculation conditions were removed from 
this mediation analysis, which is graphically depicted in Figure 1a.  Path a was calculated 
by regressing evaluation of sponsor credibility on exposure to video-mediated attack 
advertising, R2 = .23, F(2, 65) = 10.74, p < .05. Path c1 was calculated by regressing 
intention to vote for the targeted candidate on exposure to the video-mediated attack 
advertising, R2 = .17, F(2, 65) = 7.81, p < .05. Finally, paths [b] and [c2] were calculated 
by regressing intention to vote for the targeted candidate on exposure to video-mediated 
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attack advertising and evaluation of the sponsor’s credibility, R2 = 13.85, F(3, 64) = 
13.85, p < .05. Evaluation of sponsor credibility intervened in the process of video-
mediated attack advertising’s influence on intention to vote for the targeted candidate 
(Sobel = 2.78. p < .05).  
Video attack advertising influenced vote intention for the target through two 
distinct and opposing routes. The direct route was negative, which means that exposure to 
the video attack predicted a lesser intention to vote for the target. The indirect route 
consisted of two negative paths that, when multiplied, produced a positive route. The first 
negative path was between exposure to the video attack and sponsor credibility. The 
second was between sponsor credibility and vote intention. The net effect of the video 
attack through the indirect route was to increase intention to vote for the target. In other 
words, perceptions of the attack sponsor’s credibility suppressed the negative relationship 
between exposure to the video attack and intention to vote for the target, which explains 
why removing sponsor credibility, increased the magnitude of the direct and negative 
relationship. Therefore, H8a was confirmed. In part, perceptions of sponsor credibility 
intervened in the relationship between video attack advertising and vote intention. 
Hypothesis 8b. Hypothesis 8b posited that evaluation of sponsor relational 
communication intervenes in the process of video-mediated attack advertising’s influence 
on intention to vote for the targeted candidate. The print and inoculation conditions were 
removed from this mediation analysis, which is graphically depicted in Figure 1b. Path a 
was calculated by regressing evaluation of the sponsor’s relational communication on 
exposure to video-mediated attack advertising, R2 = .17, F(2, 65) = 7.81, p < .05. Path c1 
was calculated by regressing intention to vote for the targeted candidate on exposure to 
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the video-mediated attack advertising, R2 = .15, F(2, 65) = 6.82, p < .05. Finally, paths 
[b] and [c2] were calculated by regressing intention to vote for the targeted candidate on 
exposure to the video-mediated attack advertising and evaluation of the sponsor’s 
relational communication, R2 = .25, F(3, 64) = 8.28, p < .05. Ultimately, relational 
communication intervened in the process of video-mediated attack advertising’s 
influence on intention to the vote for the targeted candidate (Sobel = 2.11, p < .05). 
Exposure to video-mediated attack advertising was negatively related to evaluation of the 
sponsor’s relational communication, and relational communication was negatively 
associated with intention to vote for the targeted candidate. Mirroring the intervention of 
sponsor credibility in H8b, evaluation of sponsor relational communication suppressed 
the influence of video attack advertising on intention to vote for the targeted candidate. 
Statistically removing evaluation of the sponsor’s relational communication strengthened 
the negative relationship between exposure to video attack advertising and intention to 
vote for the targeted candidate. Hypothesis 8b was confirmed.   
Hypothesis 8c. Hypothesis 8c posited that evaluation of the attack message 
intervenes in the process of print-mediated attack advertising’s influence on intention to 
vote for the targeted candidate. The video and inoculation conditions were removed from 
the mediation analysis, which is graphically depicted in Figure 1c. Path a was calculated 
by regressing argument evaluation on exposure to print-mediated attack advertising, R2 = 
-.02, F(2, 59) = .30, p = .74. Path c1 was calculated by regressing intention to vote for the 
targeted candidate on exposure to the print-mediated attack advertising, R2 = .22, F(2, 59) 
= 9.67, p < .05. Finally, paths [b] and [c2] were calculated by regressing intention to vote 
for the targeted candidate on exposure to print-mediated attack advertising and argument 
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evaluation, R2 = .22, F(3, 58) = 6.80, p < .05. Evaluation of the argument in the attack 
messages did not intervene in the process of print-mediated attack advertising’s influence 
on intention to the vote for the targeted candidate (Sobel = .89, p = .37). Hypothesis 8c 
was not confirmed.   
Inoculation Phase: Positive Emotional Response toward Implied Beneficiary - H9a  
Hypothesis 9a posited that video attack advertising elicits a greater positive 
emotional response to the implied beneficiary than print attack advertising. Because PSG 
and candidate-sponsored attack advertising had not elicited differing outcomes, the 
sponsorship conditions were collapsed into a single attack condition, which was then held 
constant so the influence of print and video attack advertising could be compared, while 
controlling for the influence of partisanship. Therefore, H9a was evaluated with a two-
way between-subjects ANOVA that examined the influence of media (print versus video) 
and partisanship (weak versus strong) on positive emotional response to the implied 
beneficiary of the attack message. Omnibus results are presented in Table 6h. They show 
that the media conditions did not differ, F(1, 80) = .011, p = .65, η2 = .003. Compared to 
the printed attack advertisements (M = 3.00, SD = 1.91, N = 41), the video attacks (M = 
3.10, SD = 1.91, N = 43) did not elicit greater positive emotion for the implied 
beneficiary. Thus, H9a was not confirmed.  
Inoculation Phase: Negative Emotional Response toward Targeted Candidate - H9b 
 Hypothesis 9b posited that video attack advertising elicits a greater negative 
emotional response toward the targeted candidate than print attack advertising. A two-
way between-subjects univariate analysis of variance examined the influence of media 
(video versus print) and partisanship (weak versus strong) on negative emotional 
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response to the candidate targeted in the attack advertisement. The omnibus results are 
displayed in Table 6i, and there was not a media main effect, F(1, 80) = .004, p = .95, η2 
< .001. Thus, H9b was not confirmed. Compared to printed political attack advertising 
(M = 3.02, SD = 2.18, N = 41, video attacks (M = 3.05, SD = 2.02, N = 43) did not elicit a 
greater negative emotional response toward the targeted candidate. 
Inoculation Phase: Attitude – Behavior Consistency - H10a and H010b  
Hypotheses 10a and 10b examined the relative capacities of print and video-
mediated influence to elicit attitude-behavior consistency. Hypothesis 10a predicted that, 
compared to print-mediated attack advertising, video-mediated attack advertising elicits 
greater consistency between evaluations of the targeted candidate and intention to vote 
for that candidate. The results for PSG-sponsored attacks contradicted that expectation. 
Within the video condition, evaluation of the targeted candidate positively predicted vote 
intentions (attitude: M = 5.26, SD = 1.37; vote: M = 4.33, SD = 2.29, N = 24: r(21) = .46, 
p < .05), but an identical relationship was uncovered in the print condition (attitude: M = 
5.21, SD = 1.24; vote: M = 5.56, SD = 1.75, N = 18: r(15) = .73, p < .004). Furthermore, a 
comparison of the z values did not reveal a difference between the print and video 
conditions (r to z = -1.28, p = .20). Within the PSG-sponsored condition, H10a was not 
confirmed. The candidate-sponsored condition also failed to confirm H10a. Both video 
mediated (attitude: M = 4.85, SD = 1.12; vote: M = 4.84, SD = 2.46, N = 19: r(16) = .55, 
p < .05) and print-mediated (attitude: M = 5.20, SD = 1.12; vote: M = 4.65, SD = 2.37, N 
= 23: r(20) = .84, p < .05) candidate attacks elicited a positive relationship between 
evaluation of the targeted candidate and vote intention, but the magnitude of the 
correlation in the print condition was marginally greater than video condition’s 
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correlation (r to z: -1.80, p < .10). Therefore, H10a was not confirmed in either the print 
or the video conditions.  
Hypothesis 10b posited video-mediated influence is associated with greater 
attitude-behavior consistency than print-mediated influence. However, the dependent 
variable for H10b was intention to the vote for the implied beneficiary of the attack 
message, as opposed to the targeted candidate (as in H10a). In the video PSG-sponsored 
condition, there was a positive and marginally significant (p < .10) relationship between 
evaluation of the supported candidate and intention to vote for that candidate (attitude: M 
= 3.08, SD = 1.1; vote: M = 1.58, SD = 1.1, N = 24: r(21) = .38, p = .08), but in the print 
condition, the positive relationship was fully significant (attitude: M = 3.31, SD = 1.59; 
vote: M = 2.00, SD = 1.33, N = 18: r(15) = .56, p < .05). In other words, the print 
condition elicited attitude-behavior consistency, while the video condition did not. 
Ultimately, there was no difference between the two correlations (r to z: -.68, p = .49), 
and the trend contradicted the expectations of H10b. These results were replicated for the 
candidate-sponsored attack ads. The print advertisements elicited a positive correlation 
between evaluation and vote intention for the implied beneficiary (attitude: M = 3.18, SD 
= 1.38; vote: M = 1.74, SD = 1.25, N = 23: r(19) = .48, p = .03), while the video ads 
failed to produce a reliable correlation between evaluations and vote intention (attitude: 
M = 2.93, SD = 1.45; vote: M = 1.42, SD = .83, N = 19: r(15) = .15, p = .56). Once again, 
the correlation in the print condition was greater than the correlation in the video 
condition even if was not reliable (r to z: 1.11, p = .27).   
Taken together, these findings do not support the expectation (i.e., H10a & H10b) 
that video elicits more attitude-behavior consistency than print. In the video condition, 
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two of four tests showed a reliable correlation between attitude and behavior, but print 
elicited attitude-behavior consistency across all four tests. Moreover, the print 
correlations tended to be larger than the video correlations, even if those differences were 
never fully significant. These findings contradicted the expectations of H10a and H10b.  
Attack-Phase Inoculation Outcomes 
Hypothesis 12a – Hypothesis 12d: Generic Inoculation against PSG Attacks 
 Hypothesis 12a: Hypothesis 12a posited that, compared to the control, generic 
inoculation against all political attack advertising elicits greater resistance to PSG-
sponsored attack advertising in terms of a more favorable evaluation of the targeted 
candidate. It was tested with a three-way between-subjects univariate analysis of variance 
that examined the influence of inoculation (control versus generic), media (print versus 
video) and partisanship (low versus high) on phase-three evaluation of the candidate 
targeted by PSG-sponsored attack advertising. Table 7a displays the results for this 
analysis. There was no inoculation main effect, F(1, 81) = .15, p = .70, η2 = .002. 
Hypothesis 12a was not confirmed. Compared to control (M = 5.24, SD = 1.30, N = 42), 
generic inoculation (M = 5.57, SD = 1.02, N = 47) does not elicit greater resistance to 
PSG-sponsored attack advertising in terms of a more favorable evaluation of the targeted 
candidate. 
 Hypothesis 12b. Hypothesis 12b posited that, compared to control, generic 
inoculation against all political attack advertising elicits greater resistance to PSG-
sponsored attack advertising in terms of a greater intention to vote for the targeted 
candidate. The prediction was tested with a three-way between-subjects univariate 
analysis of variance that evaluated the influence of inoculation (control versus generic), 
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media (print versus video) and partisanship (low versus high) on phase-three intention to 
vote for the candidate targeted in the PSG-sponsored attack ads. Table 7b displays the 
results for this analysis. The omnibus test revealed marginally significant findings for the 
inoculation main effect, F(1, 81) = 3.45, p = .07, η2 = .04 and the inoculation by media 
interaction, F(1, 81) = 3.71, p = .06, η2 = .04. Given that both were only marginally 
significant, the interaction was interpreted and the main effect was ignored. On vote 
intention, video-mediated generic inoculation (generic inoculation: M = 6.28, SD = 1.21, 
N = 25; control: M = 4.33, SD = 2.30, N = 24) was superior to print-mediated generic 
inoculation (generic inoculation: M = 5.68, SD = 1.91, N = 22; control: M =5.56, SD = 
1.76, N = 18), t(72) = 2.32, p = .02. Therefore, H12b received weak support in the video 
condition and no support in the print condition.    
 Hypothesis 12c. Hypothesis 12c posited that, compared to control, generic 
inoculation against all political attack advertising elicits greater resistance to PSG-
sponsored attack advertising in terms of a less favorable evaluation of the ads’ implied 
beneficiary. It was evaluated with a three-way between-subjects univariate analysis of 
variance that tested the influence of inoculation (control versus generic), media (print 
versus video) and partisanship (low versus high) on phase-three evaluation of PSG attack 
advertising’s implied beneficiary. Table 7c displays the results for this analysis. There 
was not a main effect for inoculation, F(1, 81) = .06, p = .80, η2 = .001. Thus, H12c was 
not confirmed. Compared to control (M = 3.18, SD = 1.32, N = 42), generic inoculation 
(M = 2.83, SD = 1.18, N = 47) against all political attack advertising did not elicit greater 
resistance to PSG-sponsored attack advertising in terms of a less favorable evaluation of 
the advertisements’ implied beneficiary. 
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Hypothesis 12d. Hypothesis 12d posited that, compared to control, generic 
inoculation against all political attack advertising elicits greater resistance to PSG-
sponsored attack advertising in terms of a lesser intention to vote for the supported 
candidate. It was examined with a three-way between-subjects univariate analysis of 
variance that tested the influence of inoculation (control versus generic), media (print 
versus video) and partisanship (low versus high) on phase-three intention to vote for the 
implied beneficiary of PSG attack advertising. Table 7d displays the results for this 
analysis. The main effect for inoculation was marginally significant, F(1, 81) = 2.98, p = 
.09, η2 = .04. In other words, generic inoculation (M = 1.32, SD = .81, N = 47) elicited 
more resistance than control (M = 1.76, SD = 1.21, N = 42) on intention to vote for the 
implied beneficiary of the PSG attack advertisements, t(71) = 2.01, p = .05.  Thus, H12d 
was weakly confirmed.  
Hypothesis 13a – Hypothesis 13d: Candidate Specific Inoculation against PSG 
Attacks 
Hypothesis 13a. Hypothesis 13a posited that, compared to control, candidate 
specific inoculation against attack advertising elicits greater resistance to PSG-sponsored 
attack advertising in terms of a more favorable evaluation of the targeted candidate. It 
was examined with a three-way between-subjects univariate analysis of variance that 
calculated the influence of inoculation (control versus candidate specific), media (print 
versus video) and partisanship (low versus high) on phase-three evaluation of the target 
of PSG attack advertising. Table 8a displays the results for this analysis. There was no 
main effect for the inoculation condition, F(1, 73) = .04, p = .85, η2 = .0005. In other 
words, candidate-specific inoculation (M = 5.42, SD = 1.30, N = 39) did not elicit more 
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resistance than control (M = 5.24, SD = 1.30, N = 42) on evaluation of the target of the 
PSG attack advertisements. Thus, H13a was not confirmed.  
Hypothesis 13b. Hypothesis 13b projected that, compared to control, candidate 
specific inoculation against attack advertising elicits greater resistance to PSG-sponsored 
attack advertising in terms of a greater intention to vote for the targeted candidate. It was 
evaluated with a three-way between-subjects univariate analysis of variance that 
calculated the influence of inoculation (control versus candidate specific), media (print 
versus video) and partisanship (low versus high) on phase-three intention to vote for the 
target of PSG attack advertising. Table 8b displays results for this analysis. Although 
there was no main effect for inoculation, F(1, 73) = .10, p = .75, η2 = .001, there was an  
inoculation by media interaction, F(1, 73) = 4.85, p = .03, η2 = .06. With respect to vote 
intention for the target of PSG-sponsored attacks, video-mediated inoculation (control: M 
= 4.75, SD = 1.86, N = 24; inoculation: M = 5.79, SD = 1.87, N = 18) elicited more 
resistance than print-mediated inoculation (control: M = 5.64, SD = 1.78, N = 18; 
inoculation: M = 4.86, SD = 1.88, N = 21), t(75) = 2.15, p = .03. Thus, H13b was 
confirmed in the video condition but rejected in the print condition. 
Hypothesis 13c. Hypothesis 13c posited that, compared to control, candidate 
specific inoculation against attack advertising elicits greater resistance to PSG-sponsored 
attack advertising in terms of a less favorable evaluation of the implied beneficiary of the 
attack. It was tested with a three-way between-subjects univariate analysis of variance 
that calculated the influence of inoculation (control versus candidate specific), media 
(print versus video) and partisanship (low versus high) on phase-three evaluation of the 
PSG attacks’ implied beneficiary. Table 8c displays results of the analysis. There was no 
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main effect for the inoculation conditions, F(1, 73) = .42, p = .52, η2 = .006. Compared to 
control (M = 3.18, SD = 1.32, N = 42), candidate specific inoculation (M = 2.97, SD = 
1.16, N = 39) did not elicit greater resistance to PSG-sponsored attack advertising in 
terms of a less favorable evaluation of the attacks’ implied beneficiary. Hypothesis 13c 
was not confirmed.  
Hypothesis 13d. Hypothesis 13d posited that, compared to control, candidate 
specific inoculation against attack advertising elicits greater resistance to PSG-sponsored 
attack advertising in terms of a lesser intention to vote for the implied beneficiary of the 
attack. It was evaluated with a three-way between-subjects univariate analysis of variance 
that calculated the influence of inoculation (control versus candidate specific), media 
(print versus video) and partisanship (low versus high) on phase-three intention to vote 
for the PSG attacks’ implied beneficiary. Table 8d displays results of the analysis. The 
main effect for inoculation was not present, F(1, 75) = 1.66, p = .24, η2 = .02. Relative to 
vote intention for the implied beneficiary of PSG attack advertising, candidate specific 
inoculation (M = 1.48, SD = .99, N = 41) did not elicit greater resistance compared to 
control (M = 1.76, SD = 1.21, N = 42).  Therefore, H13d was not confirmed.  
Research Question 6a – Research Question 6d: Candidate versus Generic 
Inoculation against PSG Attack Ads 
 Research Question 6a. Research question 6a inquired about the relative 
effectiveness of generic versus candidate specific inoculation on their ability to elicit a 
favorable evaluation of the candidate targeted in PSG attack advertising. It was calculated 
with a three-way between-subjects univariate analysis of variance that evaluated the 
influence of inoculation (candidate specific versus generic), media (print versus video) 
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and partisanship (low versus high) on phase-three evaluation of the target in PSG attack 
advertising. Table 9a displays results of the analysis. The inoculation main effect was 
non-existent, F(1, 78) = .03, p = .87, η2 = .0004. Therefore, the answer to RQ6a is that 
generic (M = 5.81, SD = .96, N = 25) and candidate-specific (M = 5.42, SD = 1.14, N = 
39) inoculations do not differ on their capacity to elicit a favorable evaluation of the 
candidate targeted by PSG attack advertising.   
 Research Question 6b. Research question 6b inquired about the relative 
effectiveness of generic versus candidate specific inoculation on their ability to elicit a 
greater vote intention for the candidate targeted in PSG attack advertising. It was 
evaluated with a three-way between-subjects univariate analysis of variance that 
calculated the influence of inoculation (candidate specific versus generic), media (print 
versus video) and partisanship (low versus high) on phase-three intention to vote for the 
target of PSG attack advertising. Table 9b displays results for this analysis. There was not 
an inoculation main effect, F(1, 78) = 2.40, p = .13, η2 = .03, but there was an interaction 
between inoculation and partisanship, F(1, 78) = 5.18, p = .03, η2 = .06. A follow-up 
analysis showed that the difference between weak (candidate: M = 4.10, SD = 1.67, N = 
19) and strong (candidate: M = 6.55, SD = 1.76, N = 20) partisans was reliable in the 
candidate inoculation condition, t(37) = 4.46, p < .01 but not in the generic inoculation 
condition (weak: M = 5.5, SD = 1.61, N = 18; strong: M = 6.28, SD = 1.62, N = 29), t(40) 
= 1.61, p = .11. Therefore, the answer to RQ6b is that, against the influence of PSG 
attacks on intention to vote for the target, there is no difference between generic and 
candidate inoculation; however, candidate inoculation is more influential for strong 
partisans than for weak partisans.  
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Research Question 6c. Research question 6c inquired about the relative 
effectiveness of generic versus candidate specific inoculation on their ability to elicit a 
less favorable evaluation of the implied beneficiary of PSG attack advertising. It was 
tested with a three-way between-subjects univariate analysis of variance that calculated 
the influence of inoculation (candidate specific versus generic), media (print versus 
video) and partisanship (low versus high) on phase-three evaluation of the implied 
beneficiary of PSG attack advertising. Table 9c displays results of the analysis. There 
was no inoculation main effect, F(1, 78) = .22, p = .64, η2 = .003. The three way 
interaction was marginally significant, F(1, 78) = 3.28, p = .07, η2 = .04, and the 
inoculation by media interaction was fully significant, F(1, 78) = 5.20, p = .03, η2 = .06. 
Because the clearest finding was the inoculation by media interaction, it was interpreted 
and the three way interaction was ignored. Follow up analyses showed that the interaction 
was primarily driven by the difference between video generic (M = 3.06, SD = .93, N = 
25) and print generic inoculation (M = 2.91, SD = .91, N = 22), t(39) = 2.55, p = .02. 
Secondarily, the interaction was driven by the marginally significant difference between 
candidate-specific (M = 2.51, SD = .95, N = 18) and generic (M = 3.06, SD = .93, N = 25) 
inoculation in the video condition, t(40) = 1.92, p = .06.Thus, the answer to RQ6c is that, 
with respect to evaluation of the implied beneficiary of PSG attacks advertising, 
candidate inoculation is marginally more effective than generic inoculation but only in 
the video condition. That answer is further qualified by print-generic inoculation’s 
superiority to video-generic inoculation.    
 Research Question 6d. Research question 6d inquired about the relative 
effectiveness of generic versus candidate specific inoculation on their ability to elicit a 
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lesser vote intention for the implied beneficiary of PSG attack advertising. It was 
evaluated with a three-way between-subjects univariate analysis of variance that 
calculated the influence of inoculation (candidate-specific versus generic), media (print 
versus video) and partisanship (low versus high) on phase-three intention to vote for the 
implied beneficiary of PSG attack advertising. Table 9d displays results for this analysis. 
There was not a main effect for inoculation, F(1, 78) = .28, p = .60, η2 = .004. Therefore, 
the answer to RQ6d is that generic (M = 1.32, SD = .81, N = 47) and candidate-specific 
(M = 1.5, SD = 1.01, N = 39) inoculations do not differ on their capacity to elicit 
resistance to PSG-sponsored attacks, as measured by intention to vote for the implied 
beneficiary.    
Hypothesis 14a – Hypothesis 14d: Generic Inoculation against Candidate Attacks 
 Hypothesis 14a. Hypothesis 14a posited that, compared to the control, generic 
inoculation elicits greater resistance to candidate-sponsored attack advertising in terms of 
a more favorable evaluation of the targeted candidate. It was tested with a three-way 
between-subjects univariate analysis of variance that calculated the influence of 
inoculation (control versus generic), media (print versus video) and partisanship (low 
versus high) on phase-three evaluation of the candidate targeted by the candidate-
sponsored attack advertisements. Table 10a displays results of the analysis. The 
inoculation main effect was not present, F(1, 80) = .98, p = .33, η2 = .01. Therefore, H14a 
was not confirmed. Compared to control (M = 5.04, SD = 1.12, N = 42), generic (M = 
5.35, SD = 1.20, N = 46) inoculation did not elicit greater resistance to candidate-
sponsored attack advertising in terms of a more favorable evaluation of the targeted 
candidate. 
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 Hypothesis 14b. Hypothesis 14b posited that, compared to control, generic 
inoculation elicits greater resistance to candidate-sponsored attack advertising in terms of 
a greater intention to vote for the targeted candidate. It was examined with a three-way 
between-subjects univariate analysis of variance that calculated the influence of 
inoculation (control versus generic), media (print versus video) and partisanship (low 
versus high) on phase-three intention to vote for the candidate targeted by the candidate-
sponsored attack advertisements. Table 10b displays results of the analysis. There was 
not an inoculation main effect, F(1, 80) = .32, p = .58, η2 = .004. Therefore, H14b was not 
confirmed. Compared to control (M = 4.86, SD = 2.15, N = 42), generic (M = 4.74, SD = 
2.38, N = 42) inoculation did not elicit greater resistance to candidate-sponsored attack 
advertising in terms of a greater intention to vote for the targeted candidate. 
 Hypothesis 14c. Hypothesis 14c posited that, compared to control, generic 
inoculation elicits greater resistance to candidate-sponsored attack advertising in terms of 
a less favorable evaluation of the candidate sponsoring the attack advertisement. It was 
tested with a three-way between-subjects univariate analysis of variance that calculated 
the influence of inoculation (control versus generic), media (print versus video) and 
partisanship (low versus high) on phase-three evaluation of the candidate sponsoring the 
attack advertisements. Table 10c displays results of the analysis. The inoculation main 
effect was not significant, F(1, 80) = .53, p = .47, η2 = .007. Therefore, H14c as not 
confirmed. Compared to control (M = 3.07, SD = 1.40, N = 42), generic (M = 3.18, SD = 
1.36, N = 46) inoculation did not elicit greater resistance to candidate-sponsored attack 
advertising in terms of a less favorable evaluation of the candidate sponsoring the attack 
message. 
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 Hypothesis 14d. Hypothesis 14d posited that, compared to control, generic 
inoculation elicits greater resistance to candidate-sponsored attack advertising in terms of 
a lesser intention to vote for candidate sponsoring the attack advertisement. It was 
evaluated with a three-way between-subjects univariate analysis of variance that 
calculated the influence of inoculation (control versus generic), media (print versus 
video) and partisanship (low versus high) on phase-three intention to vote for the 
candidate sponsoring the attack advertisements. Table 10d displays results of the 
analysis. There was no inoculation main effect, F(1, 80) = .10, p = .75, η2 = .001; 
however, there was a marginally significant inoculation by media interaction, F(1, 80) = 
3.22, p = .08, η2 = .04. Follow up analysis of the interaction revealed that it was primarily 
driven by the relative superiority of video (M = 1.05, SD = .98, N = 23) versus printed (M 
= 1.84, SD = .97, N = 23) generic inoculation, t(37) = 2.77, p = .008.  Therefore, H14d 
was not confirmed. Generic (M = 1.04, SD = .37, N = 23) inoculation was not superior to 
control (M = 1.60, SD = .37, N = 23) on its ability to elicit greater resistance to candidate-
sponsored attack advertising in terms of a lesser intention to vote for candidate 
sponsoring the attack advertisement. On the other hand, generic video inoculation was 
more influential than generic inoculation in print.  
Hypothesis 15a – Hypothesis 15d: Candidate-Specific Inoculation against Candidate 
Attacks 
 Hypothesis 15a. Hypothesis 15a posited that, compared to control, candidate-
specific inoculation elicits greater resistance to candidate-sponsored attack advertising in 
terms of a more favorable evaluation of the targeted candidate. It was tested with a three-
way between-subjects univariate analysis of variance that calculated the influence of 
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inoculation (control versus candidate-specific), media (print versus video) and 
partisanship (low versus high) on phase-three evaluation of the candidate targeted by the 
candidate-sponsored attacks. Table 11a displays the omnibus findings for this analysis. 
Again, there was no main effect for inoculation, F(1, 79) = 1.24, p = .27, η2 = .02. 
Therefore, H15a was not confirmed. Compared to control (M = 5.04, SD = 1.12, N = 42), 
candidate-specific (M = 5.29, SD = 1.10, N = 45) inoculation did not elicit greater 
resistance to candidate-sponsored attack advertising in terms of a more favorable 
evaluation of the targeted candidate. 
 Hypothesis 15b. Hypothesis 15b posited that, compared to control, candidate-
specific inoculation elicits greater resistance to candidate-sponsored attack advertising in 
terms of a greater intention to vote for the targeted candidate. It was evaluated with a 
three-way between-subjects univariate analysis of variance that calculated the influence 
of inoculation (control versus candidate-specific), media (print versus video) and 
partisanship (low versus high) on phase-three intention to vote for the candidate targeted 
by the candidate-sponsored attacks. Table 11b displays the omnibus findings for this 
analysis. The inoculation main effect was marginally significant, F(1, 79) = 3.00, p = .09, 
η2 = .04. Therefore, H15b received weak confirmation. Compared to control (M = 4.74, 
SD = 2.38, N = 42), candidate-specific (M = 5.58, SD = 1.84, N = 45) inoculation elicits 
greater resistance to candidate-sponsored attack advertising in terms of a greater intention 
to vote for the targeted candidate. 
 Hypothesis 15c. Hypothesis 15c posited that, compared to control, candidate-
specific inoculation elicits greater resistance to candidate-sponsored attack advertising in 
terms of a less favorable evaluation of the candidate sponsoring the attack advertisement. 
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It was evaluated with a three-way between-subjects univariate analysis of variance that 
calculated the influence of inoculation (control versus candidate-specific), media (print 
versus video) and partisanship (low versus high) on phase-three evaluation of the 
candidate sponsoring the attack advertisements. Table 11c displays the omnibus findings 
for this analysis. There was no inoculation main effect, F(1, 79) = .11, p = .74, η2 = .001. 
Therefore, H15c was not confirmed. Compared to control (M = 3.07, SD = 1.40, N = 42), 
candidate-specific (M = 2.89, SD = 1.32, N = 45) inoculation did not elicit greater 
resistance to candidate-sponsored attack advertising in terms of a less favorable 
evaluation of the candidate sponsoring the attack advertisement. 
 Hypothesis 15d. Hypothesis 15d posited that, compared to control, candidate-
specific inoculation elicits greater resistance to candidate-sponsored attack advertising in 
terms of a lesser intention to vote for the candidate sponsoring the attack advertisement. 
It was examined with a three-way between-subjects univariate analysis of variance that 
evaluated the influence of inoculation (control versus candidate-specific), media (print 
versus video) and partisanship (low versus high) on phase-three intention to vote for the 
candidate sponsoring the attack advertisements. Table 11d displays the omnibus findings 
for this analysis. The inoculation main effect was not realized, F(1, 79) = 2.35, p = .13, η2 
= .03, but there was an inoculation by partisan interaction, F(1, 79) = 8.76, p = .01, η2 = 
.11. Follow up analyses found that, among weak partisans, candidate-specific (M = 1.21, 
SD = .81, N = 21) inoculation elicited more resistance than control (M = 2.03, SD = .87, 
N = 24), t(39) = 3.27, p = .002. Alternatively, for strong partisans, there was no difference 
between candidate-specific inoculation and the control condition (M = 1.26, SD = .83, N 
= 22 versus control: M = 1.00, SD = .84, N = 18), t(37) = .98, p = .33. Therefore, H15d 
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was only partially confirmed. For weak partisans, candidate-specific inoculation elicited 
greater resistance to candidate-sponsored attack advertising in terms of a lesser intention 
to vote for the candidate sponsoring the attack advertisement. The same relationship was 
not found for strong partisans.  
Research Question 7a – Research Question 7d: Candidate versus Generic 
Inoculation against Candidate-Sponsored Attack Ads 
 Research Question 7a. Research question 7a asked do generic and candidate 
specific inoculations against political attack advertising differ with respect to their ability 
to elicit a more favorable evaluation of the candidate targeted in candidate-sponsored 
attack advertising? It was examined with a three-way between-subjects univariate 
analysis of variance that calculated the influence of inoculation (generic versus 
candidate-specific), media (print versus video) and partisanship (low versus high) on 
phase-three evaluation of the candidate targeted by the candidate attack advertisement. 
Table 12a displays the omnibus findings for this analysis. The inoculation main effect 
was not present, F(1, 83) = 0, p = 1, η2 = 0, but there was a three-way interaction between 
inoculation, media and partisanship, F(1, 83) = 4.40, p = .04, η2 = .05. In the print 
condition, generic inoculation for weak partisans (M = 4.67, SD = 1.06, N = 11) elicited 
less resistance than candidate-specific inoculation for strong partisans (M = 5.95, SD = 
1.05, N = 13), t(21) = 2.97, p = .007. In the video condition, candidate-specific 
inoculation (M = 4.36, SD = 1.05, N = 13) for the weak partisans elicited less resistance 
than generic inoculation for strong partisans (M = 5.44, SD = 1.05, N = 13), t(44) = 3.96, 
p < .001. Therefore, the answer to RQ7a is that candidate-specific and generic inoculation 
elicited differing levels of resistance, but that difference was conditioned by both the 
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partisanship of the respondent and the media channel through which the inoculation 
message was sent. 
 Research Question 7b. Research question 7b asked do generic and candidate 
specific inoculations against political attack advertising differ with respect to their ability 
to elicit a greater intention to vote for the candidate targeted in candidate-sponsored 
attack advertising? It was examined with a three-way between-subjects univariate 
analysis of variance that evaluated the influence of inoculation (generic versus candidate-
specific), media (print versus video) and partisanship (low versus high) on phase-three 
intention to vote for the candidate targeted by the candidate attack advertisement. Table 
12b displays the omnibus findings for this analysis. There was no inoculation main effect, 
F(1, 83) = 1.61, p = .21, η2 = .02. Therefore, the answer to RQ7b is that generic (M = 
5.21, SD = 2.04, N = 46) and candidate-specific  (M = 5.58, SD = 1.84, N = 45) 
inoculations against political attack advertising do not differ with respect to their ability 
to elicit a greater intention to vote for the candidate targeted in candidate-sponsored 
attack advertising. 
  Research Question 7c. Research question 7c asked do generic and candidate 
specific inoculations against political attack advertising differ with respect to their ability 
to elicit a less favorable evaluation of the attack advertisement’s sponsor? It was 
examined with a three-way between-subjects univariate analysis of variance that 
evaluated the influence of inoculation (generic versus candidate-specific), media (print 
versus video) and partisanship (low versus high) on phase-three evaluation of the sponsor 
of the attack advertisement. Table 12c displays the omnibus findings for this analysis. 
There was no main effect for the inoculation conditions, F(1, 83) = 1.23, p = .27, η2 = .02. 
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Therefore, the answer to RQ7c is that generic (M = 3.18, SD = 1.36, N = 46) and 
candidate-specific (M = 2.89, SD = 1.32, N = 45) inoculations against political attack 
advertising do not differ with respect to their ability to elicit a less favorable evaluation of 
the attack advertisement’s sponsor. 
 Research Question 7d. Research question 7d asked do generic and candidate 
specific inoculations against political attack advertising differ with respect to their ability 
to elicit a lesser intention to vote for the attack advertisement’s sponsor? It was examined 
with a three-way between-subjects univariate analysis of variance that evaluated the 
influence of inoculation (generic versus candidate-specific), media (print versus video) 
and partisanship (low versus high) on phase-three intention to vote for the sponsor of the 
attack advertisement. Table 12d displays the omnibus findings for this analysis. The 
inoculation main effect was not reliable, F(1, 83) = 1.51, p = .22, η2 = .02. Therefore, the 
answer to RQ7d is that generic (M = 1.43, SD = 1.05, N = 46) and candidate specific (M 
= 1.22, SD = .60, N = 43) inoculations against political attack advertising do not differ 
with respect to their ability to elicit a lesser intention to vote for the attack 
advertisement’s sponsor. 
Hypothesis 16a and Hypothesis 16b: Candidate-Specific Inoculation’s Influence on 
Democratic Values 
 Hypothesis 16a. Hypothesis 16a posited that, compared to control, candidate-
specific inoculation better protects trust in American democracy. It was examined with a 
three-way between-subjects univariate analysis of variance that evaluated the influence of 
inoculation (control versus candidate-specific), attack (candidate versus PSG) and 
partisanship (low versus high) on phase-three trust of American democracy. Table 13a 
                                                                                                          
171 
 
displays the omnibus findings for this analysis. There was no inoculation main effect, 
F(1, 160) = .14, p = .71, η2 = .0008, but the inoculation by attack interaction was 
marginally significant, F(1, 160) = 3.61, p = .06, η2 = .02. In the candidate attack 
condition, candidate-specific (M = 4.26, SD = 1.05, N = 45) inoculation elicited less 
resistance than control (M = 4.51, SD = 1.06, N = 42). However, in the PSG-sponsored 
attack condition, candidate-specific (M = 4.65, SD = 1.04, N = 39) inoculation elicited 
more resistance than control (M = 4.28, SD = 1.08, N = 42). Therefore, H16a was 
partially and weakly confirmed in the PSG attack condition, but in the candidate attack 
condition, candidate-specific inoculation actually elicited less resistance than control, as 
measured by trust in American government.  
 Hypothesis 16b. Hypothesis 16b posited that, compared to control, candidate-
specific inoculation better protects democratic political efficacy. It was examined with a 
three-way between-subjects univariate analysis of variance that evaluated the influence of 
inoculation (control versus candidate-specific), attack (candidate versus PSG) and 
partisanship (low versus high) on phase-three democratic political efficacy. Table 13b 
displays the omnibus findings for this analysis. There was no inoculation effect, F(1, 160) 
= 1.97, p = .16, η2 = .012. Therefore, H16b was not confirmed. In terms of democratic 
political efficacy, candidate-specific inoculation did not elicit resistance against either the 
candidate attack (control: M = 3.77, SD = 1.28, N = 42; inoculation: M = 3.83, SD = 1.42, 
N = 45) or the PSG attack (control: M = 3.58, SD = 1.49, N = 42; inoculation: M = 4.08, 
SD = 1.55, N = 39).  
 Research Question 8a and Research Question 8b: Candidate versus PSG Attack 
Influence on Democratic Values  
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 Research Question 8a. Research question 8a asked do generic and candidate 
specific inoculations against political attack advertising differ on their capacity to protect 
trust in American democracy? It was examined with a three-way between-subjects 
univariate analysis of variance that evaluated the influence of inoculation (generic versus 
candidate-specific), attack (candidate versus PSG) and partisanship (low versus high) on 
phase-three trust in American government. Table 13c displays the omnibus findings for 
this analysis. The inoculation main effect was unreliable, F(1, 169) = .001, p = .99, η2 = 
0; however, there was an interaction between inoculation and attack, F(1, 169) = 3.83, p 
= .05, η2 = .02. More specifically, candidate-specific inoculation (M = 4.65, SD = 1.12, N 
= 39) elicited more resistance to PSG attacks than generic inoculation (M = 4.32, SD = 
1.15, N = 47), and generic inoculation (M = 4.59, SD = 1.12, N = 46) elicited more 
resistance to candidate attacks than candidate-specific inoculation (M = 4.26, SD = 1.12, 
N = 45). The answer to RQ8a is that, in terms of protecting trust in American democracy 
against attack advertising, the relative influence of candidate-specific and generic 
inoculation depends on the attack sponsor.   
 Research Question 8b. Research question 8b asked do generic and candidate 
specific inoculations against political attack advertising differ with respect to their 
protection of external political efficacy? It was examined with a three-way between-
subjects univariate analysis of variance that evaluated the influence of inoculation 
(generic versus candidate-specific), attack (candidate versus PSG) and partisanship (low 
versus high) on phase-three democratic political efficacy. Table 13d displays the omnibus 
findings for this analysis. There was not an inoculation main effect, F(1, 169) = 1.15, p = 
.284, η2 = .007. Therefore, the answer to RQ8b is that candidate (M = 3.95, SD = 1.48, N 
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= 84) and generic inoculations (M = 3.63, SD = 1.55, N = 93) do not significantly differ 
on their ability to protect democratic political efficacy from attack advertising.  
Inoculation-Phase Inoculation Processes 
Hypothesis 17a – Hypothesis 17b: Video versus Print Influence on Perceptions of 
Inoculation Sponsor 
 Hypothesis 17a. Hypothesis 17a posited that, compared to print inoculation, 
video inoculation elicits a more favorable evaluation of the inoculation sponsor’s source 
credibility. It was investigated with a two-way between-subjects univariate analysis of 
variance that evaluated the influence of media (print versus video) and inoculation 
(generic versus candidate-specific) on inoculation-phase perception of inoculation 
sponsor credibility. Table 14a displays the omnibus findings for this analysis. There was 
no effect for the media conditions, F(1, 220) = .01, p = .93, η2 < .01. Therefore, H17a was 
not confirmed. Compared to print inoculation (M = 5.04, SD = 1.017, N = 114), video 
inoculation (M = 5.17, SD = .90, N = 110) did not elicit a more favorable evaluation of 
the inoculation sponsor’s source credibility. 
 Hypothesis 17b. Hypothesis 17b posited that, compared to print inoculation, 
video inoculation elicits a more favorable evaluation of the inoculation sponsor’s 
relational communication. It was investigated with a two-way between-subjects 
univariate analysis of variance that evaluated the influence of media (print versus video) 
and inoculation (generic versus candidate-specific) on inoculation-phase perception of 
inoculation sponsor relational communication. Table 14b displays the omnibus findings 
for this analysis. The media main effect was unreliable, F(1, 220) = .76, p = .39, η2 = 
.003. Therefore, H17b was not confirmed. Compared to print inoculation (M = 5.04, SD = 
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1.02, N = 114), video inoculation (M = 5.17, SD = .90, N = 110) did not elicit a more 
favorable evaluation of the inoculation sponsor’s relational communication.  
Hypothesis 18a – Hypothesis 18j: Influence of Print and Video on the Inoculatoin-
Inoculation-Phase Inoculation Process  
 Hypothesis 18a. Hypothesis 18a posited that, compared to print inoculation, 
video inoculation elicits more inoculation-phase positive affect for the initially supported 
candidate. It was tested with an independent sample t-test that compared print (M = 3.47, 
SD = 1.49, N = 114) versus video (M = 3.60, SD = 1.58, N = 110) mediated inoculation 
on inoculation-phase positive affect for the initially supported candidate. The difference 
was in the predicted direction but not significant, t(222) = .65, p = .52. Therefore, H18a 
was not confirmed. Compared to print inoculation, video inoculation did not elicit more 
inoculation-phase positive affect for the initially supported candidate.   
 Hypothesis 18b. Hypothesis 18b posited that, compared to print inoculation, 
video inoculation elicits more affective associative network content about the initially 
supported candidate.  It was tested with an independent sample t-test that compared print 
(M = 14.60, SD = 9.14, N = 113) versus video (M = 14.03, SD = 9.25, N = 106) mediated 
inoculation on inoculation-phase affective associative network content. The difference 
was not in the hypothesized direction, t(217) = .46, p = .65. Therefore, H18b was not 
confirmed. Compared to print inoculation, video inoculation did not elicit more affective 
associative network content about the initially supported candidate.   
 Hypothesis 18c. Hypothesis 18c posited that, compared to print inoculation, 
video inoculation elicits more threat in the process of resistance to political attack 
advertising. It was tested with an independent sample t-test that compared print (M = 
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3.03, SD = 1.26, N = 114) versus video (M = 2.76, SD = 1.10, N = 110) mediated 
inoculation on inoculation-phase threat. The difference was marginally significant, t(222) 
= 1.72, p = .09, but H18c was not confirmed. Compared to video inoculation, print 
inoculation actually elicited a marginally greater amount of threat in the process of 
resistance to political attack advertising. 
 Hypothesis 18d. Hypothesis 18d posited that, compared to print inoculation, 
video inoculation elicits less counter argumentation against potential attacks on the 
initially supported candidate. It was tested with an independent sample t-test that 
compared print (M = 41.22, SD = 32.38, N = 110) versus video (M = 38.61, SD = 28.80, 
N = 106) mediated inoculation on inoculation-phase counter argumentation. Although in 
the posited direction, the difference was not reliable, t(214) = .63, p = .53. Therefore, 
H18d was not confirmed. Compared to print inoculation, video inoculation did not elicit 
less counter argumentation against potential attacks on the initially supported candidate. 
 Hypothesis 18e. Hypothesis 18e posited that, compared to video inoculation, 
print inoculation elicits more cognitive associative network content about the initially 
supported candidate. It was tested with an independent sample t-test that compared print 
(M = 12.72, SD = 8.54, N = 113) versus video-mediated (M = 13.06, SD = 8.77, N = 106) 
inoculation on inoculation-phase cognitive associative network content. The difference 
was not in the hypothesized direction, t(217) = .29, p = .77. Therefore, H18e was not 
confirmed. Compared to print inoculation, video inoculation did not elicit more cognitive 
associative network content about the initially supported candidate. 
 Hypothesis 18f. Hypothesis 18f posited that, compared to video inoculation, print 
inoculation elicits a less favorable evaluation of political attack advertising content. It 
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was tested with an independent sample t-test that compared print (M = 2.29, SD = 1.25, N 
= 114) versus video-mediated (M = 2.39, SD = 1.26, N = 110) inoculation on inoculation-
phase evaluation of political attack advertising content, but there was no difference, 
t(222) = .58, p = .56. Therefore, H18f was not confirmed. Compared to print inoculation, 
video inoculation did not elicit a less favorable evaluation of political attack advertising 
content.   
 Hypothesis 18g. Hypothesis 18g posited that, compared to print inoculation, 
video inoculation elicits greater inoculation-phase attitudinal confidence regarding the 
initially supported candidate. It was tested with an independent sample t-test that 
compared print (M = 2.5, SD = 1.05, N = 114) versus video-mediated (M = 2.48, SD = 
1.15, N = 110) inoculation on inoculation-phase attitudinal confidence regarding the 
initially supported candidate. There was no difference, t(222) = .08, p = .94. Therefore, 
H18g was not confirmed. Compared to print inoculation, video inoculation did not elicit 
greater inoculation-phase attitudinal confidence regarding the initially supported 
candidate. 
 Hypothesis 18h. Hypothesis 18h posited that, compared to print inoculation, 
video inoculation elicits more inoculation-phase attitudinal confidence in evaluation of 
the political attack advertising. It was tested with an independent sample t-test that 
compared print-mediated (M = 4.54, SD = 1.68, N = 114) versus video (M = 4.49, SD = 
1.69, N = 110) inoculation on inoculation-phase attitudinal confidence in evaluation of 
the political attack advertising. There was no difference, t(222) = .64, p = .53. Therefore, 
H18h was not confirmed. Compared to print inoculation, video inoculation did not elicit 
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more inoculation-phase attitudinal confidence in evaluation of the political attack 
advertising.  
 Hypothesis 18i. Hypothesis 18i predicted that, compared to print inoculation, 
video inoculation elicits more phase-two attitude-behavior consistency between 
evaluation of the initially supported candidate and vote intention. Within the video 
condition there was a positive relationship between evaluation of the initially supported 
candidate and intention to vote for that candidate, r(178) = .57, p < .01. Furthermore, 
within the print condition, there was also a positive relationship between evaluation of the 
initially supported candidate and intention to vote for that candidate, r(174) = .67, p < 
.01. Finally, a comparison between the transformed r to z values did not reveal a 
difference between the print and video conditions (r to z = -1.52, p = .13). Therefore, 
H18i was not confirmed. Compared to print inoculation, video inoculation did not elicit 
more phase-two attitude-behavior consistency between evaluation of the initially 
supported candidate and vote intention. In fact, the trend was in the other direction. Print 
elicited more attitude-behavior consistency than video. 
 Hypothesis 18j. Hypothesis 18j predicted that, compared to print inoculation, 
video inoculation elicits more inoculation-phase attitude-behavior consistency between 
evaluation of the initially opposed candidate and vote intention. Within the video 
condition there was a positive relationship between evaluation of the initially opposed 
candidate and intention to vote for that candidate, r(178) = .49, p < .01. Furthermore, 
within the print condition, there was also a positive relationship between evaluation of the 
initially opposed candidate and intention to vote for that candidate, r(174) = .47, p < .01. 
Finally, a comparison between the transformed r to z values did not reveal a difference 
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between the print and video conditions (r to z = .24, p = .81). Therefore, H18j was not 
confirmed. Compared to print inoculation, video inoculation did not elicit more 
inoculation-phase attitude-behavior consistency between evaluation of the initially 
opposed candidate and vote intention.  
 Hypothesis 18k. Hypothesis 18k posited that, compared to print inoculation, 
video inoculation elicits more phase-two attitude accessibility with respect to the 2008 
general election. It was tested with an independent sample t-test that compared print (M = 
3.73, SD = 1.79, N = 114) versus video-mediated (M = 3.91, SD = 1.79, N = 110) 
inoculation on inoculation-phase attitude accessibility with respect to the 2008 general 
election. There was no difference, t(222) = .76, p = .45. Therefore, H18k was not 
confirmed. Compared to print inoculation, video inoculation did not elicit more 
inoculation-phase attitude accessibility with respect to the 2008 general election.  
 Hypothesis 18l. Hypothesis 18l posited that, compared to print inoculation, video 
inoculation elicits more phase-two attitude accessibility with respect to the initially 
supported candidate. It was tested with an independent sample t-test that compared print 
(M = 3.83, SD = 1.79, N = 114) versus video-mediated (M = 4.12, SD = 1.79, N = 110) 
inoculation on inoculation-phase attitude accessibility with respect to the initially 
supported candidate. There was no difference, t(222) = 1.19, p = .23. Therefore, H18l 
was not confirmed. Compared to print inoculation, video inoculation did not elicit more 
phase-two attitude accessibility with respect to the initially supported candidate.  
 Hypothesis 18m. Hypothesis 18m posited that, compared to print inoculation, 
video inoculation elicits more phase-two associative network content regarding the 
initially supported candidate.  It was tested with two independent sample t-tests. The first 
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compared print (M = 11.89, SD = 4.36, N = 114) versus video-mediated (M = 11.99, SD = 
4.81, N = 110) inoculation on the number of generated nodes. The difference was not 
substantial, t(222) = .15, p = .88. The second compared print (M = 11.71, SD = 4.14, N = 
114) versus video-mediated (M = 11.72, SD = 4.44, N = 110) inoculation on the number 
of generated links between nodes. There was no difference, t(222) = .01, p = .99. 
Therefore, H18m was not confirmed. Compared to print inoculation, video inoculation 
did not elicit more inoculation-phase associative network content regarding the initially 
supported candidate. 
 Hypothesis 18n. Hypothesis 18n posited that, compared to print inoculation, 
video inoculation elicits more strongly accessible inoculation-phase associative network 
content regarding the initially supported candidate. It was tested with an independent 
sample t-test that compared print (M = 4.94, SD = 1.09, N = 114) versus video-mediated 
(M = 4.21, SD = .99, N = 110) inoculation on the strength of inoculation-phase 
associative network content regarding the initially supported candidate. The media 
conditions differed, t(222) = 1.96, p = .05. Therefore, H18n was confirmed. Compared to 
print inoculation, video inoculation elicited more accessible inoculation-phase associative 
network content regarding the initially supported candidate.  
Attack-Phase Medium-Same versus Medium-Different Inoculation Outcomes 
Hypotheses 19a – Hypotheses 19d: Relative Effectiveness of Print Inoculation to 
Print Attack versus Print Inoculation to Video Attack 
 Hypothesis 19a. Hypothesis 19a posited that, in terms of a more favorable 
evaluation of the candidate targeted by the candidate-sponsored attack ad, print 
inoculation confers more resistance to print attacks than video attacks. It was tested with 
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an independent sample t-test that compared matched inoculation (print to print) and 
mismatched inoculation (print to video). On evaluation of the targeted candidate, the 
difference between the matched and mismatched conditions was in the predicted 
direction (matched: M = 5.63, SD = .88, N = 23 versus mismatched: M = 4.87, SD = 1.32, 
N = 25), t(46) = 2.33, p = .02. Therefore, H20a was confirmed. In terms of a more 
favorable evaluation of the candidate targeted by the candidate-sponsored attack ad, print 
inoculation conferred more resistance to print attacks than video attacks. 
 Hypothesis 19b. Hypothesis 19b posited that, in terms of a greater intention to 
vote for the candidate targeted by the candidate-sponsored attack ad, print inoculation 
confers more resistance to print attacks than video attacks. It was tested with an 
independent sample t-test that compared matched inoculation (print to print) and 
mismatched inoculation (print to video). On intention to vote for the targeted candidate, 
there was a predicted difference between the matched and mismatched conditions 
(matched: M = 5.87, SD = 1.49, N = 23 versus mismatched: M = 4.6, SD = 2.31, N = 25), 
t(41.34) = 2.28, p = .03. Therefore, H19b was confirmed. In terms of a greater intention 
to vote for the candidate targeted by the candidate-sponsored attack ad, print inoculation 
confers more resistance to print attacks than video attacks. 
 Hypothesis 19c. Hypothesis 19c posited that, in terms of a less favorable 
evaluation of the candidate sponsoring the attack ad, print inoculation confers more 
resistance to print attacks than video attacks. It was tested with an independent sample t-
test that compared matched inoculation (print to print) and mismatched inoculation (print 
to video). On evaluation of the attack sponsor, there was no difference between the 
matched and mismatched conditions (matched: M = 2.84, SD = 1.16, N = 23 versus 
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mismatched: M = 3.23, SD = 1.37, N = 25), t(46) = 1.05, p = .39. Therefore, H19c was 
not confirmed. In terms of less favorable evaluation of the candidate sponsoring the 
attack ad, print inoculation did not confer more resistance to print attacks than video 
attacks. 
 Hypothesis 19d: Hypothesis 19d posited that, in terms of a lesser intention to 
vote for the candidate sponsoring the attack ad, print inoculation confers more resistance 
to print attacks than video attacks. It was tested with an independent sample t-test that 
compared matched inoculation (print to print) and mismatched inoculation (print to 
video). On intention to vote for the sponsoring candidate, there was a predicted difference 
between the matched and mismatched conditions (matched: M = 1.11, SD = .29, N = 23 
versus mismatched: M = 2.12, SD = 1.90, N = 25), t(25.3) = 2.63, p = .01. Therefore, 
H19d was confirmed. In terms of lesser intention to vote for the candidate sponsoring the 
attack ad, print inoculation confers more resistance to print attacks than video attacks. 
Hypotheses 20a – Hypotheses 20d: Relative Effectiveness of Video Inoculation to 
Video Attack versus Video Inoculation to Video Attack 
 Hypothesis 20a. Hypothesis 20a posited that, in terms of a more favorable 
evaluation of the candidate targeted by the candidate-sponsored attack ad, video 
inoculation confers more resistance to video attacks than print attacks. It was tested with 
an independent sample t-test that compared matched inoculation (video inoculation to 
video attack) versus mismatched inoculation (video to print). On evaluation of the 
targeted candidate, there was no difference between the matched (M = 5.23, SD = 1.22, N 
= 22) and mismatched (M = 5.63, SD = 1.18, N = 22) conditions, t(62) = 1.25, p = .22. 
Therefore, H20a was not confirmed. In terms of a more favorable evaluation of the 
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candidate targeted by the candidate-sponsored attack ad, video inoculation did not confer 
more resistance to video attacks than to print attacks. 
 Hypothesis 20b. Hypothesis 20b posited that, in terms of a greater intention to 
vote for the candidate targeted by the candidate-sponsored attack ad, video inoculation 
confers more resistance to video attacks than print attacks. It was tested with an 
independent sample t-test that compared matched inoculation (video to video) and 
mismatched inoculation (video to print). On intention to vote for the targeted candidate, 
there was no difference between the matched (M = 5.45, SD = 1.99, N = 42) and 
mismatched (M = 5.68, SD = 2.12, N = 22) conditions, t(62) = .43, p = .67. Therefore, 
H20b was not confirmed. In terms of a greater intention to vote for the candidate targeted 
by the candidate-sponsored attack ad, video inoculation did not confer more resistance to 
video attacks than to print attacks. 
 Hypothesis 20c. Hypothesis 20c posited that, in terms of a less favorable 
evaluation of the candidate sponsoring the attack ad, video inoculation confers more 
resistance to video attacks than print attacks. It was tested with an independent sample t-
test that compared matched inoculation (video to video) and mismatched inoculation 
(video to print). On evaluation of the sponsoring candidate, there was no difference 
between the matched (M = 2.90, SD = 1.38, N = 42) and mismatched (M = 2.85, SD = 
1.42, N = 22) conditions, t(62) = .14, p = .89. Therefore, H20c was not confirmed. In 
terms of less favorable evaluation of the candidate sponsoring the attack ad, video 
inoculation did not confer more resistance to video attacks than to print attacks. 
 Hypothesis 20d. Hypothesis 20d posited that, in terms of a lesser intention to 
vote for the candidate sponsoring the attack ad, video inoculation confers more resistance 
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to video attacks than print attacks. It was tested with an independent sample t-test that 
compared matched inoculation (video to video) and mismatched inoculation (video to 
print). On intention to vote for the sponsoring candidate, there was no difference between 
the matched (M = 1.40, SD = .90, N = 40) and mismatched (M = 1.32, SD = .84, N = 22) 
conditions, t(60) = .35, p = .73. Therefore, H20d was not confirmed. In terms of lesser 
intention to vote for the candidate sponsoring the attack ad, video inoculation did not 






















The 2008 presidential election was remarkable. Just 40 years after the 
assassination of Martin Luther King, the black son of a single mother defeated the white 
son of a Navy admiral to become the 44th President of the United States. History was in 
the making. The pundits proposed it in the media, and the people proclaimed it in the 
voting booths. The hunger for change was palpable. Gas prices were at an all time high, 
two wars raged, and a steadily worsening economy brought the international banking 
system to the brink of collapse. Activated by Democratic hope and the promise of 
Republican change, Americans flooded the campaigns with their time, their money and 
their votes. In the end, it was the Democratic candidate Barack Hussein Obama who 
earned the most volunteers, donations and votes. Generous donors enabled Obama to 
become the first presidential candidate to opt out of the general election public financing 
system. He raised more money than any other presidential campaign in American history 
(Schouten, 2008). The McCain campaign, the political parties, political action 
committees (PAC’s) and even the PSGs were dwarfed by Obama’s unfettered ability to 
purchase communication. His campaign expanded the boundaries of political 
communication into both long neglected and heretofore unknown forums. Obama posted 
ads inside video games, aired a 30 minute infomercial on seven national networks and 
even distributed tattoos on Halloween. Still, even though there is hope for change, some 
things stayed the same. The 2008 general presidential election was also remarkable in a 
way the last two presidential elections were remarkable.  
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An unprecedented amount was spent to mediate the 2008 presidential campaign in 
the language of advertising. The candidates, the political parties, the PAC’s and the PSGs 
(i.e., 501c and 527 groups) collectively spent record amounts to broadcast their political 
pitches in 30 to 60 second televised political spots (McClellan, 2008). Ad spending was 
up 40% from 2004. And, the ads continued their trend toward extreme incivility. In ad 
entitled Celeb, McCain mocked Obama for being too popular and even compared the 
Democratic candidate to Brittany Spears and Paris Hilton – people who were notoriously 
famous for just being famous. Obama also used uncivil appeals. In an ad entitled Still, he 
mocked McCain’s age by claiming that the Republican candidate did not know how to 
send an email. Still, advertising by outside groups was the most negative. It routinely 
accused Obama of associating with domestic terrorists and McCain of being a doddering 
old man and puppet for George W. Bush. Taken together, the ads of 2008 offered an 
outstanding context in which to conduct a large scale study of the most important form of 
contemporary political communication (Jamieson, 1996) 
This study investigated the content of the 2008 general election ads, their 
influence, the capacity of inoculation to obviate that influence and the role media 
technology plays in the process of that influence. One of this study’s clearest findings 
was that PSG’s broadcast the most extreme forms of negative ads. Furthermore, this 
research showed that those highly negative ads can be effective, albeit their influence is 
complicated by the role of source credibility. However, that influence can be obviated by 
generic inoculation messages. Finally, this study showed that distinct forms of media 
technology exercise their influence through distinct processes. Like the 2008 presidential 
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election, this study’s findings are often complicated, but at other times, they provide 
something new and even profound.  
Sponsorship’s Influence on Presidential Advertising Content 
 The general election phase of presidential campaigns is starting earlier and earlier 
(West, 2004; Franz, et al., 2008). The 2008 contest was no exception. Advertising began 
in March. By November, more than $425 million was spent on election ads that 
mentioned a presidential candidate (Scheinkman, Xaquin, McLean, & Weitberg, 2009b). 
John McCain ran his first ad on March 11. By November, his campaign spent $125 
million on 75 ads. Obama began much later, but only because his primary lasted longer. 
Obama ran his first ad ran on June 11, but by November, his campaign spent almost twice 
as much as McCain’s: $235 million on 118 television spots. Combined, the candidates 
spent about $360 million on 193 ads. Independent groups spent about $65 million. The 
first PSG-sponsored general election ad ran in July. By November, PSG’s had spent 
about $8.5 million on 35 ads. The FEC-compliant groups also aired their first ads in July, 
but by November, they spent much more than the PSG’s: $57.5 million on 105 ads. This 
study described and compared the content of the 2008 ads. 
The content analysis examined nearly every 2008 general election presidential 
advertisement. It tested the proposition that a sponsor’s level of anonymity is associated 
with the quantity and quality of negativity in its political spots. The analyzed ads were 
sponsored by candidate campaigns, FEC-approved organizations and PSGs. Statistical 
analysis revealed that about 50% of the candidate’s thematic content was negative; 74% 
of the PAC content was negative and 82% of the PSG content was negative. Tests for 
independence showed that the proportion of negativity was contingent on sponsorship. 
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The candidates, who are legally required to appear in their ads, balanced their negative 
appeals with an almost equal proportion of positive appeals. The PSG and FEC-
compliant sponsored ads provided disclaimers, but there was no single person to take 
responsibility for the content; therefore, they had less to lose from conveying a greater 
proportion of negative content. Consistent with previous research (Benoit, 2006; Franz, 
Freedman, Goldstein, & Ridout, 2008), third-party sponsors were more negative than the 
candidates.   
Compared to recent presidential elections, the proportion of negativity in 2008 
was relatively consistent with the levels of negativity in 2000 and 2004. Whereas 59% of 
the 2008 general election themes were negative, about 61% of the 2004 themes attacked 
and in 200, 58% attacked (Benoit, 2004). Since 2000, the proportion of negativity in 
presidential races has been substantially greater than it was during the first 50 years of 
televised advertising. Benoit (2001) reported that, between 1952 and 1996, the overall 
proportion of negative thematic content in presidential races was only 37% from all 
sources. The recent uptick in negativity may be explained by the larger role played by 
outside groups in recent elections.  
Non-candidate advertisers attack more often (Benoit, 2006; Franz, et al., 2008), 
and their attacks are more extreme. This study found that the quality of attack themes 
depended on the ad’s sponsor; such that, non-candidate sponsors attacked on character 
more than policy. There was a positive relationship between the attacking sponsor’s 
anonymity and its proportion of character attacks. Candidates attacked on character the 
least (31%). PSG’s attacked on character the most (55%), and FEC-compliant sponsors 
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(46%) were in the middle. The presence of highly anonymous money in campaigns seems 
to promote both more negativity and more personal forms of it.  
It is worth noting that this study of 2008 political advertising content did not 
incorporate advertising buy data into its conclusions. Ad placement and ad buy decisions 
are consequential strategic decisions (West, 2004). The state of the art in functional 
analysis of political advertising weights thematic content by both the number of times 
those themes air and their estimated reach (Semmler, Whitehill, Hammer, Hill, Seurer & 
Stech, 2009). Such weighted content analyses provide the most accurate estimations of 
advertiser intent and potential influence (Pryor, 2001; Franz, et al., 2008).  
On the other hand, the news media often amplifies the most unusual or apt forms 
of political attack advertising. The best example of the amplification effect was the 1964 
Daisy Ad; however, more recent examples abound. The late Senator Paul Wellstone (D-
MN) aired an unexpectedly humorous attack ad that was often replayed on local news 
programs (Pfau, Parrot & Lindquist, 1992). Even more recently, the Swift Boat Veterans 
for Truth’s first ad was amplified by cable news, talk radio and even the network news 
(Dionisopoulos, 2009). In these three cases, negative content alone was influential. Ads 
like these have been called phantom ads (Kurtz, 2008). They run once, but their novelty 
provokes and directs the public debate. In other words, the most extreme attacks are often 
more influential than their ad buys would suggest.  
Extreme attacks can also inspire a spiral of negativity across an entire campaign 
(Andres, 2007). When candidates attack they lock themselves into a kind of mutually 
assured destruction. Pfau and Kenski (1990) reported that, “one of the most important 
lessons in attack politics is the necessity of responding to an attack quickly and 
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persuasively” (p. 11). Conventional wisdom is that presidential candidate Mike Dukakis 
(D-1988) lost because his campaign failed to respond more quickly to attacks on his 
record as Massachusetts Governor (Jamieson, 1992; West, 2004). His frustrated 
presidential bid is now a cautionary tale to those who would otherwise ignore Roger 
Ailes’ dictum that, “when punched, punch back” (in Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995). 
Ansolobehere and Iyengar (1995) empirically demonstrated that the least effective 
response to an attack is a positive claim. The most effective response is another attack. 
Generally speaking, the prudent strategy against negative advertising is more negativity. 
The introduction of highly negative attacks into a campaign may ratchet up the level of 
negativity from all sources. 
This type of incivility arms race was apparently on display in the 2004 
presidential election. An increase in attacks by uncoordinated interest groups was 
associated with an across the board increase in negativity (Franz, et al., 2008). Between 
2000 and 2004, spending by PSGs rose from $151 million (Malcomb, et al., 2005) to 
$486 million (Weissman, 2009). Uncoordinated groups aired 75,304 ads in 2000 and 
160,743 in 2004. In both years, about 70% of uncoordinated ads were negative (Franz, et 
al., 2008). Political parties matched the increasing magnitude of negative ads. They 
increased their own proportion of pure attack advertisements from 45% in 2000 to 70% in 
2004. Coordinated interest groups also increased their proportion of pure attack 
advertisements from 29% in 2000 to 44% in 2004. During the same period, both parties 
and coordinated interest groups reduced their proportion of positive advertisements 
(Franz, et al., 2008). The parties reduced their proportion of promotional appeals from 
25% in 2000 to 10% in 2004, and coordinated interest groups reduced their proportion of 
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promotional appeals from 39% in 2000 to 17% in 2004. These apparent associations lack 
the certainty of statistical analysis or the logic of non-spuriousness, but they join a 
constellation of argumentation and evidence supporting Andres’ (2007) argument that 
PSG-sponsored incivility predicts greater levels of overall incivility. A heuristic program 
of study would clearly articulate and test a negative campaign contagion hypothesis.  
The question then becomes so what? PSGs injected more negativity into public 
discourse, and that might even influence the overall negativity of presidential campaigns. 
If political negativity is a positive good, then PSGs should be applauded. If it is effective, 
then campaigns should be aware and ready to either pre-empt or respond to political 
negativity. On the other hand, many have speculated that high levels of negativity erode 
the health of our democracy. If any of the aforementioned outcomes is demonstrated, 
policymakers, activists and candidates need to pay close attention to PSG activity. 
Activists and lawmakers have called for more regulation of PSGs, but not a single 
experimental study has investigated the influence of this unique brand of attack 
advertising. This study attempted to redress that deficit with the first experimental 
evaluation of PSG-sponsored attack advertising’s influence. 
Extreme Political Attack Advertising’s Influence on Audiences 
 This study examined 35 hypotheses and research questions related to the 
influence of extreme political attack advertising. Those questions were organized into 
three broad categories: sponsorship influences, medium effects and interactions with 
partisanship. Sponsorship was examined to determine the relative influence of candidate 
versus PSG-sponsorship on several campaign outcomes, like intention to vote for a 
particular candidate and democratic values. The advertising conditions were also 
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compared to a control condition. The second group of hypotheses concerned the 
influence of media on several theoretical outcomes, like affect and attitude-behavior 
consistency. The final set of hypotheses concerned the moderating influence of political 
partisanship on political attack advertising’s influence.  
Attack advertising effects. Because voting is a comparative act, presidential 
candidates have a strong incentive to communicate their own strengths, while 
simultaneously conveying their opponents’ weaknesses (Benoit, 2006). Generally, voters 
praise candidates for the former and criticize them for the latter. Voters despise the 
negativity (Begley & Interlandi, 2008), but no candidate has ever captured the White 
House with a purely positive campaign. Anecdotal and systematic empirical evidence 
show that some amount of negativity is needed to win an election (Jamieson, 1996; West, 
1996; Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995). Still, presidential candidates must strike a delicate 
balance between going negative and staying positive. Negativity that is too one-sided or 
too personal elicits backlash effects (Haddock & Zanna, 1997; Meirick, 2002; Pfau & 
Burgoon, 1989; Pinkleton, 1997, 1998; Shapiro & Rieger, 1992). This research posited 
that such backlash effects are mitigated when extreme political negativity is sponsored by 
third-party PSGs. More specifically, it was expected that attacks sponsored by a PSG 
attack sponsor would be perceived as more credible than attacks sponsored by a 
candidate.  
Persuasion is powerfully influenced by perceptions of the communicator’s 
credibility. More than 2000 years ago, Aristotle observed that, “we believe good men 
more fully and more readily than others” (Aristotle, 1954, p. 1356a). Therefore, the first 
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and perhaps most important test of sponsorship effects was a comparison of PSG and 
candidate sponsorship on perceptions of the sponsor’s credibility.   
Results showed PSG-sponsored attack ads were not perceived as more credible 
than candidate-sponsored attacks. Using identical advertising content and only 
manipulating sponsorship, PSGs were not perceived as more credible than the candidates; 
however, a post hoc analysis showed that, compared to no attack, the combined attacks 
were associated with lower levels of perceived credibility. A univariate factorial ANOVA 
analyzed the influence of the collapsed attack condition (0 = no attack / 1 = attack), 
partisanship (0 = weak / 1 = strong) and media (0 = print / 1 = video) on sponsor 
credibility. There was a main effect for the combined attack conditions, F(1, 122) = 
12.21, p = .002, η2 = .07. Compared to the control condition (M = 2.93, SD = 1.25, N = 
46), the extremely negative ads were associated with less credibility for the combined 
attacks (M = 3.52, SD = 1.08, N = 84), t(105) = 2.83, p < .01. The original hypothesis 
posited a difference between PSG and candidate-sponsored attacks, but it did not 
consider the possibility that the extreme attacks, by themselves, reduce the credibility of 
the sponsor, which was the ultimate outcome. 
Reductions in credibility for the combined sponsorship conditions may explain 
the lack of findings for hypotheses 4, 5, 6, 7 and research question 2. The remainder of 
this section describes the null findings for sponsorship, and it explains those null findings 
by showing that the advertisements’ influence was blocked by their initial impact on 
sponsor credibility. That explanation will be referred to as the credibility suppression 
explanation.  
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Sponsorship did not directly influence any dependent variables related to 
campaign outcomes. It was expected that PSG-sponsored ads are more effective than 
candidate-sponsored ads, as measured by more support for the implied beneficiary and 
less support for the target. Those expectations were not confirmed. Hypotheses 4a 
through H4b predicted that PSG-sponsored attacks elicit a more favorable evaluation of 
their implied beneficiary, a less favorable evaluation of their target, a greater intention to 
vote the implied beneficiary and a lesser intention to vote for the target. A detailed 
statistical analysis of each dependent variable failed to reveal a single main effect for 
sponsorship. However, it was stilled hoped that, at least, the attack conditions (i.e. 
candidate and PSG-sponsored) would elicit some effects relative to the control condition. 
That hope also went unfulfilled.  
Disappointing findings were discovered for the eight hypotheses (i.e., H5, H6 & 
H7) that compared each attack condition to a common control condition. Based on 
arguments that candidate-sponsored extreme attacks backfire against both the sponsoring 
candidate (Pfau & Burgoon, 1989; Shapiro & Rieger, 1992; Thorson, Christ, & 
Caywood, 1991) and erode faith democratic values (Brooks & Geer, 2007; Funk, 2001; 
Mutz, 2007; Mutz & Reeves, 2005), hypothesis 5 and 7 posited that candidate attacks 
would reduce favorable evaluations of the sponsor, reduce intention to vote for the 
sponsor, increase favorable evaluations of the target, increase intention to vote for 
sponsor, reduce trust in American government and erode democratic political efficacy. 
These predictions were not confirmed. Similarly disappointing results were found for the 
expectations of hypotheses 6a through 6b, which posited that, compared to the control 
condition, PSG-sponsored attacks increase favorable evaluations of the sponsor, increase 
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intention to vote for the sponsor, decrease favorable evaluations of the target and 
decrease intention to vote for sponsor. A separate set of research questions asked about 
the influence of PSG-sponsored attacks on trust of American government and democratic 
political efficacy. Compared to the control condition, PSG-sponsored attacks did not 
influence those democratic values.  
This consistency of null findings suggests a systematic failure in the execution of 
the experiment or conception of attack advertising’s influence. Post-hoc analyses sought 
to reveal the underlying pattern. In fact, attack advertising’s influence was more 
complicated than the hypotheses posited. Like many media effects, the advertisement’s 
influence was indirect (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960). More specifically, 
sponsor credibility indirectly affected the influence of attack, which is an explanation 
supported by analogous research (Garramone, 1984; Garromone & Smith, 1984; 
Groenendyk & Valentino, 2002). Garramone and Smith (1984) found that independent 
sponsors of political advertising are more credible than candidate sponsors. They also 
revealed that the independent ads were more influential. In another study, Garramone 
(1984) confirmed that, “perceived truthfullness of a negative political commercial is 
positively related to its intended impact” (p. 258). Groenendyk and Valentino (2002) 
found that issue advertising was both more credible than candidate advertising, and it was 
more influential.    
The intervening influence of sponsor credibility was also on display in this study. 
More specifically, it was examined as a mediating variable. Several post-hoc regression-
based mediation procedures, like those used to examine hypothesis 8 (Baron & Kenny, 
1986; Kenny, 2006), were used to test the post-hoc expectation that credibility indirectly 
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affected the influence of the combined attack conditions. Firstly, the attack conditions 
were collapsed into a single factor (0 = no attack / 1 = attack), which was directly related 
to the dependent variables in hypotheses 4, 5, 6, 7 and research question 2 (path c1). 
Secondly, sponsor credibility was regressed on attack exposure (path a). Thirdly, the 
aforementioned dependent variables were jointly regressed onto attack exposure (path 
[c2]) and sponsor credibility (path [b]). All three regression equations were calculated 
while controlling for the influence of media (0 = print / 1 = video) and partisanship (0 = 
weak / 1 = strong). The variance attributed to the indirect path through sponsor credibility 
was quantified and tested with the Sobel (1982) procedure. Figures 2 through 4 
graphically display these post-hoc analyses.  
The first dependent variables analyzed with this mediation procedure were 
favorable evaluation of the target and intention to vote for the target. The targets were the 
candidates whom the respondents supported at phase one. Results showed that attack 
exposure elicited a less favorable evaluation of the sponsor’s credibility (R2 = .15, F(4, 
125) = 17.01, p < .001), and the reduction in credibility predicted a more favorable 
evaluation of the target (R2 = .33, F(4, 125) = 16.63, p < .001), followed by a greater 
intention to vote for the target (R2 = .28, F(4, 125) = 13.39, p < .001). Furthermore, a 
reevaluation of the direct path (i.e., controlling for credibility) between attack exposure 
and support for the candidate showed that controlling for credibility freed the attacks to 
elicit a less favorable evaluation of the target (Sobel = 2.59, p = .009) and a lesser 
intention to vote for the target (Sobel = 2.45, p = .01). In other words, the indirect role of 
sponsor credibility produced a backlash against the attackers’ persuasive intent, but 
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controlling for credibility allowed the ads to have their intended effect.  Figure 2a and 2b 
graphically depict this post hoc analysis.  
A parallel analysis revealed an identical pattern of results for the candidate 
supported in the attack ads. The dependent variables in the second set of mediation 
analyses were favorable evaluation of the attacks’ beneficiary and intention to vote for 
the beneficiary. Those findings are graphically depicted in Figures 2a and 2b. The 
candidate supported in the attack ad was also the candidate whom the respondents 
reported rejecting at phase one. Results showed that attack exposure elicited a less 
favorable evaluation of sponsor’s credibility (R2 = .15, F(4, 125) = 17.01, p < .001), and 
the reduction in credibility predicted a less favorable evaluation of the candidate 
supported in the attack (R2 = .40, F(4, 125) = 22.06, p < .001), followed by a lesser 
intention to vote for the candidate supported in the attack (R2 = .16, F(4, 125) = 7.26, p < 
.001). Furthermore, a reevaluation of the direct path between attack exposure and support 
for the benefited candidate showed that, removing credibility freed the attacks to elicit a 
more favorable evaluation of the beneficiary (Sobel = -2.88, p = .004) and a greater 
intention to vote for the beneficiary (Sobel = -2.07, p = .04). In other words, the 
intervention of sponsor credibility produced a backlash against the attacks’ persuasive 
intent. By removing credibility from the equation, the ads moved audience’s closer to 
supporting the candidate whom they rejected at phase one. When credibility was 
removed, the extreme attacks changed the audience’s attitudes and behavioral intentions. 
The dependent variables in the third set of mediation analyses were trust in 
American government and democratic political efficacy. Those analyses are graphically 
depicted in Figures 3a and 3b. Sponsor credibility did not intervene in the relationship 
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between exposure to attack advertising and trust in government (Sobel = -.29, p = .77) or 
in the relationship between exposure to the attacks and democratic political efficacy 
(Sobel = 1.25, p = .21). Thus, the credibility suppression explanation did not clarify the 
null findings for democratic values. Therefore, this study provided strong support for the 
argument that democratic values are not harmed by exposure to attack advertising (Finkel 
& Geer, 1998; Franz, et al., 2008; Geer & Lau, 1998; Geer, 2000, 2008; Goldstein & 
Freedman, 2002).  
For campaign outcomes, however, these post-hoc analyses showed a clear and 
consistent pattern of effects. First, the extreme attacks elicited unfavorable evaluations of 
their sponsor’s credibility, which in turn elicited a backlash in the form of boomerang 
effects (more support for the target and less support for supported candidate). Secondly, 
the attacks worked as intended once credibility was removed from the equation. The 
implication of these findings is two-fold. First, a less favorable evaluation of the 
sponsor’s credibility explains why the sponsorship hypotheses were unconfirmed. The 
second implication is more interesting. Sponsor credibility is the only barrier to the 
effectiveness of extreme attacks on a candidate’s character. Therefore, these attacks could 
work as intended when sponsor credibility is irrelevant or when faith in the sponsor is 
strong enough to resist derogations for any reason. Indeed, several methods exist for 
increasing a source’s credibility.  
Even the most unbelievable sources can be made trustworthy if they argue for 
positions that apparently violate their own self interest (Walster, Wood, & Chaiken, 
1966) or if they violate the audience’s expectations (Eagly, Wood, & Chaiken, 1978). 
These propositions may explain why the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth (SBVT) ads were 
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so devastatingly effective in 2004. Kerry established the expectation that his fellow 
Vietnam veterans were uniquely qualified to discuss his qualifications for the presidency. 
Because the SBVT were also Vietnam Vets who had served close to John Kerry, voters 
might have included them among the band of brothers who had been endorsing Kerry’s 
candidacy. During the Iowa caucus campaign, Kerry substantially advanced his 
candidacy with a television advertisement in which one of his swift-boat shipmates 
testified that the Senator had saved his life. At the 2004 Democratic national convention, 
Kerry placed his military service at the forefront of his campaign. He even invited four 
veterans to endorse his candidacy, referring to them as his “band of brothers”. Not only 
had many of the members of SBVT served with Kerry, some were even pictured in his 
official presidential campaign literature. Believing that the SBVT must have had a good 
reason to betray their “brother in arms”, voters might have been more willing to believe 
the group’s personal and one-sided attacks.  
Such speculation deserves to be tested under rigorous conditions. Future research 
should directly manipulate the credibility of third-party attack advertisers relative to the 
extremity of their attacks. In the meantime, this study offers an important principle to 
political practitioners. Even when audiences support the target of an attack, they can be 
persuaded by an extremely negative advertising message, so long as the attack sponsor’s 
credibility can sustain the attack itself. It would be very interesting to test the limits of 
credibility with respect to extreme forms of political propaganda, like the paranoid style 
(Hofstadter, 1964).  
Can credibility overwhelm objections to arguments that the Republicans seek 
authoritarian fascism or that Obama is the member of a fifth column intent on enslaving 
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Americans to an Islamic-Marxist state? In recent years, both ideas have gained currency 
in American discourse. Neither is conducive to the kind of political compromise that is 
necessary for democratic governance (see Madison, 1787). If one believes that her 
political opponent seeks the destruction of civilization, it defies reason to compromise 
with him. This research shows that combating such extreme beliefs with skilled 
argumentation may be futile. Rather, such an effort should focus on enhancing the 
credibility of the extreme position’s spokesperson or spokespersons.  
The impact of channel on attack advertising’s influence. It was posited that 
video political attack advertisements are source oriented, affective and directly 
experiential, whereas print political attack advertisements are message oriented, cognitive 
and indirectly experiential. These expectations were tested within the context of both 
political attack advertising effects and the inoculation effects. This section discusses the 
findings related to political attack advertising. Two hypotheses posited that relational 
communication and source credibility indirectly affected attack advertising’s influence.  
Another hypothesis posited that message factors impact the influence of printed attack 
advertising. Finally, video and print-mediated political attack advertisements were 
compared on their capacity to elicit affective responses and attitude-behavior consistency. 
All of these tests were justified by the central assumptions of medium theory (Chesebro, 
1984; McLuhan, 1964; Meyrowitz, 1994; Ong, 1982; Postman, 1985).    
Medium theory proposes that media represent distinct epistemological 
environments (Chesebro, 1984; McLuhan, 1964; Meyrowitz, 1994; Ong, 1982; Postman, 
1985). Because video conveys experiential access to a message’s source (Horton & 
Wohl, 1956; Meyrowitz, 1982; Pfau, 1990), it was expected that video-mediated attack 
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advertising’s influence would flow through source factors. The two source factors tested 
here were source credibility (McCroskey, Holdridge, & Toomb, 1974 1974; McCroskey 
& Jensen, 1973) and relational communication (J. Burgoon & Hale, 1987). Both 
dimensions of source were indirect factors in the process of video-mediated political 
attack advertising’s influence on intention to vote for the targeted candidate. In addition, 
perceptions of communicator credibility and relational communication indirectly 
mitigated the intended influence of the video-mediated political attack ads. By removing 
their influence, the video attack ads operated as intended; which is to say, they reduced 
intention to vote for the targeted candidate. 
Given that findings from the post-hoc analyses showed that the ads exercised their 
influence through credibility, it became necessary to determine if an isolated print 
condition produced the same intervening relationships. Post-hoc analysis showed that 
neither credibility (Sobel = .84, p = .39) nor relational communication (Sobel = .52, p = 
.60) intervened in the process of printed political attack advertising’s influence. Thus, 
video attack influence operates through processes that are distinct from print attack 
influence. It was also expected that printed attacks exercise their influence through 
message factors. That was not the case. Nevertheless, these findings provided additional 
confirmation of medium theory’s claim that video foregrounds source factors (Beninger, 
1987; Pfau, 1990), even if it did not confirm the claim that print operates through 
message factors. 
Tests of print and video’s relative capacity to elicit emotion similarly failed to 
operate as expected. It was reasoned that video elicits more affect than print. That 
expectation was tested with respect to positive affect for the implied beneficiary of the 
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attack and negative affect for the target of the attack. Those expectations were not 
confirmed, although the null findings could result from the similarity between the print 
and video ads. Both video and print ads contained stimuli that are associated with the 
elicitation of affect, like vivid colors (Brader, 2005) and facial affect displays (Hatfield, 
Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1992; Hsee, Hatfield, & Chemtob, 1991). Therefore, the distinction 
between the media may not have been vivid enough to produce the hypothesized 
differences. A more powerful manipulation would simply compare plain black and white 
print to full color video attacks.  
The unexpected findings for media’s influence on attitude-behavior consistency 
are more difficult to explain. Based upon video’s similarity to lived experience 
(Beninger, 1987; Horton & Wohl, 1956; Meyrowitz, 1982), it was expected that, 
compared to print, video elicits a greater degree of attitude-behavior consistency. That 
expectation was supported by extant research showing that directly formed attitudes 
elicited more attitude-behavior consistency than the indirectly formed attitudes (Fazio & 
Zanna, 1978, 1981; Fazio, Zanna, & Cooper, 1978). Surprisingly, the print-mediated 
attacks elicited greater attitude-behavior consistency than the video-mediated attacks. 
That correspondence may be attributable to print’s demonstrated capacity to facilitate 
message comprehension and therefore, issue-relevant message processing (Chaiken & 
Eagly, 1976), which has been associated with greater attitude-behavior consistency 
(Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, & Rodriguez, 1986). In other words, the greater cognitive 
elaboration required to process the print messages may have facilitated the attitude-
behavior consistency. Analogous results are evident in studies showing that newspaper 
use is associated with greater levels of political participation (Eveland & Scheufele, 
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2000; McLeod, et al., 1996; Pfau, Houston, & Semmler, 2007). Analogous results are 
evident in studies showing that newspaper use is associated with greater levels of 
political participation (Eveland & Scheufele, 2000; McLeod, et al., 1996; Pfau, Houston, 
& Semmler, 2007).  
Cognitive elaboration (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), which is composed of 
motivation and ability, may provide a more general explanation for the relationship 
between experiential processing and attitude-behavior consistency. For example, the 
attitude-behavior consistency of students who experienced the housing shortage in Regan 
and Fazio’s (1977) study may have been produced by the relevance, as opposed to the 
concreteness, of their experience. Therefore, future studies of experiential and 
representational processing should control for relevance across the conditions.       
 Influence of partisanship on attack effects. The conventional wisdom in 
political campaigns is that 40% of voters vote Republican, 40% vote Democratic and 
20% are persuadable. Strength of partisan identification exerts a strong influence on the 
decision to vote and for whom to vote (Bartels, 2000; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 
1954; Campbell, et al., 1960; Popkin, 1994). This study posited that weak partisans are 
more persuaded by political attack advertising than strong partisans. None of the 
hypotheses based on that reasoning were confirmed. Strength of party identification did 
not interact with exposure to either PSG-sponsored or candidate-sponsored attack 
advertising. Both candidate support and democratic values were unaffected by the 
combined influence of partisanship and exposure to attack advertising content. Findings 
clearly showed main effects for partisanship on candidate support, but those effects did 
not translate into interactions with exposure to the attacks. Therefore, it seems that 
                                                                                                          
203 
 
partisanship is a powerful determinant of candidate support, but in this case, it did not 
influence responses to political attack advertising content from any sponsor.  
Effectiveness of Inoculation against Extreme Attack Advertising 
 Influence of inoculation on phase three candidate support. Inoculation is a 
demonstrably effective means of preempting campaign negativity (Pfau & Burgoon, 
1988; Pfau, Kenski, Nitz, & Sorenson, 1990; Pfau, Park, Holbert, & Cho, 2001). Its 
blanket of protection extends to candidate support (Pfau & Burgoon, 1988), democratic 
values and behavioral intentions (Pfau, Park, et al., 2001). In the typically unpredictable 
environment of political campaigns, inoculation mitigates the influence of both 
anticipated and unanticipated attacks (Pfau & Burgoon, 1988, 1990; Pfau & Kenski, 
1990; Pfau, et al., 1990). The inoculation message strategy’s reliable effectiveness has 
immortalized it in both the pages of academic journals and the practices of political 
campaigns (Jamieson, 1996; Trent & Friedenberg, 2000; West, 2004).  
This study sought to enrich the inoculation construct by demonstrating its ability 
to protect against both PSG and candidate-sponsored political attacks ads. To that end, it 
tested both a traditional candidate-centered inoculation message and a broader generic 
inoculation message. The candidate-specific message warned audiences against the 
particular influence of candidate-specific attacks, and it bolstered favorable attitudes 
toward the candidate whom the respondent initially supported. The generic inoculation 
message provided specific reasons to reject all political attack advertisements. Both 
strategies were tested in print and video. Finally, both strategies were tested against 
candidate-sponsored and PSG-sponsored attack advertisements.  
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Six, four-part hypotheses or research questions evaluated the influence of the two 
inoculation strategies against the two attack conditions.  In total, 24 inoculation main 
effects were analyzed. Generic inoculation’s influence was tested against a control for 
both candidate and PSG-sponsored attacks. Candidate-specific inoculation was also 
tested against a control for both candidate and PSG-sponsored attacks. And, finally, 
generic and candidate-sponsored inoculations were evaluated against each other relative 
to their defense against both candidate and PSG-sponsored attacks. All hypotheses and 
research questions were evaluated along with media and partisanship with three-way 
factorial ANOVAs. Not a single main effect was significant.  
With the lower threshold of a one-tailed test, two main effects were significant. 
Compared to generic inoculation, candidate-specific inoculation was a more reliable 
bulwark against increased intention to vote against the candidate supported in the PSG-
sponsored attack messages. On the other hand, that finding was rendered relatively 
meaningless by the lack of significant differences between either of the inoculation 
strategies and the control condition. Even though candidate-specific inoculation was 
superior to generic inoculation, neither inoculation condition was superior to control 
against PSG-sponsored attacks. A slightly more encouraging marginal effect was 
uncovered for the influence of candidate-specific inoculation against the control 
condition. The dependent variable was intention to vote for the targeted candidate. The 
result was that candidate-specific inoculation predicted a greater intention to vote for the 
target. Consistent with previous inoculation findings (Pfau & Burgoon, 1988; Pfau, et al., 
1990; Pfau, Park, et al., 2001), candidate-specific inoculation was slightly more efficient 
at protecting support for a candidate from both opposition-candidate and PSG-sponsored 
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attacks; however, the differences were so marginal and so inconsistent, they were almost 
meaningless.  
None of the hypotheses were strongly confirmed, but the actual influence of 
inoculation was substantially more interesting when they were revealed by three post-hoc 
analyses, which revealed their potential for profit in three trends among the null findings. 
First, inoculation influenced phase-three behavioral candidate support more reliably than 
it influenced phase-three attitudinal support. Second, video inoculation was associated 
with more reliable findings than print inoculation. And third, generic inoculation 
produced more reliable results than candidate-specific inoculation. These patterns were 
evident when inoculation was pitted against both the candidate and PSG attack 
conditions. Of course, these patterns were neither hypothesized nor did they account for 
every significant inoculation outcome. On the other hand, they did suggest a set of post-
hoc examinations for the video-mediated generic and candidate-specific inoculation 
conditions.  
The first set examined the potential of video-mediated inoculation to obviate 
attack advertising’s influence. Two sets of independent sample t-tests compared video 
inoculation to the controls on vote intentions at the phase-three attack condition. The 
attack-sponsorship conditions and partisanship conditions were collapsed to increase 
statistical power and to isolate the influence of the video-mediated inoculation relative to 
the control condition. The dependent variables were intention to vote for the targeted 
candidate and intention to vote for the implied beneficiary of the attacks. The first t-tests 
examined the influence of video-mediated generic inoculation and the second t-tests 
examined the influence of video-mediated candidate-specific inoculation. It was expected 
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that, compared to no inoculation, video inoculation is associated with a greater intention 
to vote for the targeted candidate and a lesser intention to vote for the implied 
beneficiary.  
The post-hoc examinations confirmed that video inoculation is an effective agent 
against attack advertising’s influence. Compared to the control condition, generic video-
mediated inoculation protected  phase-three intention to vote for the targeted candidate 
(control: M = 4.56, SD = 2.35, N = 43; inoculation: M = 5.79, SD = 1.86, N = 48, t(80) = 
2.75, p = .007) and phase-three intention to vote against the implied beneficiary of the 
attack (control: M = 1.51, SD = .98, N = 43; inoculation: M = 1.08; SD = .35, N = 48), 
t(51) = 2.71, p = .01. At the lower threshold of a one-tailed test, video-mediated 
candidate-specific inoculation also protected phase-three intention to vote for the targeted 
candidate (control: M = 4.56, SD = 2.35, N = 43; inoculation: M = 5.38, SD = 5.382, N = 
40), t(81) = 1.70, p = .09), but even at the lower threshold, it did not influence intention 
to vote for the implied beneficiary (control: M = 1.51, SD = .98, N = 43; inoculation: M = 
1.70, SD = 1.52, N = 40), t(81) = .67, p = .50). Comparable but unreported t-tests 
revealed that printed inoculation was utterly unable to protect candidate attitudes in the 
face of the attacks. Therefore, video inoculation was the most reliable means of pre-
empting the influence of phase-three attacks on candidate support.  
Isolating the video inoculation conditions reaffirmed that both candidate-specific 
(Pfau & Burgoon, 1988; Pfau & Kenski, 1990) and generic inoculation (Pfau, Park, et al., 
2001) is capable of protecting candidate support from political attack advertising’s 
influence; however, these results showed that generic inoculation was the more reliable 
agent. Generic inoculation appeals have been shown to obviate the influence of soft-
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money attack ads (Pfau, Park, et al., 2001), corporate front stealth group attacks (Pfau, 
Park, et al., 2001) and print news photographs (Pfau, et al., 2006). The practical potential 
of generic inoculation against political attack advertising is enormous. Candidate 
campaigns ahead in the polls could use a generic inoculation strategy to protect attitudes 
from opposition negativity in the waning days of a campaign, when trailing challengers 
attack most vociferously (Trent & Friedenberg, 2000). Third-party groups that have an 
interest in reducing the influence of campaign negativity could also benefit from a 
generic inoculation message strategy. Given the myriad of ways in which televised 
negativity can mislead (Jamieson, 1996; West, 2004), the electorate may have the most to 
gain from an inoculation strategy that preempts the influence of all extreme political 
attack advertising.  
Influence of inoculation on attack-phase democratic values. Previous efforts 
have demonstrated generic inoculation’s potential to protect democratic values and 
activities (Pfau, Park, et al., 2001), but this study did not reproduce those findings. It 
found that, compared to generic inoculation, candidate-specific inoculation better protects 
trust in government against PSG-sponsored attacks. It further demonstrated that, 
compared to candidate-specific inoculation, generic inoculation better protects trust in 
government against candidate-sponsored attacks. Unfortunately, the relative difference 
between the generic and candidate-specific inoculation conditions meant little, since there 
was no overall inoculation effect on democratic values (i.e., inoculation versus control). 
This finding contradicts those studies that have demonstrated inoculation’s capacity to 
protect democratic values (Pfau, Park, et al., 2001). The difference between those efforts 
and this one may have been a matter of context. The 2008 presidential contest was 
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electrifying. It attracted a record number of voters, and in particular, it attracted a record 
number of young voters. That enthusiasm for the democratic process may have simply 
rendered the inoculation messages unnecessary.   
The Influence of Media on the Inoculation Process 
 Print inoculation was associated with greater levels of threat than video, although 
the difference was only significant at the lower threshold of a one-tailed test. This finding 
contradicted the logic of hypotheses 18h, which posited that video inoculation elicits 
more threat than print. Still, print’s superior capacity to elicit threat confirmed the larger 
claim that video and print operate through distinct processes. On the other hand, post-hoc 
tests revealed that neither the video (control: M = 2.87, SD = 1.24, N = 43; inoculation: M 
= 2.76, SD = 1.10, N = 110, t(151) = .56, p = .58) nor the print inoculation conditions 
(control: M = 2.78, SD = 1.21, N = 41; inoculation: M = 3.03, SD = 1.26, N = 114, t(153) 
= 1.09, p = .28) differed from the control. This finding was surprising. The 
preponderance of inoculation research shows that threat is an important means of 
inducing resistance to persuasion (Compton & Pfau, 2005; Pfau, 1997; Szabo & Pfau, 
2002). With the failure of threat, this effort resorted to explaining video inoculation’s 
effects through other process variables. Indeed, substantial research shows that 
inoculation operates through other mechanisms, like attitude accessibility (Pfau, et al., 
2004, 2005), emotion (Pfau, et al., 2008; Pfau, Szabo, et al., 2001), counter-
argumentation (Compton & Pfau, 2004) and associative networks (Pfau, et al., 2005). 
This study did not find any differences between the print and video inoculation 
conditions on emotion, counter argumentation or associative networks, but it did find 
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evidence for an inoculation process that was rooted in video’s elicitation of attitude 
strength and accessibility.  
Video and print did not directly differ on their capacity to elicit attitude strength 
or accessibility, but when the video condition was isolated, post-hoc tests showed that it 
differed from the control condition on both attitude accessibility and attitude confidence. 
Simple independent sample t-tests showed that, with respect to their initial candidate 
choice, video inoculation elicited greater attitude accessibility than the control condition 
(control: M = 3.48, SD = 1.71, N = 43; inoculation: M = 4.02, SD = 1.81, N = 88, t(129) = 
1.63, p = .10), and less attitude confidence than the control condition, (control: M = 3.89, 
SD = .96, N = 43; inoculation: M = 2.56, SD = 1.16, N = 88, t(129) = 6.49, p < .001).  
Furthermore, a two-step hierarchical regression analysis showed that, after 
controlling for intention to vote for the targeted candidate at phase one (b = .74, SE = .06, 
β = .71, t(129) = 11.46, p < .001), R2 = .5, F(1, 129) = 131.34, p < .001, attitude 
accessibility positively predicted intention to vote for the targeted candidate (b = .29, SE 
= .08, β = .24, t(128) = 3.56, p < .001), R2Δ = .05, F(1, 128) = 77.93, p < .001. A similar 
regression analysis showed that attitude confidence negatively predicted intention to vote 
for the targeted candidate (b = -.42, SE = .11, β = -.25, t(128) = 3.89, p < .001), R2Δ = .05, 
F(1, 128) = 80.45, p < .001. In other words, both accessibility and confidence increased 
resistance to the influence of phase-three attack advertising; although, the direction of 
that influence required further scrutiny. Accessibility acted as previous research has 
demonstrated (Pfau, et al., 2004; Pfau, et al., 2003); which is to say, inoculation elicited 
accessibility and accessibility elicited resistance.  
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Attitude confidence’s role, however, was more complicated. A consensus of 
inoculation research shows that inoculation elicits confidence and confidence elicits 
greater resistance to persuasion (Compton & Pfau, 2004; Lin, 2007; Pfau, et al., 2005). 
This study revealed that confidence took two negative paths to resistance (inoculation 
was (-) with confidence and confidence was (-) with resistance), as opposed to the two 
positive paths seen in previous research (inoculation is (+) confidence is (+) with 
resistance). The effect is the same, but confidence’s path in this study was unique. The 
explanation for this discrepancy could be this study’s unique measure of attitude 
confidence. This 5-item measure of confidence (M. Burgoon, Cohen, Miller, & 
Montgomery, 1978) had never been used to examine the inoculation process. Rather, 
inoculation research had measured confidence with a single item asking participants to 
rate their attitude certainty on a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 means uncertain and 100 
means certain (Compton & Pfau, 2004; Lin, 2007; Pfau, et al., 2005).  
Additional tests examined the possibility that the M. Burgoon et al. (1978) 
measure of confidence was a proxy for threat. Within the video-mediated candidate-
specific and generic inoculation conditions, a post-hoc correlation analysis revealed that 
threat and confidence were positively correlated, r(222) = .20, p < .01. Thus, the two 
must offer distinct paths of influence. If confidence were a proxy for threat, the variables 
would have been negatively related; which is to say, more threat would have been 
associated with less confidence. Instead, more threat was associated with more 
confidence, which is conceptually contradictory. Since the two variables were positively 
related, the 5-item confidence measure may represent a distinct path of inoculation’s 
influence. If that is the case, attitude confidence might account for the direct and 
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unexplained path to resistance that operates independently of threat, counterarguing, 
certainty and attitude accessibility (Pfau, et al., 2005).   
Medium-Same and Medium-Different Inoculation 
 Medium theory posits that print and video media are associated with distinct ways 
of knowing (Chesebro, 1984; Meyrowitz, 1985; Postman, 1993). This study tested that 
claims under a variety of conditions and against a variety of dependent variables. At the 
inoculation phase, print messages were expected to elicit relatively less affect, less 
attitude accessibility, less attitude-behavior consistency, fewer source considerations, 
greater emphasis on message considerations, more counter argumentation and a greater 
overall level of cognition.  Some of these expectations were validated. Many were not, 
and some operated contrary to expectations. For example, video operated as expected 
when it was associated with greater source considerations than print, but video operated 
contrary to expectations when it was associated with less attitude-behavior consistency 
than print at both phases two and three. Nevertheless, this pattern of results generally 
confirmed the fundamental proposition of medium theory: print and video persuasion 
offer different ways of knowing or at least, distinct means of eliciting resistance to attack 
advertising’s influence. Given these distinct processes and outcomes of video and print-
mediated inoculation and attack advertising, it was interesting to further examine the 
impact of switching media in the middle of the inoculation process. 
 This study examined the relative influence of medium-same and medium-
different inoculation. Of course, the inoculation message strategy has been used to 
convey resistance to persuasion across media (Pfau & Burgoon, 1988; Pfau, Park, et al., 
2001; Pfau, et al., 1990). Printed inoculation messages have conferred resistance to 
                                                                                                          
212 
 
printed attack messages (Pfau & Burgoon, 1988), video attack messages (Pfau, Park, et 
al., 2001) and direct mail (Pfau, et al., 1990). Video inoculation has conferred resistance 
to peer pressure (Pfau, Van Bockern, & Kang, 1992) and printed attack messages (Pfau, 
et al., 2002). Print and video inoculation messages have even been compared on several 
dimensions of resistance. This study compared inoculation’s effect when the medium 
carrying the inoculation message was the same as the medium conveying the attack 
(medium-same) versus when the medium carrying the inoculation message was different 
from the from the medium conveying the attack medium-different). Given that previous 
findings showed reliable effects for candidate-specific inoculation and candidate-
sponsored attacks (Pfau & Burgoon, 1988; Pfau & Kenski, 1990; Pfau, et al., 1990), this 
study employed candidate inoculation and candidate attacks across medium-same and 
medium-different conditions.  
The first test of medium-same versus medium-different inoculation compared the 
effect of print-inoculation to print attack (P-P or medium same) versus print-inoculation 
to video-attack (P-V or medium different). When print inoculation crossed over to a 
video attack, inoculation lost its relative potency. Medium same (P-P) conferred more 
resistance than medium different (P-V) in terms of a more favorable evaluation of the 
targeted candidate, greater intention to vote for the targeted candidate and lesser intention 
to vote against the supported candidate. There was no difference between P-P and P-V on 
favorable evaluation of the candidate supported in the attack message. 
The second examination of medium-same versus medium-different inoculation 
failed to reveal any significant differences. It compared video-inoculation to video-attack 
(V-V) versus video-inoculation to print-attack (V-P). The trend was not in the predicted 
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direction. In other words, the medium-different condition (V-P) seemed to provide more 
resistance than the matched conditions (V-V); however, this difference was merely 
superficial.  
Still, the success of the former hypotheses must be compared to the failure of the 
latter set. When the inoculation was initiated in print, the difference between the matched 
and mismatched conditions was reliable, but when inoculation was initiated in video, the 
differences were non-significant and inconsistent. This problem may be the product of 
the particular type of processing elicited by video versus print. Further analysis is needed 
to examine possibility. Another explanation is that these findings were driven by the 
video and print attacks, as opposed to the inoculations. When inoculation was initiated in 
print, the matched attack was in print. When inoculation was initiated in video, the 
matched attack was in video. If the video attack was more effective than the print attack, 
the video-video condition would naturally appear inferior relative to the print-print 
condition. This alternative explanation was tested within the no-inoculation condition and 
between the print and video attacks. More specifically, an independent sample t-test 
compared the print-mediated candidate-sponsored attack to the video-mediated 
candidate-sponsored attack. If there were no differences between the conditions, it could 
be assumed the medium-same inoculation treatment was more effective than the medium-
different treatment. Indeed, no significant differences were found for favorable evaluation 
of the targeted candidate (print: M = 5.23, SD = 1.17, N = 92; video: M = 5.22, SD = 1.21, 
N = 86, t(176) = .02, p = .98), intention to vote for the supported candidate (print: M = 
5.01, SD = 2.06, N = 92; video: M = 5.28, SD = 2.23, N = 86, t(176) = .81, p = .42) or 
favorable evaluation of the implied beneficiary (print: M = 3.13, SD = 1.32, N = 92; 
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video: M = 2.97, SD = 1.41, N = 86, t(176) = .82, p = .41). The only significant difference 
was marginal. On intention to vote for the candidate supported in the attack, the print-
mediated candidate-sponsored attack was marginally more effective than the video-
mediated candidate-sponsored attack (video: M = 1.41, SD = 1.13, N = 86; print: M = 
1.72, SD = 1.38, N = 92, t(176) = 1.66, p < .10). Nevertheless, because the t-tests did not 
reveal a more effective video-mediated candidate-sponsored attack condition, the best 
explanation for the relative superiority of the medium-same (P-P) condition is medium 
theory’s proposition that different media represent distinct epistemologies. 
Limitations 
 Any large-scale endeavor teaches lessons in the language of hindsight. This study 
is no different. Hindsight has suggested three limitations and areas for improvement. This 
section describes those limitations and opportunities. First, it discusses the limitations 
inherent in Baron & Kenny’s (1986) procedure for testing indirect effects. Second, it 
reviews the large number of null findings, especially in the attack conditions. Finally, it 
discusses the significantly skewed variables and possible transformations that might be 
employed in secondary analyses of this data.  
 Initially, this study over relied on Baron and Kenny’s (1986) mediation 
procedure to examine the indirect effects associated with the relative processes of print 
and video-mediated influence. Hayes (2010) has observed several problems with the 
mediation procedure used in this study. Firstly, the procedure unnecessarily requires a 
direct effect, when logic dictates that effects can be entirely indirect. Hayes also reported 
that Baron and Kenny’s (1986) use of the Sobel (1982) test for indirect effects is 
misguided; since, it maintains the nearly impossible assumption that the indirect effect is 
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normally distributed. The better alternative to Sobel is an iterative bootstrapping 
procedure combined with a confidence-interval test for significance (Hayes, 2010). In a 
post-Baron and Kenny (1986) world, tests of indirect effects will be more powerful, less 
restrictive and accomplished with a bootstrapping procedure.  
The second limitation of this study was evident in the preponderance of null or 
weak findings, especially in the attack conditions. Those null results might be explained 
by an overzealous pursuit of mundane realism. Not only were the ads embedded in 
entertaining content, which could be distracting; they were sandwiched between 
commercial breaks, which prevented any serial position effects. Future efforts to 
demonstrate the influence of extreme attack advertising should expose subjects to ads that 
are isolated from the distractions of an actual viewing environment. Once effects are 
established within an internally valid context, the next step could be to test those ads in a 
more mundane environment.  
A third and important concern was the lack of normality within many of the 
dependent variables, as displayed in Table 4b. According to the recommendations of 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), transformations were attempted on the three most 
significantly skewed variables: intention to vote for the implied beneficiary of the 
political attack, negative emotion for the target of the political attack and intention to vote 
for the target of the political attack. In all but one case, the transformations failed in their 
mission to correct the skew; but even then, the corrected skew came at the cost of 
significant kurtosis. Table 15 displays the transformations discussed in this section. 
 
 




 At least four implications of this study are worth reiterating. First, PSG-sponsored 
ads are more negative and more personal than ads sponsored by more accountable 
organizations, like the candidate’s campaigns and FEC-compliant PACs. Second, highly 
personal and negative attacks work as intended when their sponsors are highly credible. 
Third, video-mediated generic inoculation appeals can obviate the influence of extremely 
negative political attack advertising. And fourth, video and print media convey distinct 
ways of knowing.  
 The greater negativity of PSG-sponsored ads should be considered with respect to 
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) and the Supreme Court’s recent decision 
to permit more soft money into political campaigns (i.e., Citizens United v. FEC). 
Although the BCRA sought to limit the role of soft money in political campaigns, it 
merely diverted it from political parties to less accountable institutions (e.g., PSGs). 
Furthermore, that lack of accountability inhibits another stated goal of the BCRA, which 
was to limit the negativity in political campaigns. Soft money now finances the least 
accountable and most extreme forms of negativity. Interestingly, this study provided 
evidence to suggest that political negativity is contagious. Future research needs to test a 
negativity contagion hypothesis. Furthermore, legislators should be made aware that the 
Citizens United decision could exacerbate the trend toward more negativity by allowing 
an unlimited amount of soft money into federal campaigns.  
 This study’s findings also suggest that credible sources are the key to the success 
of highly personal and highly negative political attacks. Source factors consistently 
suppressed the impact of both candidate and PSG-sponsored extreme attacks. When those 
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factors were removed, the ads had their intended effect. Practitioners should be interested 
in further research that develops axiomatic ratios between negativity and factors 
influencing credibility, so that the influence of extreme negativity could be reliably 
predicted.  
 Campaigns and practitioners can also take comfort knowing that video-mediated 
generic-inoculation appeals can defend against the influence of extreme political attacks. 
Generic appeals are more efficient than specific appeals, since their lack of specificity 
can better cope with the inherent volatility of political campaigns. In the late stages of a 
campaign, candidates or organizations interested in stabilizing the electorate’s attitudes 
might use generic inoculation ads to obviate any successful last-minute insurgencies.  
 Medium theorists are another beneficiary of this study’s findings. In both 
expected and unexpected ways, this study demonstrated that print and video exercise 
their influence through distinct processes. Video’s influence was indirectly routed 
through source considerations and print was associated with greater attitude-behavior 
consistency than video. Finally, the central theoretical proposition of this dissertation was 
confirmed by the relative superiority of medium-same (P-P) versus medium-different (P-
V) inoculation. This finding both confirms the proposition that media are epistemic, and 
it offers practitioners another dimension on which they can predict the success of an 
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Presidential Campaign Advertising: 2008 General Election Phase 
 
Sponsor Title Air Date 
 
Candidate 
 Obama The Country I Love 6/20 
 Obama Dignity 6/30 
 Obama New Energy  7/8 
 Obama America's Leadership 7/15 
 Obama Changing World 7/17 
 Obama Old Politics General 7/28 
 Obama New Energy Rev 7/30 
 Obama Low Road 8/1 
 Obama Low Road Rev 8/4 
 Obama Pocket 8/5 
 Obama Hands 8/9 
 Obama Backyard 8/11 
 Obama Fix the Economy Rev 8/13 
 Obama Free Sticker 1 15 8/13 
 Obama Embrace 8/13 
 Obama Book 8/13 
 Obama Fix the Economy  8/13 
 Obama Free Sticker 2 15 8/14 
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Sponsor Title Air Date 
 
Candidate 
 Obama Punch 8/14 
 Obama Three Bedroom Ranch 8/16 
 Obama Three Times 8/19 
 Obama Never 8/20 
 Obama Dangerous 8/21 
 Obama Seven 8/22 
 Obama Out of Touch 8/25 
 Obama Ayers Response 8/25 
 Obama Don’t Know Much 8/26 
 Obama Revitalize 8/30 
 Obama Obama Scranton 8/31 
 Obama Same 8/31 
 Obama No Change 9/3 
 Obama Keep You Safe 9/7 
 Obama Ensure Opportunity 9/7 
 Obama No Maverick 9/9 
 Obama Bush Economics 9/9 
 Obama Shaky Economy 9/9 
 Obama Scranton (Rev) 9/9 
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Sponsor Title Air Date 
 
Candidate 
 Obama No Third Term 9/10 
 Obama Still 9/12 
 Obama Real Change 9/12 
 Obama It's Over 9/12 
 Obama Burden 9/15 
 Obama Honor 9/15 
 Obama Sold Us Out 9/16 
 Obama Social Security 9/16 
 Obama Alternative 9/16 
 Obama Protect Obama: Protect Infants 9/17 
 Obama Real Change 120 9/18 
 Obama Need Education 9/21 
 Obama Foreign Vehicles MI 9/23 
 Obama A Stronger Economy 9/25 
 Obama Vote  OH 9/25 
 Obama Healthcare Reform 9/29 
 Obama Mother General 9/30 
 Obama Same Path 120 9/30 
 Obama Risk 9/30 
                                                                                                          
260 
 
Table 1 cont. 
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Sponsor Title Air Date 
 
Candidate 
 Obama Tax Healthcare 10/1 
 Obama Spending Spree 10/1 
 Obama Can’t Explain 10/4 
 Obama Troop Funding 10/6 
 Obama Floridians Hurting 10/7 
 Obama Grandfather 60 10/7 
 Obama Outrageous  10/8 
 Obama On Your Side 10/8 
 Obama Unravel 10/8 
 Obama Biden Appoint 10/9 
 Obama The Subject 10/9 
 Obama Work Hard NV 10/9 
 Obama Barney Smith 10/10 
 Obama Lose 10/10 
 Obama Mills 10/10 
 Obama Vote PA 10/10 
 Obama Vote WI 10/10 
 Obama Vote NC 10/10 
 Obama Vote MI 10/10 
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Candidate 
 Obama Tested 10/10 
 Obama What Kind 10/10 
 Obama Taketh 10/11 
 Obama Vote IN 10/13 
 Obama Vote VA 10/13 
 Obama Vote CO 10/13 
 Obama Vote FL 10/13 
 Obama Coin 10/13 
 Obama Worried About 10/14 
 Obama We Can General 10/15 
 Obama Vote NV 10/15 
 Obama Vote NV 10/15 
 Obama Absolute Lie 10/15 
 Obama Medicare 10/16 
 Obama Golden Years 10/16 
 Obama Looking Out For 10/17 
 Obama 90 Percent 10/17 
 Obama Michigan Hurting 10/17 
 Obama What I Believe 10/17 
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Sponsor Title Air Date 
 
Candidate 
 Obama Strikeland 10/18 
 Obama Education General Rev 10/20 
 Obama Erratic 10/20 
 Obama American People 10/21 
 Obama Try This 10/24 
 Obama American People PA 10/24 
 Obama American Dream   10/26 
 Obama Defining Moment 120 10/26 
 Obama Pennsylvania Hurting 10/27 
 Obama Audio Tapes 10/29 
 Obama McCain Own Words 10/29 
 Obama McCain Say Anything 10/31 
 Obama Look Behind 11/2 
 Obama Something Happening 11/2 
 McCain 624787 3/31 
 McCain Ready 4/4 
 McCain Ignite 4/16 
 McCain Healthcare 5/1 
 McCain McCain: Health Solutions 5/2 
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Candidate 
 McCain A Better Way 5/12 
 McCain Leading 5/15 
 McCain Accountable 5/15 
 McCain Safe 6/6 
 McCain Global 6/17 
 McCain Purpose 6/26 
 McCain Love 60 7/8 
 McCain God's Children 7/11 
 McCain Troop Funding 7/19 
 McCain Pump 7/21 
 McCain Troops 7/26 
 McCain Celeb 7/30 
 McCain Broken 8/5 
 McCain Family 8/6 
 McCain Painful 8/8 
 McCain Taxman 8/15 
 McCain Maybe 8/18 
 McCain Higher 8/22 
 McCain Housing Problem 8/22 
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Candidate 
 McCain Passed Over 8/25 
 McCain Joe Biden on Barack Obama 8/25 
 McCain Debra 8/25 
 McCain Expensive Plans 9/1 
 McCain Recovery MI 9/3 
 McCain Recovery OH 9/3 
 McCain Alaska Maverick 9/3 
 McCain Original Maverick 9/8 
 McCain Temple 9/8 
 McCain Disrespectful 9/10 
 McCain Education 9/10 
 McCain Foundation 9/18 
 McCain Foundation 9/18 
 McCain Michigan Jobs 9/19 
 McCain Overseas 9/19 
 McCain New Mexico Jobs 9/19 
 McCain Ohio Jobs 9/19 
 McCain Advice 9/20 
 McCain Jim Johnson 9/21 
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Candidate 
 McCain Chicago Machine 9/24 
 McCain Chicago Machine 9/24 
 McCain Mum 9/24 
 McCain Promise 9/29 
 McCain Rein 60 10/1 
 McCain Week 10/2 
 McCain Tax Cutter 10/3 
 McCain Dangerous 10/6 
 McCain Hypo 10/7 
 McCain Folks 10/8 
 McCain Ambition 10/10 
 McCain Unethical 10/14 
 McCain Fight 60 10/16 
 McCain Fight 10/17 
 McCain Joe the Plumber 10/21 
 McCain Listen to Biden 10/25 
 McCain Voter Alert 10/26 
 McCain Voter Alert 10/26 
 McCain Jeb Bush 11/1 
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Candidate 
 McCain Jeb Bush 11/3 
 McCain Special 11/3 
 McCain Your Choice 11/3 
PSGs 
 Healthcare for America Now Magic 8 Balls 7/8 
 Vets for Freedom Finish the Job 7/9 
 Vets for Freedom Four Months for Victory 7/18 
 Let Freedom Ring Both Ways Barack  7/22 
 Let Freedom Ring Both Ways Barack Rev 7/23 
 American Issues Project Know Enough 60 8/21 
 PowerPAC What Matters 8/21 
 American Issues Project Know Enough 60 Rev 8/27 
 Vets for Freedom I Am the Surge 8/27 
 Vets for Freedom Re-Enlistment 9/3 
 Born Alive Truth.org  Gianna 9/16 
 RightChange.com Bungee 9/16 
 Vets for Freedom Patraeus vs. Obama 9/16 
 Defenders of Wildlife Brutal 60 9/21 
 RightChange.com Fine Print 9/29 
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PSGs 
 Vets for Freedom Skipped 9/30 
 Defenders of Wildlife Savagery 10/1 
 RightChange.com Fought Reform 10/3 
 RightChange.com Fighting 10/3 
 American Issues Project What Happened 10/8 
 RightChange.com Angry 10/9 
 Employee Freedom Action Committee George McGovern Union Vote 60 10/12 
 Let Freedom Ring Card Check 60 10/13 
 Let Freedom Ring Energy 60 10/13 
 Let Freedom Ring Energy Common Sense 10/13 
 Let Freedom Ring Card Check Common Sense 60 10/13 
 Employee Freedom Action Committee Lost Jobs Union 10/15 
 Let Freedom Ring Part of the Problem 10/20 
 Let Freedom Ring Income Taxes 10/20 
 Defenders of Wildlife Polar Bear 10/21 
 Let Freedom Ring Taxing Businesses 10/21 
 Let Freedom Ring Mad Mike 60 10/22 
 Let Freedom Ring Chicken Button 10/23 
 Let Freedom Ring Mad Mike 10/23 
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PSGs 
 Let Freedom Ring Punished 10/23 
 Let Freedom Ring Friend of Latinos Sp 60 10/24 
 Campaign Money Watch McCain Gamble 10/28 
 Healthcare for America Now McCain Cancer 10/28 
 Let Freedom Ring Dick Patten 10/28 
 Let Freedom Ring Robert Carlstrom 60 10/28 
 Let Freedom Ring Frank Gaffney 60 10/29 
 Let Freedom Ring Judicial Choices 60 10/30 
 RightChange.com Crisis 11/1 
 Let Freedom Ring Thank You Economy 11/2 
FEC-compliant Groups 
 AFL-CIO Not Now 7/10 
 Friends of the Earth Trillions More 4/16 
 Service Employees International Union Fill Up Obama 4/17 
 DNC Better Off 4/22 
 Progressive Media USA Out of Touch 4/23 
 Service Employees International Union Feeling the Pain 4/29 
 Service Employees International Union Feeling the Pain OH 4/29 
 Service Employees International Union Biggest Worries 4/29 
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FEC-compliant Groups 
 Service Employees International Union Iraq Future 4/30 
 DNC 100 Years 4/30 
 MoveOn.Org Mission Accomplished 5/1 
 Service Employees International Union Iraq Future Rev 5/1 
 MoveOn.Org Obamacan 5/13 
 MoveOn.Org Obamacan.Rev 5/16 
 VoteVets McCain GI Bill 5/21 
 MoveOn.Org Fire Charlile Black 5/23 
 MoveOn.Org Bush-McCain Challenge 5/28 
 Coalition Against Anti-Christian Rhetoric Obama Godlike 6/2 
 MoveOn.Org John Cusak 6/13 
 MoveOn.Org Not Alex 6/18 
 RNC Balance 7/6 
 Strong American Schools This Boy's Future 7/14 
 Planned Parenthood McCain Birth Control 7/16 
 MoveOn.Org Timeline 7/18 
 Citizens United Hype 7/21 
 BET Voting Rap 60 7/25 
 VoteVets Freedom 7/25 
                                                                                                          
270 
 
Table 1 cont. 
Presidential Campaign Advertising: 2008 General Election Phase 
 
Sponsor Title Air Date 
 
FEC-compliant Groups 
 MoveOn.Org Hope 7/30 
 MoveOn.Org Gimmick 8/5 
 Matthew 25 Network Families 8/16 
 MoveOn.Org Pocket 8/21 
 Denver Group Declaration 8/22 
 Health Care First Falling through the Cracks 8/23 
 One Campaign Matt Damon 8/24 
 RNC Right 8/26 
 Planned Parenthood Sex Ed 9/2 
 DNC More 9/4 
 DNC Vote 9/9 
 Service Employees International Union McCain Economics 9/12 
 Vitae Society What Was I Thinking 9/15 
 MoveOn.Org My Friend 9/18 
 UFCW McCain Wal-Mart 9/18 
 Brave New PAC McCain Medical Records 9/25 
 One Campaign Just One Question 9/25 
 MoveOn.Org My Friend's Mess 9/27 
 RNC Worse 9/29 
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FEC-compliant Groups 
 CA Nurses Association One Heartbeat Away 10/1 
 Committee for Truth in Politics Protect Infants 10/2 
 Judicial Confirmation Network Chose 60 10/2 
 Planned Parenthood Heartless 10/2 
 ph for America Sermon on the Mount 10/4 
 Foundation for Life Weakest Members 10/6 
 Service Employees International Union Worried Sick 10/6 
 United Auto Workers Nicole Lowe 10/7 
 United Auto Workers Joel Blatchford 10/7 
 VoteVets Jason Bensley 10/8 
 RNC Trillion 10/8 
 Bring Ohio Back Beer Gut 10/9 
 Committee for Truth in Politics Early Release 10/9 
 RNC Chicago Way 10/10 
 Bring Ohio Back Nuts 10/11 
 Our Country Deserves Better Most Liberal 10/13 
 Our Country Deserves Better Different Values 10/13 
 Our Country Deserves Better Shameful 60 10/14 
 Afscme Fixed Income 10/16 
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FEC-compliant Groups 
 RNC Chair 10/16 
 Afscme Tough Votes 10/17 
 Denver Group Used Car 10/17 
 National Republican Trust Licenses 10/17 
 Denver Group Judgment 10/18 
 Denver Group Good Idea 10/18 
 MoveOn.Org Moose 10/20 
 Republican Jewish Coalition Concerned about Obama 10/20 
 Progressive Future Reagan 10/21 
 Tim D'Annunzio Obama Tax 10/21 
 Our Country Deserves Better Patriotism Problem 60 10/22 
 Our Country Deserves Better Sarah's a Fighter 60 10/22 
 Our Country Deserves Better Wrong for MI 10/22 
 Our Country Deserves Better Ayers Wright Kilpatrick 60 10/23 
 Trust in Small Business Obama Sununu Small Business 10/25 
 RNC RNC Listen to Biden 10/25 
 RNC RNC Storm   10/25 
 National Republican Trust Social Security for Illegals 10/26 
 Planned Parenthood Worse for Women 10/26 
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Presidential Campaign Advertising: 2008 General Election Phase 
 
Sponsor Title Air Date 
 
FEC-compliant Groups 
 Trust in Small Business Obama McConell Small Business  10/26 
 Bring Ohio Back Wrecking Ball 10/27 
 Winning Message Action Fund Mug Shot 10/28 
 National Rifle Association Chuck Norris 10/29 
 National Pro-Life Alliance Obama-Udall Abortion  60 10/30 
 RNC RNC Virginia 10/30 
 National Pro-Life Alliance Obama-Hagen Abortion  60 10/31 
 Service Employees International Union Meghan Cofield 10/31 
 RNC Your Choice 10/31 
 MoveOn.Org John Weiler 11/1 
 PA Republican Party Obama Consider This 11/1 
 Progressive Future What's Wrong 60 11/1 
 truthandhope.org Someone Who Cares 11/1 
 RNC Joe the Plumber 11/1 
 Common Sense Issues Baby Human Rights 11/2 
 Family Research Council Draw the Line 11/2 
 Missouri Right to Life Jill Stanek 60 11/2 
 truthandhope.org Conservative Area 11/2 
 truthandhope.org Gun Lover 60 11/2 
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Table 1 cont. 
Presidential Campaign Advertising: 2008 General Election Phase 
 
Sponsor Title Air Date 
 
FEC-compliant Groups 
 truthandhope.org Joe the Plumber 11/2 
 RNC Surgeon 11/2 
 truthandhope.org Keith Howell 60 11/3 
 RNC Charlie Crist 11/3 
 RNC Jeb Bush 11/3 
 National Republican Trust Preacher of Hate 11/4 



































 General Definition: A theme is a distinct idea, claim or argument. A single theme can extend  
from one phrase to an entire paragraph.  
  
0 No Function Present 
 
  General Definition: The theme does not provide a reason to vote for or against a candidate 
or a political party and by extension, a candidate. 
  
1  Functional Theme: Acclaim 
 
  General Definition: Themes that portray the sponsoring candidate or the candidate's 
political party in a favorable light.
  
2 Functional Theme: Attack  
 
  General Definition: Themes that portray the opposing candidate or opposing candidate's 
political party in an unfavorable light.
  
3 Functional Theme: Defense 
  





1  Topic: Policy 
 
  General Definition: Policy utterances, often called “issues,” concern problems facing the 
nation and proposals for alleviating those problems.  
 
2  Topic: Character 
 
  General Definition: Character comments address the qualifications and / or personalities of 
the candidates.  
 
Additional Function Rules 
 
1. Treat appeals to support a specific policy as an attack.  
 
2. Themes that consist of only solicitations (e.g., vote for the candidate, volunteer, donate money 
or visit a web page) are not functions. A function is a reason to support or oppose a candidate. 
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Table 2 cont. 
 
Coding Instructions: Functional Theory of Campaign Discourse 
 
 
3. Hypothetical speculation on a candidate’s issue position(s), issue awareness or character is an 
attack, since it is designed to create doubt about a candidate’s desirability.  
 
4. Consider functions within the context of their surrounding themes.   
 
5. Attacks against the opposing political party or candidates from the opposing party are 
considered attacks, even if those attacks don’t mention a presidential candidate.  
 
6. Acclaims of a political party or candidates from that party are considered acclaims, even if 
those acclaims don’t mention a presidential candidate.  
 
Additional Topic Rules 
 
1 .References to campaign tactics that do not directly implicate policy past deeds, future plans or 
general goals are character-personal qualities attacks.  
 
2. Attacking a candidate’s policy advisors is essentially the same as attacking a candidate’s policy 





Theme   Topic 
         
0 No Function 
 
     1 Policy 
1 Acclaim 
 
     2 Character 
2 Attack 
 
       




















Cohen’s Kappa  Reliability Statistics for Analysis of 2008 Presidential Campaign 
Advertising 
 
    
Coder Pairs  Function Topic 
    
    
2 and 3  .94 .81 
    
2 and 4  .93 .68 
    
2 and 5  .98 .73 
    
3 and 4  .89 .71 
    
3 and 5  .91 .65 
    
4 and 5  .89 .71 
    
Average Reliability  .92 .71 
































Dependent Variables Employed at Three Data Analytic Stages 
 
   
Attack Phase Inoculation Phase Attack Phase 
   
  Attack Outcomes   Inoculation Processes   Inoculation Outcomes 
   
   
Targeted Candidate Threat Targeted Candidate 
  global evaluation    global evaluation 
  positive emotion Amount of Counterarguing   positive emotion 
  vote intention    vote intention 
 Associative Networks  
Implied Beneficiary   number of nodes / links Implied Beneficiary 
  global evaluation   strength   global evaluation 
  positive emotion   valence   negative emotion 
  vote intention   affective content   vote intention 
   cognitive content  
Democracy  Democracy 
  trust  Targeted Candidate   trust 
  efficacy   global evaluation   efficacy 
   positive emotion  
Sponsor of Attack   vote intention Sponsor  
  credibility    credibility 
  relational communication Implied Beneficiary   relational communication 
   global evaluation  
Attack Message   vote intention Partisanship 
  global evaluation   
 Sponsor of Inoculation  
Partisanship   credibility  




  evaluation of candidate Attitude-Behavior Consistency  
  vote intention   evaluation of candidate  
   vote intention  
     
   















Reliability and Normality of Examined Variables 
 
      
Measurement N α skew kurtosis 
      
      
Inoculation Phase: Inoculation Sponsor      
      
 Inoculation Sponsor: Relational 
Communication 
354 .94 -3.73** 2.26 
      
 Inoculation Sponsor: Credibility 354 .91 .99 -2.01 
      
Inoculation Phase: Inoculation Processes     
      
 Counterarguing 339 NA 7.02** 1.55 
      
 Threat 354 .93 2.16 -1.69 
      
 Negative Advertising: Evaluation 354 .92 6.63** 3.53** 
      
 Negative Advertising: Attitudinal 
Confidence 
354 .92 -1.59 -2.60* 
      
 Associative Network: Links 353 NA 6.39** 2.89* 
      
 Associative Network: Nodes 354 NA 7.68** 5.30** 
      
 Associative Networks: Rate 354 NA -2.64* -1.11 
      
 Associative Networks: Affective Content 346 NA 4.44** -.58 
      
 Associative Network: Cognitive Content 346 NA 4.86** 1.40 
      
 08 Election: Attitude Access 354 92.03 .45 -4.84 
      
Inoculation Phase: Supported Candidate     
      
 Supported Candidate: Positive Affect 354 .92 3.02* 2.54 
      
 Supported Candidate: Evaluation 354 .92 -2.73* -1.38 
      
 Supported Candidate: Vote Intention 354 NA -8.25** .36 
      
 Supported Candidate: Attitude Confidence 354 .91 2.97* -1.86 
      
*p < .01.  ** p < .001 
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Table 4b cont. 
 
Reliability and Normality of Examined Variables 
 
      
Measurement N α skew kurtosis 
      
      
 Supported Candidate: Attitude Access 354 .92 -.57 -4.55** 
     
Inoculation Phase: Opposed Candidate     
      
 Opposed Candidate: Evaluation 354 .95 -.57 -1.98 
      
 Opposed Candidate: Vote Intention 351 NA 15.72** 10.31** 
      
 Opposed Candidate: Attitude Confidence 354 .94 1.75 -3.39** 
      
 Opposed Candidate: Attitudinal Access 354 .93 3.74** -3.89** 
      
Attack Phase: Attack Sponsor     
      
 Sponsor Relational Communication 354 .95 3.04* -2.42 
      
 Sponsor Credibility  354 .95 1.74 -1.76 
      
 PSG Relational 174 .97 .79 -2.28 
      
 PSG Credibility 174 .97 .44 -1.25 
      
 Candidate Relational 226 .95 2.75* -1.94 
      
 Candidate Credibility 226 .94 1.97 -1.61 
      
Attack Phase: Supported Candidate     
      
 Supported Candidate: Evaluation  354 .97 -3.57** -.33 
      
 Supported Candidate: Negative Emotion  354 .95 12.66** 8.93** 
      
 Supported Candidate: Vote Intention 354 NA -7.41** -1.32 
      
Attack Phase: Opposed Candidate     
      
 Opposed Candidate: Evaluation  354 .96 .99 -2.54 
      
 Opposed Candidate: Positive Emotions 354 .92 6.84** -.42 
      
*p < .01.  ** p < .001 
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Table 4b cont. 
 
Reliability and Normality of Examined Variables 
 
      
Measurement N α skew kurtosis 
      
      
 Opposed Candidate: Vote Intention 350 NA 15.55** 11.09** 
      
Attack Phase: Democratic Attitudes      
      
 Democratic Efficacy 354 .76 .04 -2.94* 
      
 Trust in American Government 354 .75 -.44 -1.19 
     
Attack Phase: Attack Arguments     
      
 Attack Advertising Arguments: Evaluation 354 .97 1.48 -1.36 
      



































2008 General Election Advertising: Candidate versus PSG by Acclaim versus Attack 
 
  X2 
(p) 
V 
Sponsor Acclaim Attack Total 
    
     
Candidates 437 (49.4%) 523 (50.6%) 960 46.94 
    (p < .001) 
    V =.21 
PSG 24 (17.9%) 110 (82.1%) 134  











































2008 General Election Advertising: FEC versus PSG by Acclaim versus Attack 
 
  X2 
(p) 
V 
Sponsor Acclaim Attack Total 
    
     
PSG 24 (17.9%) 110 (82.1%) 134 3.79 
    (p = .05) 
    V =.09 
FEC 89 (26.4%) 248 (73.6%) 337  











































2008 General Election Attack Advertising: Policy versus Character 
 
     X2 
(p) 
V 
Sponsor Policy versus Character Total 
     
      
Candidates 335 (69%)  151 (31%) 486 29.13 
     (p < .001) 
PSG 50 (46%)   60 (55%) 110 V = .19 
      
FEC 134 (54%)  114 (46%) 248  
      









































Attack Phase: Perceptions of Sponsor Credibility (H3) 
 
 
Condition SS  df  MS  F  p  η2
            
            
Attack 0.83  1  0.83  0.61  0.44  0.0080 
Media 5.31  1  5.31  3.91  0.05  0.0490 
Partisan 16.87  1  16.87  12.44  0.01  0.1406 
Attack * Media 0.93  1  0.93  0.68  0.41  0.0089 
Attack * Partisan 0.01  1  0.01  0.01  0.92  0.0001 
Media * Partisan 0.47  1  0.47  0.35  0.56  0.0046 
Attack * Partisan* Media 2.05  1  2.05  1.51  0.22  0.0195 
Error 103.05  76  1.36       






























Attack Phase: Global Evaluation of the Implied Beneficiary (H4a, H5a, H6a,  
 
H11a and RQ4a) 
 
 
Condition SS  df  MS  F  p  η2
            
            
Attack 0.12  2  0.06  0.04  0.96  0.0007 
Media 0.67  1  0.67  0.42  0.52  0.0036 
Partisan 42.56  1  42.56  27.04  0.01  0.1864 
Attack * Media 0.91  2  0.45  0.29  0.75  0.0049 
Attack * Partisan 0.62  2  0.31  0.20  0.82  0.0033 
Media * Partisan 0.60  1  0.60  0.38  0.54  0.0032 
Attack * Partisan* Media 0.32  2  0.16  0.10  0.90  0.0017 
Error 185.69  118  1.57       

































Condition SS  df  MS  F  p  η2
            
            
Attack 2.21  2  1.11  1.08  0.34  0.0181 
Media 4.01  1  4.01  3.93  0.05  0.0322 
Partisan 14.25  1  14.25  13.97  0.01  0.1058 
Attack * Media 1.94  2  0.97  0.95  0.39  0.0159 
Attack * Partisan 2.01  2  1.00  0.98  0.38  0.0164 
Media * Partisan 2.11  1  2.11  2.06  0.15  0.0172 
Attack * Partisan* Media 0.98  2  0.49  0.48  0.62  0.0081 
Error 120.37  118  1.02       

































Condition SS  df  MS  F  p  η2
            
            
Attack 2.74  2  1.37  1.17  0.31  0.0194 
Media 0.55  1  0.55  0.47  0.49  0.0040 
Partisan 44.63  1  44.63  38.01  0.01  0.2437 
Attack * Media 3.68  2  1.84  1.57  0.21  0.0259 
Attack * Partisan 1.88  2  0.94  0.80  0.45  0.0134 
Media * Partisan 0.01  1  0.01  0.01  0.92  0.0001 
Attack * Partisan* Media 1.44  2  0.72  0.61  0.54  0.0103 
Error 138.53  118  1.17       

































Condition SS  df  MS  F  p  η2
            
            
Attack 6.77  2  3.38  0.90  0.41  0.0150 
Media 2.12  1  2.12  0.56  0.45  0.0047 
Partisan 108.98  1  108.98  28.91  0.01  0.1968 
Attack * Media 11.18  2  5.59  1.48  0.23  0.0245 
Attack * Partisan 3.16  2  1.58  0.42  0.66  0.0071 
Media * Partisan 0.99  1  0.99  0.26  0.61  0.0022 
Attack * Partisan* Media 11.05  2  5.52  1.47  0.24  0.0242 
Error 444.83  118  3.77       




























Attack Phase: Democratic Political Efficacy (H7a RQ2a, RQ3a and RQ5a) 
 
 
Condition SS  df  MS  F  p  η2
            
            
Attack 5.04  2  2.52  1.17  0.31  0.0195 
Media 1.39  1  1.39  0.65  0.42  0.0055 
Partisan 3.92  1  3.92  1.82  0.18  0.0152 
Attack * Media 2.43  2  1.22  0.56  0.57  0.0095 
Attack * Partisan 0.07  2  0.04  0.02  0.98  0.0003 
Media * Partisan 0.20  1  0.20  0.09  0.76  0.0008 
Attack * Partisan * Media 0.83  2  0.41  0.19  0.83  0.0033 
Error 254.00  118  2.15       






























Attack Phase: Candidate Sponsorship on Trust of American Government (H7b,  
 
RQ2b, RQ3b and RQ5b) 
 
 
Condition SS  df  MS  F  p  η2
            
            
Attack 2.89  2  1.44  1.42  0.25  0.0235 
Media 3.06  1  3.06  3.02  0.08  0.0249 
Partisan 1.15  1  1.15  1.14  0.29  0.0095 
Attack * Media 3.95  2  1.97  1.94  0.15  0.0319 
Attack * Partisan 0.79  2  0.40  0.39  0.68  0.0066 
Media * Partisan 0.04  1  0.04  0.04  0.85  0.0003 
Attack * Partisan* Media 1.34  2  0.67  0.66  0.52  0.0111 
Error 119.86  118  1.02       

































Condition SS  df  MS  F  p  η2
            
            
Partisan 30.71  1  30.71  9.19  0.00  0.10 
Media 0.04  1  0.04  0.01  0.92  0.00 
Media * Partisan 0.69  1  0.69  0.21  0.65  0.00 
Error 267.40  80  3.34       









































Condition SS  df  MS  F  p  η2
            
            
Partisan 43.80  1  43.80  11.13  0.00  0.12 
Media 0.02  1  0.02  0.00  0.95  0.00 
Media * Partisan 2.12  1  2.12  0.54  0.46  0.01 
Error 314.79  80  3.93       









































Condition SS  df  MS  F  p  η2
            
            
Inoculation 0.17  1  0.17  0.15  0.70  0.0018 
Media  2.16  1  2.16  1.87  0.17  0.0226 
Partisan 16.88  1  16.88  14.65  0.01  0.1532 
Inoculation * Media 0.13  1  0.13  0.11  0.74  0.0014 
Inoculation * Partisan 1.86  1  1.86  1.62  0.21  0.0196 
Media * Partisan 1.76  1  1.76  1.53  0.22  0.0185 
Inoculation * Partisan* Media 0.01  1  0.01  0.01  0.94  0.0001 
Error 93.32  81  1.15       




























Attack Phase: Generic Inoculation - PSG Attack Influence on Intention to Vote for the  
 
Targeted Candidate (H12b) 
  
 
Condition SS  df  MS  F  p  η2
            
            
Inoculation 10.04  1  10.04  3.45  0.07  0.0408 
Media  0.56  1  0.56  0.19  0.66  0.0024 
Partisan 39.61  1  39.61  13.61  0.01  0.1438 
Inoculation * Media 10.81  1  10.81  3.71  0.06  0.0438 
Inoculation * Partisan 7.52  1  7.52  2.58  0.11  0.0309 
Media * Partisan 1.38  1  1.38  0.47  0.49  0.0058 
Inoculation * Partisan* Media 1.34  1  1.34  0.46  0.50  0.0056 
Error 235.82  81  2.91       

































Condition SS  df  MS  F  p  η2
            
            
Inoculation 0.07  1  0.07  0.06  0.80  0.0008 
Media  0.26  1  0.26  0.23  0.63  0.0029 
Partisan 42.62  1  42.62  38.09  0.01  0.3199 
Inoculation * Media 1.43  1  1.43  1.28  0.26  0.0155 
Inoculation * Partisan 0.05  1  0.05  0.04  0.83  0.0005 
Media * Partisan 0.67  1  0.67  0.60  0.44  0.0073 
Inoculation * Partisan* Media 0.38  1  0.38  0.34  0.56  0.0042 
Error 90.62  81  1.12       




























Attack Phase: Generic Inoculation - PSG Attack Influence on Intention to Vote for the  
 
Implied Beneficiary (H12d) 
 
 
Condition SS  df  MS  F  p  η2
            
            
Inoculation 2.89  1  2.89  2.98  0.09  0.0354 
Media  4.34  1  4.34  4.47  0.04  0.0522 
Partisan 5.00  1  5.00  5.15  0.03  0.0598 
Inoculation * Media 0.03  1  0.03  0.03  0.86  0.0004 
Inoculation * Partisan 0.27  1  0.27  0.28  0.60  0.0034 
Media * Partisan 2.43  1  2.43  2.50  0.12  0.0299 
Inoculation * Partisan* Media 0.05  1  0.05  0.05  0.82  0.0006 
Error 78.66  81  0.97       




























Attack Phase: Candidate  Inoculation - PSG Attack Influence on Evaluation of the  
 
Targeted Candidate (H13a) 
 
 
Condition SS  df  MS  F  p  η2
            
            
Inoculation 0.05  1  0.05  0.04  .85  0.0005 
Media  1.44  1  1.44  1.08  .30  0.0146 
Partisan 18.48  1  18.48  13.81  .01  0.1591 
Inoculation * Media 0.02  1  0.02  0.02  .89  0.0002 
Inoculation * Partisan 0.71  1  0.71  0.53  .47  0.0073 
Media * Partisan 0.66  1  0.66  0.50  .48  0.0067 
Inoculation * Partisan* Media 0.13  1  0.13  0.09  .76  0.0013 
Error 97.68  73  1.34       




























Attack Phase: Candidate  Inoculation - PSG Attack Influence on Intention to Vote for the 
 
Targeted Candidate (H13b) 
 
 
Condition SS  df  MS  F  p  η2
            
            
Inoculation 0.31  1  0.31  0.10  0.75  0.0014 
Media  0.01  1  0.01  0.00  0.95  0.0000 
Partisan 89.69  1  89.69  28.73  0.01  0.2824 
Inoculation * Media 15.15  1  15.15  4.85  0.03  0.0623 
Inoculation * Partisan 0.96  1  0.96  0.31  0.58  0.0042 
Media * Partisan 0.15  1  0.15  0.05  0.82  0.0007 
Inoculation * Partisan* Media 6.67  1  6.67  2.14  0.15  0.0284 
Error 227.88  73  3.12       




























Attack Phase: Candidate  Inoculation - PSG Attack Influence on Evaluation of the  
 
Implied Beneficiary (H13c) 
 
 
Condition SS  df  MS  F  p  η2
            
            
Inoculation 0.43  1  0.43  0.42  0.52  0.0057 
Media  6.02  1  6.02  5.83  0.02  0.0739 
Partisan 45.26  1  45.26  43.80  0.01  0.3750 
Inoculation * Media 0.72  1  0.72  0.70  0.41  0.0095 
Inoculation * Partisan 0.65  1  0.65  0.62  0.43  0.0085 
Media * Partisan 0.64  1  0.64  0.62  0.43  0.0084 
Inoculation * Partisan* Media 0.97  1  0.97  0.94  0.34  0.0127 
Error 75.44  73  1.03       




























Attack Phase: Candidate  Inoculation - PSG Attack Influence on Intention to Vote for the 
 
Implied Beneficiary (H13d) 
 
 
Condition SS  df  MS  F  p  η2
            
            
Inoculation 1.66  1  1.66  1.39  0.24  0.0144 
Media  1.43  1  1.43  1.20  0.28  0.0157 
Partisan 6.28  1  6.28  5.25  0.02  0.0654 
Inoculation * Media 0.38  1  0.38  .31  0.58  0.0042 
Inoculation * Partisan 0.01  1  0.01  0.01  0.92  0.0002 
Media * Partisan 0.04  1  0.04  0.04  0.85  0.0004 
Inoculation * Media *Partisan 0.94  1  0.94  0.77  0.38  0.0105 
Error 89.11  73  1.22       




























Inoculation Phase: Candidate versus Generic Inoculation - PSG Attack Influence on  
 
Evaluation of the Targeted Candidate (RQ6a) 
 
 
Condition SS  df  MS  F  p  η2
            
            
Inoculation 0.03  1  0.03  0.03  0.87  0.0004 
Media  2.51  1  2.51  2.35  0.13  0.0293 
Partisan 9.65  1  9.65  9.06  0.01  0.1041 
Inoculation * Media 0.03  1  0.03  0.03  0.86  0.0004 
Inoculation * Partisan 0.20  1  0.20  0.19  0.66  0.0024 
Media * Partisan 0.84  1  0.84  0.79  0.38  0.0100 
Inoculation * Partisan* Media 0.20  1  0.20  0.19  0.67  0.0024 
Error 83.14  78  1.07       




























Inoculation Phase: Candidate versus Generic Inoculation - PSG Attack Influence on  
 
Intention to Vote for the Targeted Candidate (RQ6b) 
 
 
Condition SS  df  MS  F  p  η2
            
            
Inoculation 6.21  1  6.21  2.40  0.13  0.0298 
Media  10.80  1  10.80  4.17  0.04  0.0507 
Partisan 50.45  1  50.45  19.47  0.01  0.1997 
Inoculation * Media 0.68  1  0.68  0.26  0.61  0.0034 
Inoculation * Partisan 13.43  1  13.43  5.18  0.03  0.0623 
Media * Partisan 2.33  1  2.33  0.90  0.35  0.0114 
Inoculation * Partisan* Media 2.37  1  2.37  0.92  0.34  0.0116 
Error 202.16  78  2.59       
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Table 9c  
 
Inoculation Phase: Candidate versus Generic Inoculation - PSG Attack Influence on 
Evaluation of the Implied Beneficiary (RQ6c) 
 
Condition SS  df  MS  F  p  η2
            
            
Inoculation 0.17  1  0.17  0.22  0.64  0.0028 
Media  1.88  1  1.88  2.36  0.13  0.0294 
Partisan 51.09  1  51.09  64.24  0.01  0.4516 
Inoculation * Media 4.13  1  4.13  5.20  0.03  0.0625 
Inoculation * Partisan 0.37  1  0.37  0.47  0.49  0.0060 
Media * Partisan 0.05  1  0.05  0.06  0.80  0.0008 
Inoculation * Partisan* Media 2.61  1  2.61  3.28  0.07  0.0404 
Error 62.03  78  0.80       




























Inoculation Phase: Candidate versus Generic Inoculation - PSG Attack Influence on 
Intention to Vote for the Implied Beneficiary (RQ6d) 
 
Condition SS  df  MS  F  p  η2
            
            
Inoculation 0.22  1  0.22  0.28  0.60  0.0036 
Media  2.33  1  2.33  3.01  0.09  0.0372 
Partisan 4.53  1  4.53  5.85  0.02  0.0698 
Inoculation * Media 0.44  1  0.44  0.57  0.45  0.0072 
Inoculation * Partisan 0.22  1  0.22  0.28  0.60  0.0036 
Media * Partisan 0.26  1  0.26  0.33  0.57  0.0043 
Inoculation * Partisan* Media 1.48  1  1.48  1.91  0.17  0.0239 
Error 60.34  78  0.77       




























Inoculation Phase: Generic Inoculation - Candidate Attack Influence on Evaluation of 
the Targeted Candidate (H14a) 
 
Condition SS  df  MS  F  p  η2
            
            
Inoculation 1.20  1  1.20  0.98  0.33  0.0121 
Media  1.27  1  1.27  1.03  0.31  0.0127 
Partisan 12.74  1  12.74  10.32  0.01  0.1143 
Inoculation * Media 2.77  1  2.77  2.24  0.14  0.0273 
Inoculation * Partisan 0.36  1  0.36  0.29  0.59  0.0036 
Media * Partisan 2.26  1  2.26  1.83  0.18  0.0224 
Inoculation * Partisan* Media 1.15  1  1.15  0.94  0.34  0.0116 
Error 98.74  80  1.23       




























Inoculation Phase: Generic Inoculation - Candidate Attack Influence on Intention to 
Vote for the Targeted Candidate (H14b) 
 
Condition SS  df  MS  F  p  η2
            
            
Inoculation 1.37  1  1.37  0.32  0.58  0.0039 
Media  0.80  1  0.80  0.18  0.67  0.0023 
Partisan 69.54  1  69.54  15.96  0.01  0.1663 
Inoculation * Media 1.19  1  1.19  0.27  0.60  0.0034 
Inoculation * Partisan 3.20  1  3.20  0.73  0.39  0.0091 
Media * Partisan 0.24  1  0.24  0.06  0.81  0.0007 
Inoculation * Partisan* Media .001  1  0.01  0.00  0.97  0.0000 
Error 348.59  80  4.36       




























Inoculation Phase: Generic Inoculation - Candidate Attack Influence on Evaluation of 
the Implied Beneficiary (H14c) 
 
Condition SS  df  MS  F  p  η2
            
            
Inoculation 0.99  1  0.99  0.53  0.47  0.0066 
Media  0.00  1  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.0000 
Partisan 13.55  1  13.55  7.30  0.01  0.0836 
Inoculation * Media 0.06  1  0.06  0.03  0.85  0.0004 
Inoculation * Partisan 1.58  1  1.58  0.85  0.36  0.0105 
Media * Partisan 0.30  1  0.30  0.16  0.69  0.0020 
Inoculation * Partisan* Media 0.01  1  0.01  0.00  0.95  0.0001 
Error 148.60  80  1.86       




























Inoculation Phase: Generic Inoculation - Candidate Attack Influence on Intention to  
 
Vote for the Implied Beneficiary (H14d) 
 
 
Condition SS  df  MS  F  p  η2
            
            
Inoculation 0.10  1  0.10  0.10  0.75  0.0013 
Media  3.53  1  3.53  3.77  0.06  0.0450 
Partisan 11.80  1  11.80  12.59  0.01  0.1360 
Inoculation * Media 3.02  1  3.02  3.22  0.08  0.0387 
Inoculation * Partisan 1.58  1  1.58  1.69  0.20  0.0207 
Media * Partisan 0.87  1  0.87  0.93  0.34  0.0114 
Inoculation * Partisan* Media 0.62  1  0.62  0.66  0.42  0.0082 
Error 74.94  80  0.94       




























Inoculation Phase: Candidate-Specific Inoculation - Candidate Attack Influence on 
Evaluation of the Targeted Candidate (H15a) 
 
Condition SS  df  MS  F  p  η2
            
            
Inoculation 1.19  1  1.19  1.24  0.27  0.0154 
Media  6.25  1  6.25  6.52  0.01  0.0763 
Partisan 20.53  1  20.53  21.43  0.01  0.2134 
Inoculation * Media 0.07  1  0.07  0.07  0.79  0.0009 
Inoculation * Partisan 0.16  1  0.16  0.17  0.68  0.0021 
Media * Partisan 0.36  1  0.36  0.38  0.54  0.0048 
Inoculation * Partisan* Media 1.06  1  1.06  1.10  0.30  0.0138 
Error 75.69  79  0.96       




























Inoculation Phase: Candidate-Specific Inoculation - Candidate Attack Influence on 
Intention to Vote for the Targeted Candidate (H15b) 
 
Condition SS  df  MS  F  p  η2
            
            
Inoculation 11.68  1  11.68  3.00  0.09  0.0365 
Media  3.53  1  3.53  0.90  0.34  0.0113 
Partisan 57.67  1  57.67  14.79  0.01  0.1577 
Inoculation * Media 0.01  1  0.01  0.00  0.97  0.0000 
Inoculation * Partisan 5.98  1  5.98  1.53  0.22  0.0190 
Media * Partisan 2.63  1  2.63  0.67  0.41  0.0085 
Inoculation * Partisan* Media 4.73  1  4.73  1.21  0.27  0.0151 
Error 307.98  79  3.90       




























Inoculation Phase: Candidate-Specific Inoculation - Candidate Attack Influence on 
Evaluation of the Implied Beneficiary (H15c) 
 
Condition SS  df  MS  F  p  η2
            
            
Inoculation 0.19  1  0.19  0.11  0.74  0.0014 
Media  0.01  1  0.01  0.00  0.95  0.0000 
Partisan 17.38  1  17.38  9.89  0.01  0.1113 
Inoculation * Media 0.03  1  0.03  0.02  0.89  0.0002 
Inoculation * Partisan 0.53  1  0.53  0.30  0.58  0.0038 
Media * Partisan 0.07  1  0.07  0.04  0.84  0.0005 
Inoculation * Partisan* Media 0.03  1  0.03  0.02  0.89  0.0002 
Error 138.77  79  1.76       




























Inoculation Phase: Candidate-Specific Inoculation - Candidate Attack Influence on 
Intention to Vote for the Implied Beneficiary (H15d)  
 
Condition SS  df  MS  F  p  η2
            
            
Inoculation 1.56  1  1.56  2.35  0.13  0.0296 
Media  0.23  1  0.23  0.34  0.56  0.0044 
Partisan 4.82  1  4.82  7.24  0.01  0.0859 
Inoculation * Media 0.38  1  0.38  0.57  0.45  0.0074 
Inoculation * Partisan 5.84  1  5.84  8.76  0.01  0.1022 
Media * Partisan 0.12  1  0.12  0.18  0.67  0.0023 
Inoculation * Partisan* Media 0.04  1  0.04  0.06  0.80  0.0008 
Error 51.29  77  0.67       




























Inoculation Phase: Candidate versus Generic Inoculation - Candidate Attack Influence 
on Evaluation of the Targeted Candidate (RQ7a) 
 
Condition SS  df  MS  F  p  η2
            
            
Inoculation 0.01  1  0.01  0.00  0.99  0.0001 
Media  0.79  1  0.79  0.73  0.40  0.0087 
Partisan 17.05  1  17.05  15.61  0.01  0.1583 
Inoculation * Media 2.10  1  2.10  1.93  0.17  0.0227 
Inoculation * Partisan 1.08  1  1.08  0.99  0.32  0.0118 
Media * Partisan 0.23  1  0.23  0.21  0.64  0.0026 
Inoculation * Partisan* Media 4.81  1  4.81  4.40  0.04  0.0503 
Error 90.67  83  1.09       





























Inoculation Phase: Candidate versus Generic Inoculation - Candidate Attack Influence 
on Intention to Vote for the Targeted Candidate (RQ7b) 
 
Condition SS  df  MS  F  p  η2
            
            
Inoculation 5.59  1  5.59  1.61  0.21  0.0191 
Media  0.70  1  0.70  0.20  0.65  0.0024 
Partisan 37.20  1  37.20  10.73  0.01  0.1145 
Inoculation * Media 1.08  1  1.08  0.31  0.58  0.0038 
Inoculation * Partisan 0.50  1  0.50  0.14  0.71  0.0017 
Media * Partisan 3.13  1  3.13  0.90  0.34  0.0108 
Inoculation * Partisan* Media 4.88  1  4.88  1.41  0.24  0.0167 
Error 287.72  83  3.47       





























Inoculation Phase: Candidate versus Generic Inoculation - Candidate Attack Influence 
on Evaluation of the Attack’s Sponsor (RQ7c)  
 
Condition SS  df  MS  F  p  η2
            
            
Inoculation 2.22  1  2.22  1.23  0.27  0.0146 
Media  0.03  1  0.03  0.02  0.90  0.0002 
Partisan 9.37  1  9.37  5.18  0.03  0.0587 
Inoculation * Media 0.01  1  0.01  0.00  0.95  0.0000 
Inoculation * Partisan 0.30  1  0.30  0.16  0.69  0.0020 
Media * Partisan 0.14  1  0.14  0.08  0.78  0.0009 
Inoculation * Partisan* Media 0.08  1  0.08  0.04  0.84  0.0005 
Error 150.24  83  1.81       





























Inoculation Phase: Candidate versus Generic Inoculation - Candidate Attack Influence 
on Intention to vote for the Attack’s Sponsor (RQ7d) 
 
Condition SS  df  MS  F  p  η2
            
            
Inoculation 0.98  1  0.98  1.51  0.22  0.0184 
Media  1.65  1  1.65  2.56  0.11  0.0306 
Partisan 1.01  1  1.01  1.56  0.22  0.0189 
Inoculation * Media 5.92  1  5.92  9.17  0.01  0.1017 
Inoculation * Partisan 1.52  1  1.52  2.36  0.13  0.0283 
Media * Partisan 1.37  1  1.37  2.12  0.15  0.0255 
Inoculation * Partisan* Media 0.36  1  0.36  0.55  0.46  0.0068 
Error 52.35  81  0.65       


































Condition SS  df  MS  F  p  η2
            
            
Inoculation 0.15  1  0.15  0.14  0.71  0.0008 
Attack 0.27  1  0.27  0.25  0.62  0.0016 
Partisanship 0.23  1  0.23  0.21  0.65  0.0013 
Inoculation * Attack 3.94  1  3.94  3.61  0.06  0.0221 
Inoculation * Partisanship 0.64  1  0.64  0.59  0.44  0.0037 
Attack by Partisanship  1.14  1  1.14  1.05  0.31  0.0065 
Inoculation * Attack * 
Partisanship 
0.01  1  0.01  0.01  0.94  0.0000 
Error 174.23  160  1.09       



























Inoculation Phase: Candidate Inoculation - Democratic Political Efficacy (H16b) 
 
 
Condition SS  df  MS  F  p  η2
            
            
Inoculation 4.11  1  4.11  1.97  0.16  0.0121 
Attack 0.01  1  0.01  0.00  0.95  0.0000 
Partisanship 3.74  1  3.74  1.79  0.18  0.0111 
Inoculation * Attack 2.25  1  2.25  1.07  0.30  0.0067 
Inoculation * Partisanship 0.29  1  0.29  0.14  0.71  0.0009 
Attack by Partisanship  0.40  1  0.40  0.19  0.66  0.0012 
Inoculation * Attack * 
Partisanship 
 
0.09  1  0.09  0.04  0.84  0.0003 
Error 334.44  160  2.09       


































Condition SS  df  MS  F  p  η2
            
            
Inoculation 0.01  1  0.01  0.00  .99  0.0001 
Attack 0.15  1  0.15  0.12  0.73  0.0007 
Partisanship 3.67  1  3.67  2.93  0.09  0.0171 
Inoculation * Attack 4.79  1  4.79  3.83  0.05  0.0222 
Inoculation * Partisanship 0.37  1  0.37  0.29  0.59  0.0017 
Attack by Partisanship  0.80  1  0.80  0.64  0.42  0.0038 
Inoculation * Attack * 
Partisanship 
 
0.02  1  0.02  0.01  0.91  0.0001 
Error 211.63  169  1.25       
































Condition SS  df  MS  F  p  η2
            
            
Inoculation 2.59  1  2.59  1.15  0.28  0.0068 
Attack 0.36  1  0.36  0.16  0.69  0.0009 
Partisanship 11.98  1  11.98  5.33  0.02  0.0306 
Inoculation * Attack 1.09  1  1.09  0.48  0.49  0.0028 
Inoculation * Partisanship 4.09  1  4.09  1.82  0.18  0.0106 
Attack by Partisanship  3.46  1  3.46  1.54  0.22  0.0090 
Inoculation * Attack * 
Partisanship 
 
0.83  1  0.83  0.37  0.55  0.0022 
Error 
 380.08  169  2.25       
            



























P2 Video versus Print Inoculation:  Sponsor Credibility (H17a) 
 
 
Condition SS  df  MS  F  p  η2
            
            
Media 0.01  1  0.01  0.01  0.93  0.0001 
Inoculation 1.11  1  1.11  0.92  0.34  0.0041 
Media * Inoculation 0.15  1  0.15  0.12  0.73  0.0006 
Error 266.73  220  1.21       







































P2 Video versus Print Inoculation: Sponsor Relational Communication (H17b) 
 
 
Condition SS  df  MS  F  p  η2
            
            
Media 0.70  1  0.70  0.76  0.39  0.0034 
Inoculation 0.68  1  0.68  0.73  0.39  0.0033 
Media * Inoculation 0.36  1  0.36  0.39  0.53  0.0018 
Error 204.86  220  0.93       







































Transformations of the Most Skewed and Kurtototic Variables 
 
      
Measurement  skew  kurtosis 
      
     
Inoculation Phase     
      
Attack Phase: Vote for Implied Beneficiary     
  original     15.55**    11.09** 
  base 10 log    15.10  10.88 
  square root    13.12   5.57 
  fractional (1/X)  -11.07   0.99 
      
Attack Phase: Negative Emotion for Target     
  original      12.66**      8.93** 
  base 10 log   -16.00  17.50 
  square root   -20.69  32.69 
  fractional (1/X)   36.70   114.60 
      
Attack Phase: Vote for Target     
  original    -7.41**     -1.32** 
  base 10 log    2.84  -5.61 
  square root    4.93  -3.87 
  fractional (1/X)  -0.32  -7.13 
       



























Figure 1a – 1c 
 
Attack Phase: Intervening Processes of Advertising’s Influence on Intention to Vote for 
the  Target (H8a-H8c) 
   
 Figure 1a      
       
  Credibility   
 (B, SE, β)    [B, SE, β]  
(-1, .29, -.37)*  a    [b]  [-.85, .18, -.52]*
  c1   
  
Video Attack Ad 
 




 (B, SE, β) (-1.08, .49, -.24)* 
 [B, SE, β] [-1.93, .47, -.43]*  
   Sobel 2.78*   
 
 Figure 1b      
       
  Relational Communication   
 (B, SE, β)    [B, SE, β]  
(-.9, .27, -.38)* a   [b] [-.60, .22, -.32]* 
  c1   
  
Video Attack Ad 
 




 (B, SE, β) (-1.09, .49, -.24)* 
 [B, SE, β] [-1.63, .52, -.36]*  
  Sobel 2.11*   
 Figure 1c      
       
  Argument Evaluation   
 (B, SE, β)    [B, SE, β]  
 (-.07, .32, -.03)  a   [b]  [-.21, .20, -.12]   
  c1   
  
Print Attack Ad 
 




 (B, SE, β)  (.22, .52, .05) 
 [B, SE, β] [.21, .52, .05]  
  Sobel .21   
 
 
Note. All regression analyses controlled for strength of party identification in step one.  *p < .05.  
 
#p < .10. 
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Figure 2a –2b 
 





   
       
 Figure 2a      
    Credibility   
 (B, SE, β)    [B, SE, β]  
( -.66, .21, -.26)*  a    [b]  [-.37, .08, -.37]* 








 (B, SE, β) (-.18, .19, -.07) 
 [B, SE, β] [-.42, .19, .17]*  
   Sobel 2.59 (p = .009)   
 Figure 2b      
    Credibility   
 (B, SE, β)    [B, SE, β]  
( -.66, .21, -.26)*  a    [b]  [-.59, .15, -.34]* 









 (B, SE, β) (-.53, .36, -.12) 
 [B, SE, β] [-.92, .35, -.2]*  
   Sobel 2.45 (p = .01)   
 
 
Note. All regression analyses controlled for media and strength of partisan identification in step  
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Figure 3a – 3b 
 




   
       
 Figure 3a      
    Credibility   
 (B, SE, β)    [B, SE, β]  
 ( -.66, .21, -.26)*  a    [b]  [.57, .08, .53]*  








 (B, SE, β) (-.03, .22, -.01) 
 [B, SE, β] [.35, .20, .13]  
   Sobel -2.88 (p = .004)*  
 
 Figure 3b      
    Credibility   
 (B, SE, β)    [B, SE, β]  
 ( -.66, .21, -.26)*  a    [b]  [.21, .08, .24]*  









 (B, SE, β) (.22, .19, .10) 
 [B, SE, β] [.35, .19, .16]#  
   Sobel -2.07 (p = .04)   
 
 
Note. All regression analyses controlled for media and strength of partisan identification in step  
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Figure 4a – 4b 
 
 




   
       
 Figure 4a      
    Credibility   
 (B, SE, β)    [B, SE, β]  
( -.66, .21, -.26)*  a    [b]  [.03, .11, .03] 








 (B, SE, β) (-.33, .26, -.11) 
 [B, SE, β] [-.31, .28, -.10]  
   Sobel -.29 (p = .77)   
 Figure 4b      
    Credibility   
 (B, SE, β)    [B, SE, β]  
( -.66, .21, -.26)*  a    [b]  [-.13, .08, -.16]# 








 (B, SE, β) (.29, .19, .14) 
 [B, SE, β] [.21, .19, .10]  
   Sobel 1.25 (p = .21)   
 
 
Note. All regression analyses controlled for media and strength of partisan identification in step  
 

























Assignment Worksheets and Cell Counts 
 
 
Pro-Obama: Assignment Work Sheet for Both Phase One and Inoculation Phase 
Print Pro-Obama 
  
Print Candidate Inoculation 
 
 
Print Generic Inoculation 
 
Print – No Inoculation 
Print PSG-Sponsored 
Attack 
weak moderate strong weak moderate strong weak moderate strong 
Print McCain-Sponsored 
Attack 




weak moderate strong 
Video Pro-Obama 
 Video Candidate Inoculation Video Generic Inoculation Video – No Inoculation 
Video PSG-Sponsored 
Attack 
weak moderate strong weak moderate strong weak moderate strong 
Video McCain-Sponsored 
Attack 
weak moderate strong weak moderate strong weak moderate strong 
Video  
No Attack 
  weak moderate strong 
Video versus Print Pro-Obama 
 Video Candidate Inoculation Print Candidate Inoculation  
Video McCain-Sponsored 
Attack 








Pro-McCain: Assignment Work Sheet for Both Phase One and Inoculation Phase 
Print Pro-McCain 
 Print Candidate Inoculation Print Generic Inoculation Print – No Inoculation 
Print PSG-Sponsored 
Attack 
low medium high weak moderate strong weak moderate strong 
Print Obama-Sponsored 
Attack 
weak moderate strong weak moderate strong weak moderate strong 
Print  
No Attack  
  
weak moderate strong 
Video Pro-McCain 
 Video Candidate Inoculation Video Generic Inoculation Video – No Inoculation 
Video PSG-Sponsored 
Attack 
weak moderate strong weak moderate strong weak moderate strong 
Video Obama-Sponsored 
Attack 
weak moderate strong weak moderate strong weak moderate strong 
Video  
No Attack  
  
weak moderate strong 
Video versus Print Pro-McCain 














                                                                                                          
330 
 
Appendix 1 cont. 
 
Assignment Worksheets and Cell Counts 
 
 
Pro-Obama: Assignment Work Sheet for Both Phase One and Inoculation Phase 
Print Pro-Obama 
 Print Candidate Inoculation Print Generic Inoculation Print – No Inoculation 
Print PSG-Sponsored 
Attack 
weak moderate strong weak moderate strong weak moderate strong 
Print McCain-Sponsored 
Attack 




weak moderate strong 
Video Pro-Obama 
 Video Candidate Inoculation Video Generic Inoculation Video – No Inoculation 
Video PSG-Sponsored 
Attack 
weak moderate strong weak moderate strong weak moderate strong 
Video McCain-Sponsored 
Attack 
weak moderate strong weak moderate strong weak moderate strong 
Video  
No Attack 
  weak moderate strong 
Video versus Print Pro-Obama 
 Video Candidate Inoculation Print Candidate Inoculation  
Video McCain-Sponsored 
Attack 








Pro-McCain: Assignment Work Sheet for Both Phase One and Inoculation Phase 
Print Pro-McCain 
 Print Candidate Inoculation Print Generic Inoculation Print – No Inoculation 
Print PSG-Sponsored 
Attack 
low medium high weak moderate strong weak moderate strong 
Print Obama-Sponsored 
Attack 
weak moderate strong weak moderate strong weak moderate strong 
Print  
No Attack  
  
weak moderate strong 
Video Pro-McCain 
 Video Candidate Inoculation Video Generic Inoculation Video – No Inoculation 
Video PSG-Sponsored 
Attack 
weak moderate strong weak moderate strong weak moderate strong 
Video Obama-Sponsored 
Attack 
weak moderate strong weak moderate strong weak moderate strong 
Video  
No Attack  
  
weak moderate strong 
Video versus Print Pro-McCain 
 Video Candidate Inoculation Print Candidate Inoculation  
Video Obama Sponsored 
Attack 
 
weak moderate strong 
 
Print Obama Sponsored 
Attack 
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Appendix 1 cont. 
 
Assignment Worksheets and Cell Counts 
 
All: Number of Respondents per Cell 
Print Inoculation 
 Print Candidate Inoculation Print Generic Inoculation Print – No Inoculation 
Print PSG-Sponsored  
Attack 
21 22 18 
Print Candidate-Sponsored 
Attack 






 Video Candidate Inoculation Video Generic Inoculation Video – No Inoculation 
Video PSG-Sponsored  
Attack 
20 23 24 
Video Candidate-Sponsored 
Attack 






Video versus Print Inoculation 












































PHASE ONE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Researchers in the Department of Communication at the University of South Dakota 
want to learn more about how people process media content and how they understand 
media personalities. We appreciate your willingness to participate in this study. We ask 
that you read each set of instructions carefully and respond to each of the survey items 
as accurately as possible.  
Questions in Phase 1 are designed to provide necessary information about your current 
views of television content and some television personalities. All of your responses in 
this study will be treated confidentially. But, we need some information so we can match 
up the questionnaires you complete during each of the three sessions, and so that we 
can inform your instructor about your participation in the study. For items on department, 
course number and instructor, we want to know which course/instructor we should 
inform about your participation in this study. PLEASE PRINT LEGIBLY.  
 
1. YOUR NAME: _________________________, _____________, _____
  (last name) (first name) (middle)
2. DEPARTMENT: ________________________________________________.
3. COURSE NUMBER (for extra credit): _______________________. 
4. INSTRUCTOR (for extra credit): ___________________________. 
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SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC ITEMS
 
The following items are designed to assess your social and demographic situation. 
Please work quickly but accurately.  
 
1. Your Gender? (circle only one) Male  Female
 About how many people live in your home community or the community where 
lived most before your 18th birthday (please circle only one)?    












3. How would you characterize your home community or the community where you 
lived most before your 18th birthday (please circle only one)?   
 Rural Town Small City Big City Suburb
4. How many brothers and sisters lived with you and your parents until your 18th 
birthday (please circle only one)?  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 More than 7
5. Please write in your religious affiliation, if any.   
_________________________________
6. About how many public and/or private schools did you attend before your 18th 
birthday (please circle only one)?  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 More than 7
7. Please estimate your immediate families approximate annual income (circle only 
one): 

















The following items are designed to assess your social role as a consumer. Please read 
each of the statements and then circle a number, where 1 indicates strong disagreement 
and 7 indicates strong agreement with the statement. Please work quickly but 
accurately.  
 
1. I admire people who own expensive homes, cars and clothes.  
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
2. Some of the most important achievements in life include acquiring material 
possessions.  
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
3. I don’t place much emphasis on the amount of material objects people own as a 
sign of success. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
4. The things I own say a lot about how well I’m doing in life.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
5. I like to own things that impress people.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
6. I don’t pay much attention to the material objects that other people own.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
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7. I usually buy only the things I need.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
8. I try to keep my life simple, as far as possessions are concerned. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
9. The things I own aren’t all that important to me. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
10. I enjoy spending money on things that aren’t practical. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
11. Buying things gives me a lot of pleasure.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
12. I like a lot of luxury in my life.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
13. I put less emphasis on material things than most people I know. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
14. I have all the things I really need to enjoy life.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
15. My life would be better if I owned certain things I don’t have. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
16. I wouldn’t be any happier if I owned nicer things.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
17. I’d be happier if I could afford to buy more things.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
18. It sometimes bothers me quite a bit that I can’t afford to buy all the things I’d like. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
 
TELEVISION VIEWING BEHAVIOR AND ATTITUDES 
 
The following items are designed to assess your television viewing behavior and 
attitudes toward television. Please work quickly but accurately.  
 
1. On an average WEEKDAY, about how many hours per day do you watch 
television programming (please circle only one)?  
















2. On an average WEEKEND day, about how many hours per day do you watch 
television programming (please circle only one)?  
















3. About how many hours per WEEK do you watch television (please circle only 
one)?  




















                                                                                                          
335 
 
Read each of the statements and then circle a number, where 1 indicates strong 
disagreement and 7 indicates strong agreement with the statement. 
 
1. Watching television is one of the most important things I do each day. 
 Strongly 
disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
agree
2. If the television set wasn’t working, I would really miss it.
 Strongly 
disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
agree
3. Watching television is very important in my life.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
4. I could easily do without television for several days.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
5. I would feel lost without television to watch. 
 Strongly 
disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
 
COMMERCIAL VIEWING BEHAVIOR AND ATTITUDES 
 
1. About how much attention do you pay to television commercials?   
 No 
attention 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
A lot of 
attention
 
Read each of the statements and then circle a number, where 1 means strong 
disagreement and 7 means strong agreement with the statement. 
 
1. Watching television commercials is one of the most important things I do each 
day. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
2. If I couldn’t watch television commercials I would really miss them.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
3. Watching television commercials is very important in my life. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
4. I could easily do without television commercials for several days.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
5. I would feel lost without television commercials to watch. 
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RESPONSES TO FAVORITE TELEVISION PERSONALITIES 
 
What is your favorite type of television programming? Your favorite type of television 
programming might consist of dramatic series (like, Grey’s Anatomy or The Sopranos), 
professional sports (like, Golf or Football), news and information (like, Fox News or 
CNN), television situation comedies (like, Scrubs) or whatever. Please record your 




The next items assess your thoughts and feelings about the personalities that populate 
your favorite television programming that you just listed. Read each of the statements 
and then circle a number (between 1 and 7), where 1 indicates strong disagreement and 
7 indicates strong agreement that best describes your response to the statement. 
 
1. I feel sorry for the people on my favorite television programs when they make a 
mistake.  
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
2. The people on my favorite television programs make me feel comfortable, as if I’m 
with old friends.  
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
3. I see the people on my favorite television programs as natural, down-to-earth 
people. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
4. I look forward to watching the people on my favorite television programs when 
they are on television. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
5. If the people on my favorite television programs appeared on another television 
program, I would watch that program. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
6. When the people on my favorite television programs appear, they seem to 
understand the kinds of things that I want to know.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
7. If there were a story about the people on my favorite television programs in a 
newspaper or magazine, I would read it. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
8. I miss seeing the people on my favorite television programs when they are not on 
television. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
9. I would like to meet the people on my favorite television programs in person.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
10. I find the people on my favorite television programs to be attractive.  
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PERSONAL PERCEPTIONS OF TELEVISED PERSONS AND PERSONALITIES
 
On the items below, please indicate your feelings about the people and personalities 
who appear on your favorite type of television programs. Circle the number that best 
represents your feelings. Numbers “1” and “7” mean a very strong feeling. Numbers “2” 
and “6” mean a strong feeling. Numbers “3” and “5” mean a fairly weak feeling. Number 
“4” means that you are undecided or don’t know. Please work quickly. There are no right 
or wrong answers. 
 
1.  Don’t think like me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Think like me
2.  From social class 
similar to mine 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
From social class 
different than mine
3.  Behave like me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Don’t behave like me
4.  Economic 
situation different 
than mine 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Economic situation like 
mine 
5.  Similar to me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Different from me
6.  
Status like mine 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Status different from 
mine
7.  Unlike me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Like me
8.  Background 
different than mine 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Background similar to 
mine
 
RESPONSES TO CURRENT PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES 
 
We would also like to know about your responses to specific television personalities. As 
you know, the television world contains many types of television personalities. Those 
personalities range from fictional cartoon characters to non-fictional persons, like 
professional athletes and politicians. Although some respondents might be asked about 
other types of personalities, you will be asked to report your thoughts and feelings about: 
the 2008 presidential candidates.  
 
1. Initially, we would like to know which of the presidential candidates you most 
favor. Please circle one of the following options.
Democratic Candidate John McCain (R) Undecided
RESPONSES TO JOHN MCCAIN
 
The next items assess your thoughts about John McCain’s presidential campaign. The 
items consist of pairs of adjective opposites. The numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 
separate each of the pairs of adjective opposites. Read each of the adjective opposite 
pairs, and then circle a number that best describes your response to John McCain’s 
presidential campaign. 
 
1. Negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Positive
2. Bad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Good
3. Unfavorable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Favorable
4. Unacceptable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Acceptable
5. Wrong 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Right
6. Foolish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Wise
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The next items assess your feelings about John McCain’s presidential campaign. Please 
circle the number that best indicates your feelings about John McCain’s presidential 
campaign, where 0 means “none of this feeling” and 6 means “a great deal of this 
feeling.” 
 
1. Irritated 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
2. Annoyed 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
3. Angry 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
4. Cheerful 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
5. Happy 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
6. Content 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
 
The next items assess your intention to behaviorally support John McCain’s presidential 
campaign. We want to know the extent to which you are willing to engage in the 
following behaviors. Read each of the statements and then circle a number (between 1 
and 7), where 1 indicates strong disagreement and 7 indicates strong agreement with 
the following statements.  
 
1. I will contribute money to John McCain’s presidential campaign. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
2. I will volunteer my time on behalf of John McCain.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
3. I will go to the polls and vote for John McCain on Election Day. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
 
The next items are designed to measure the confidence of your responses to the John 
McCain’s presidential campaign. 
 
1. Estimate the certainty of your responses to John McCain’s presidential campaign 
on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 represents no certainty and 100 indicates 
absolute certainty: _____.
 
The following items assess the certainty of your responses to John McCain’s presidential 
campaign. The items consist of pairs of adjective opposites. The numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
and 7 separate each of the pairs of adjective opposites. Read each of the adjective 
opposite pairs, and then circle a number that best describes your response to the issue 
statement. 
 
1. Sure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unsure
2. Confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not Confident
3. Certain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Uncertain
4. Negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Positive
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The next items assess how much you think and talk about John McCain’s presidential 
campaign. We want to know the extent to which you engage in the following activities. 
Read each of the statements and then circle a number (between 1 and 7), where 1 
indicates “rarely” and 7 means “often”.  
 
1. Compared to other issues, how often do you think about John McCain’s 
presidential campaign?
 Rarely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Often
2. Compared to other issues, how often do you discuss John McCain’s presidential 
campaign with friends, family members, or others?
 Rarely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Often
 
RESPONSES TO BARACK OBAMA
 
The next items assess your thoughts about Barack Obama’s presidential campaign. The 
items consist of pairs of adjective opposites. The numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 
separate each of the pairs of adjective opposites. Read each of the adjectives opposite 
pairs, and then circle a number that best describes your response to Barack Obama’s 
presidential campaign. 
 
1. Negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Positive
2. Bad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Good
3. Unfavorable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Favorable
4. Unacceptable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Acceptable
5. Wrong 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Right
6. Foolish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Wise
 
The next items assess your feelings about Barack Obama’s presidential campaign. 
Please circle the number that best indicates your feelings about Barack Obama’s 
presidential campaign, where 0 means “none of this feeling” and 7 means “a great deal 
of this feeling.” 
 
1. Irritated 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
2. Annoyed 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
3. Angry 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
4. Cheerful 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
5. Happy 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
6. Content 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
 
 
The next items assess your intentions to behaviorally support Barack Obama’s 
presidential campaign. We want to know the extent to which you disagree or agree with 
each of the statements below. Read each of the statements and then circle a number 
(between 1 and 7), where 1 indicates strong disagreement and 7 indicates strong 
agreement with the following statements.   
 
1. I will contribute money to Barack Obama’s presidential campaign. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
2. I will volunteer my time on behalf of Barack Obama’s presidential campaign.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
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3. I will go to the polls and vote for Barack Obama on Election Day. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
The next items are designed to measure the confidence of your responses to Barack 
Obama’s presidential campaign. 
 
1. Estimate the certainty of your responses to Barack Obama’s presidential 
campaign on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 represents no certainty and 100 
indicates absolute certainty: _____.
 
The following items assess the certainty of your responses to Barack Obama’s 
presidential campaign. The items consist of pairs of adjective opposites. The numbers 1, 
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 separate each of the pairs of adjective opposites. Read each of the 
adjectives opposite pairs, and then circle a number that best describes your response to 
the Barack Obama’s presidential campaign. 
 
1. Sure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unsure
2. Confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not Confident
3. Certain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Uncertain
4. Negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Positive
5. Right 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Wrong
 
The next items assess how much you think and talk about Barack Obama’s presidential 
campaign. We want to know the extent to which you engage in the following activities. 
Read each of the statements and then circle a number (between 1 and 7), where 1 
indicates “rarely” and 7 means “often”.  
 
1. Compared to other issues, how often do you think about Barack Obama’s 
presidential campaign?
 Rarely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Often
2. Compared to other issues, how often do you discuss Barack Obama’s presidential 
campaign with friends, family members, or others?




The next items are designed to measure your general political impressions.  
 
How important is this presidential election to you? 
          
1. Unimportant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Important
2. Of no concern 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Of much concern
3. Irrelevant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Relevant
4. Means nothing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Means a lot
5. Doesn’t matter 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Matters 
6. Insignificant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Significant 
 
1. We would like to know your political party affiliation. Please circle one of the 
following options (circle only one). 
 Republican Democrat Independent Non-affiliated
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2. If your political party affiliation is Republican or Democrat, how strong is your 
political party affiliation? Please circle a number (between 1 and 7), where 1 
means no affiliation and 7 means strong affiliation. 




















































Illustrative Phase-Two Instrument (Inoculation Phase / Control Condition) 
 
 
PHASE TWO QUESTIONNAIRE: PINM
(No Print Inoculation Against Attacks on McCain) 
 
We appreciate your continued participation in this study of how people process media 
content and media personalities. Please read instructions at the start of each section of 
this booklet, do what is asked, and complete the survey items in each section as quickly 
but as accurately as possible.  
 
After you complete this questionnaire, please report back to the main desk for further 
instructions.  
 
All of your responses in this study will be treated confidentially. But, we need some 
information so we can match up the questionnaires you complete during each of the 
three sessions, and so that we can inform your instructor about your participation in the 
study. For items concerning department, course number and instructor, we want to know 
which course/instructor we should inform about your participation in this study. PLEASE 
PRINT LEGIBLY.  
 
1. YOUR NAME: _____________________, _______________, _________
  (last name) (first name) (middle)
2. DEPARTMENT: __________________________________________________.
3. COURSE NUMBER (for extra credit): _______________________. 
4. INSTRUCTOR (for extra credit): ___________________________. 
     
5. Your Gender? (circle only one) Male  Female
  
6. DAY AND DATE: _______________________, _____________________.
 
Before you begin filling in the survey, you will read a segment of typical magazine 
content, which is followed by exercises and scales. Please read the entire magazine 
segment carefully.  
 
PLEASE CAREFULLY READ THE ENTIRE MAGAZINE SEGMENT, INCLUDING  
THE ADVERTISEMENTS. DO NOT TURN TO THE NEXT PAGE OF THE SURVEY      
UNTIL FINISHED READING THE MAGAZINE SEGMENT 
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RESPONSES TO JOHN MCCAIN
 
Despite your position on John McCain’s presidential campaign, please respond to the 
possibility that you may come into contact with arguments contrary to your position that 
are so persuasive that they may cause you to rethink your position on John McCain’s 
presidential campaign. I find this possibility:  
 
1. Safe 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Dangerous
2. Non-threatening 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Threatening
3. Calm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Anxious
4. Unintimidating 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Intimidating
5. Not Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Harmful
6. Not Risky 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Risky
 
The next items assess your thoughts about John McCain’s presidential campaign. The 
items consist of pairs of adjective opposites. The numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 
separate each of the pairs of adjective opposites. Read each of the adjective opposite 
pairs, and then circle a number that best describes your response to John McCain’s 
presidential campaign. 
 
1. Negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Positive
2. Bad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Good
3. Unfavorable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Favorable
4. Unacceptable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Acceptable
5. Wrong 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Right
6. Foolish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Wise
 
The next items assess your feelings about John McCain’s presidential campaign. Please 
circle the number that best indicates your feelings about John McCain’s presidential 
campaign, where 0 means “none of this feeling” and 6 means “a great deal of this 
feeling.” 
 
1. Irritated 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
2. Annoyed 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
3. Angry 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
4. Cheerful 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
5. Happy 0 1 2 3 4 5 6




The next items assess your intention to behaviorally support John McCain’s presidential 
campaign. We want to know the extent to which you are willing to engage in the 
following behaviors. Read each of the statements and then circle a number (between 1 
and 7), where 1 indicates strong disagreement and 7 indicates strong agreement with 
the following statements.  
 
1. I will contribute money to John McCain’s presidential campaign. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
2. I will volunteer my time on behalf of John McCain.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
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3. I will go to the polls and vote for John McCain on Election Day. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
The next items are designed to measure the confidence of your responses to John 
McCain’s presidential campaign. 
 
1. Estimate the certainty of your responses to John McCain’s presidential campaign 
on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 represents no certainty and 100 indicates 
absolute certainty: _____.
 
The following items assess the certainty of your responses to John McCain’s presidential 
campaign. The items consist of pairs of adjective opposites. The numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
and 7 separate each of the pairs of adjective opposites. Read each of the adjectives 
opposite pairs, and then circle a number that best describes your response to John 
McCain. 
 
1. Unsure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Sure
2. Not Confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Confident
3. Uncertain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Certain
4. Negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Positive
5. Wrong  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Right
 
The next items assess how much you think and talk about John McCain’s presidential 
campaign. We want to know the extent to which you engage in the following activities. 
Read each of the statements and then circle a number (between 1 and 7), where 1 
indicates “rarely” and 7 means “often”.  
 
1. Compared to other issues, how often do you think about John McCain’s 
presidential campaign?
 Rarely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Often
2. Compared to other issues, how often do you discuss John McCain’s presidential 
campaign with friends, family members?
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Now, think about your position on John McCain’s presidential campaign. In this section, 
we want you to complete four tasks.  
First, in the spaces on the left, which are labeled First, Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth, 
IDENTIFY AS MANY ARGUMENTS AS YOU CAN (THOUGHTS AND FEELINGS) 
THAT ARE CONTRARY TO YOUR POSITION ON JOHN MCCAIN’S PRESIDENTIAL 
CAMPAIGN (that are opposite of how you think or feel); 
Second, to the right of each argument following the letters A, B, C, D, and E, LIST AS 
MANY POTENTIAL ANSWERS AS YOU CAN TO EACH OF THOSE ARGUMENTS 
(what you would tell a person with that thought or feeling to convince them that they are 
wrong). Please write clearly. 
Third, we have included a scale under each of the arguments contrary to your position 
on the John McCain’s presidential campaign. Those scales are numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, & 5. 
Circle a number between 1 and 7, which indicates your opinion of the strength of that 
argument, where 1 means a “weak argument”, and 7 means “a strong argument.”  
 
ARGUMENTS CONTRARY TO JOHN MCCAIN POTENTIAL ANSWERS TO THOSE 
ARGUMENTS 
   
First Argument: A. ___________________ A-1. ___
 B. ___________________ B-1. ___
 C. ___________________ C-1. ___
1. Rating of this argument: D. ___________________ D-1. ___
Weak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strong E. ___________________ E-1. ___
Second Argument: A. ___________________ A-2. ___
 B. ___________________ B-2. ___
 C. ___________________ C-2. ___
2. Rating of this argument: D. ___________________ D-2. ___
Weak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strong E. ___________________ E-2. ___
Third Argument: A. ___________________ A-3. ___
 B. ___________________ B-3. ___
 C. ___________________ C-3. ___
3. Rating of this argument: D. ___________________ D-3. ___
Weak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strong E. ___________________ E-3. ___
Fourth Argument: A. ___________________ A-4. ___
 B. ___________________ B-4. ___
 C. ___________________ C-4. ___
4. Rating of this argument: D. ___________________ D-4. ___
Weak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strong E. ___________________ E-4. ___
Fifth Argument: A. ___________________ A-5.  ___
 B. ___________________ B-5. ___
 C. ___________________ C-5. ___
5. Rating of this argument: D. ___________________ D-5. ___
Weak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strong E. ___________________ E-5. ___
  
 
Fourth, go back to each of the potential answers (the items you entered after the letters) 
and rate each from 1 (weak) to 7 (strong) in terms of how strongly you feel about it. Write 
your numerical rating in the numbered space that follows each answer.  
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RESPONSES TO POLITICAL ATTACK ADVERTISING AGAINST JOHN MCCAIN
   
The next items are designed to assess your feelings about political attack advertising 
against John McCain. Please circle the number that best matches your feelings about 
political attack advertising against John McCain, where 0 means “none of this feeling” 
and 6 means “a great deal of this feeling.” 
 
1. Irritated 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
2. Annoyed 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
3. Angry 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
4. Cheerful 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
5. Happy 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
6. Content 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
 
The next items assess your thoughts about political attack advertising against John 
McCain. The items consist of pairs of adjective opposites. The numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
and 7 separate each of the pairs of adjective opposites. Read each of the adjectives 
opposite pairs, and then circle a number that best describes your response to political 
attack advertising against John McCain. 
 
1. Negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Positive
2. Bad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Good
3. Unfavorable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Favorable
4. Unacceptable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Acceptable
5. Wrong 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Right
6. Foolish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Wise
 
The next items are designed to measure the confidence of your responses to political 
attack advertising against John McCain. 
 
1. Estimate the certainty of your responses to political attack advertising against John 
McCain on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 represents no certainty and 100 
indicates absolute certainty: _______.
 
The following items assess the certainty of your responses to political attack advertising 
against John McCain. The items consist of pairs of adjective opposites. The numbers 1, 
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 separate each of the pairs of adjective opposites. Read each of the 
adjectives opposite pairs, and then circle a number that best describes your response to 
political attack advertising against John McCain. 
 
1. Unsure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Sure
2. Not Confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Confident
3. Uncertain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Certain
4. Negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Positive
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RESPONSES TO POLITICAL ATTACK ADVERTISING 
   
The next items are designed to assess your feelings about political attack advertising. 
Please circle the number that best matches your feelings about political attack 
advertising, where 0 means “none of this feeling” and 6 means “a great deal of this 
feeling.” 
 
1. Irritated 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
2. Annoyed 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
3. Angry 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
4. Cheerful 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
5. Happy 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
6. Content 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
 
The next items assess your thoughts about political attack advertising. The items consist 
of pairs of adjective opposites. The numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 separate each of the 
pairs of adjective opposites. Read each of the adjective opposite pairs, and then circle a 
number that best describes your response to political attack advertising. 
 
1. Negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Positive
2. Bad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Good
3. Unfavorable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Favorable
4. Unacceptable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Acceptable
5. Wrong 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Right
6. Foolish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Wise
 
The next items are designed to measure the confidence of your responses to political 
attack advertising. 
 
1. Estimate the certainty of your responses to political attack advertising on a scale 
from 0 to 100, where 0 represents no certainty and 100 indicates absolute 
certainty: _______. 
 
The following items assess the certainty of your responses to political attack advertising. 
The items consist of pairs of adjective opposites. The numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 
separate each of the pairs of adjective opposites. Read each of the adjective opposite 
pairs, and then circle a number that best describes your response to political attack 
advertising. 
 
1. Unsure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Sure
2. Not Confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Confident
3. Uncertain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Certain
4. Negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Positive













The next items assess how much you think and talk about presidential politics. We want 
to know the extent to which you engage in the following activities. Read each of the 
statements and then circle a number (between 1 and 7), where 1 means “rarely” and 7 
means “often”.  
 
1. Compared to other issues, how often do you think about the issue of presidential 
politics? 
 Rarely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Often
2. Compared to other issues, how often do you discuss with friends, family members, 
or others the issue of presidential politics?
 Rarely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Often
 
RESPONSES TO CITIZENS FOR AN INFORMED ELECTORATE 
 
The next items assess your response to Citizens for an Informed Electorate. Please 
indicate to what extent you disagree or agree with each of the statements below. Read 
each of the statements and then circle a number (between 1 and 7), where 1 indicates 
strong disagreement and 7 indicates strong agreement that best describes your 
response to Citizens for an Informed Electorate. 
 
1. The Citizens for an Informed Electorate communicated a sense of warmth.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
2. The Citizens for an Informed Electorate seemed enthusiastic in communicating 
with me. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
3. The Citizens for an Informed Electorate seemed interested in communicating with 
me. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
4. The Citizens for an Informed Electorate seemed involved in the communication.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
5. The Citizens for an Informed Electorate made me feel that they were similar to me.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
6. The Citizens for an Informed Electorate seemed friendly to me. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
7. The Citizens for an Informed Electorate acted as if they would like to get to know 
me better. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
8. The Citizens for an Informed Electorate seemed like the kind of people who would 
be willing to listen to me.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
9. The Citizens for an Informed Electorate seemed sincere in communicating to me.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
10. The Citizens for an Informed Electorate communicated a sense of honesty.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
11. The Citizens for an Informed Electorate appeared to care whether or not I liked 
them. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
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12. The Citizens for an Informed Electorate appeared interested in communicating 
with me. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
 
The next items continue to assess your response to the Citizens for an Informed 
Electorate. The items consist of pairs of adjective opposites. The numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, and 7 separate each of the pairs of adjective opposites. Read each of the adjectives 
opposite pairs, and then circle a number that best describes your response to Citizens 
for an Informed Electorate. 
 
1. Unintelligent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Intelligent
2. Unqualified 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Qualified
3. Incompetent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Competent
4. Selfish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unselfish
5. Bad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Good
6. Dishonest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Honest
 
RESPONSES TO BARACK OBAMA
 
The next items assess your thoughts about Barack Obama’s presidential campaign. The 
items consist of pairs of adjective opposites. The numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 
separate each of the pairs of adjective opposites. Read each of the adjective opposite 
pairs, and then circle a number that best describes your response to Barack Obama’s 
presidential campaign. 
 
1. Negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Positive
2. Bad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Good
3. Unfavorable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Favorable
4. Unacceptable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Acceptable
5. Wrong 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Right
6. Foolish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Wise
 
The next items assess your feelings about Barack Obama’s presidential campaign. 
Please circle the number that best indicates your feelings about Barack Obama’s 
presidential campaign, where 0 means “none of this feeling” and 6 means “a great deal 
of this feeling.” 
 
1. Irritated 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
2. Annoyed 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
3. Angry 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
4. Cheerful 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
5. Happy 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
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The next items assess your intentions to behaviorally support Barack Obama’s 
presidential campaign. We want to know the extent to which you disagree or agree with 
each of the statements below. Read each of the statements and then circle a number 
(between 1 and 7), where 1 indicates strong disagreement and 7 indicates strong 
agreement with the following statements.   
 
1. I will contribute money to Barack Obama’s presidential campaign. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
2. I will volunteer my time on behalf of Barack Obama’s presidential campaign.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
3. I will go to the polls and vote for Barack Obama on Election Day. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
 
The next items are designed to measure the confidence of your responses to Barack 
Obama’s presidential campaign. 
 
1. Estimate the certainty of your responses to Barack Obama’s presidential 
campaign on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 represents no certainty and 100 
indicates absolute certainty: _____.
 
The following items assess the certainty of your responses to Barack Obama’s 
presidential campaign. The items consist of pairs of adjective opposites. The numbers 1, 
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 separate each of the pairs of adjective opposites. Read each of the 
adjectives opposite pairs, and then circle a number that best describes your response to 
the Barack Obama’s presidential campaign. 
 
1. Unsure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Sure
2. Not Confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Confident
3. Uncertain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Certain
4. Negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Positive
5. Wrong  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Right
 
The next items assess how much you think and talk about Barack Obama’s presidential 
campaign. We want to know the extent to which you engage in the following activities. 
Read each of the statements and then circle a number (between 1 and 7), where 1 
indicates “rarely” and 7 means “often”.  
 
1. Compared to other issues, how often do you think about Barack Obama’s 
presidential campaign?
 Rarely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Often
2. Compared to other issues, how often do you discuss Barack Obama’s presidential 
campaign with friends, family members, or others?
 Rarely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Often
 
YOU ARE ALMOST DONE. PLEASE RETURN YOUR COMPLETED SURVEY 
BOOKLET TO THE RESEARCHER AND ANY COMMUNICATION MATERIALS TO 
THE RESEARCHER, WHO WILL PROVIDE ANOTHER QUESTIONNAIRE FOR YOU 
TO USE IN ORDER TO COMPLETE THE FINAL TASK OF THIS PHASE OF THE 
STUDY. THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION. 
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This section concerns your thoughts and feelings about JOHN MCCAIN. You will 
build a concept map that captures your thoughts and feelings about JOHN 
MCCAIN. We will show you how to build a concept map and then we will ask you 
build a concept map about JOHN MCCAIN.  
How to build a concept map: An Example. 
 
To build a concept map, you will write down on a piece of paper anything that comes to 
mind when you think about a topic and circle it—there are no correct or incorrect 
answers. Your thoughts and feelings are arranged around a concept node. In the map 
below, a student mapped his/her thoughts and feelings about Spring Break.  
 
Around the concept node Spring Break, the student jotted down thoughts and feelings in 
the form of words or short phrases. Often times, these thoughts or feelings triggered 
other thoughts and feelings that the student linked together by drawing a line to connect 
them.  
 
In the example below, the student’s thoughts branched from Spring Break to travel 
plans, to Daytona Beach, to fun and relaxation. In addition, the concept of Spring Break 
also shows a line of connection to family, reunion and happy.  
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We also want to know your evaluations of the thoughts and feelings you entered on the 
map. Evaluate each thought or feeling as being positive, negative or neutral.  
 
Use (+) for positive (-) negative, and (0) for neutral. Make your marks clear and place 
them to the left of the word(s) within the circle.   
 
Next, we want to know the strength of each thought or feeling on a scale of 1-7, where 1 
means VERY WEAK and 7 means VERY STRONG. Indicate how strong you feel about 
each thought or feeling. Place a number from 1-7 to the right of the word within each 
circle.   
 
In the example below, the student’s thoughts branched from Spring Break to travel 
plans, to Daytona Beach, to fun and relaxation, which were all considered to possess 
very strong and positive feelings. In addition, the concept of Spring Break also shows a 
line of connection to family and reunion. The family contact was positively evaluated but 
the idea of the reunion was not. However, the idea of being happy is a strong positive 
feeling. Also notice the thought of Easter was a neutral idea with minimal strength.  
 
Now you are ready to complete your concept map about the issue in question. Turn the  
page and begin, When you are finished make sure your concept nodes, numbers and 
































+    7 
Daytona 
Beach 
+    7 
Relaxation 
+    7 Travel Plans 
+    5 
Easter 
0     3 
Friends 
+    5 
Spring Break 
Family 
+    4 
Stress 
-   3 7
Grades 
0    4 
Reunion 
-    3 
Midterms 
-   6 Happy 
+   7 
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COMPLETE YOUR OWN CONCEPT MAP ON JOHN MCCAIN’S PRESIDENTIAL 
CANDIDACY. 
 
We want to understand what individuals think about, and how they organize 
information about John McCain’s presidential campaign. All of your thoughts and 
feelings are helpful, and again there are no correct or incorrect answers. Circle 
each thought you include. It may be helpful to think for a moment about the topic 
before adding your entries onto the map.  
IMPORTANT: Please PRINT and make sure your writing is clear. When your thoughts or 
feelings trigger other thoughts or feelings please connect the circles by placing a line to 
connect, or link, the entries as illustrated in the example.  
 
Next, go back to each thought/feeling and (1) evaluate it as positive, negative, or neutral 
and (2) indicate its strength on a scale from 1-7 where 1 means very weak and 7 










































Inoculation Phase: Experimental Materials 
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Appendix 4 cont. 
 
Inoculation Phase: Experimental Materials 
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Appendix 4 cont. 
 
Inoculation Phase: Experimental Materials 
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Appendix 4 cont. 
 
Inoculation Phase: Experimental Materials 
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Appendix 4 cont. 
 
Inoculation Phase: Experimental Materials 
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Appendix 4 cont. 
 
Inoculation Phase: Experimental Materials 
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Appendix 4 cont. 
 
Inoculation Phase: Experimental Materials 
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Appendix 4 cont. 
 
Inoculation Phase: Experimental Materials 
 
  
Inoculation Phase: Generic Inoculation: Two 
 
  





Links to Inoculation-Phase and Attack-Phase Videos 
 
 
Inoculation Phase: Generic Inoculation Videos 
 Generic One http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EjkNMJayDYU 
 Generic Two http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MgZsKDhiWxA 
   
Inoculation Phase: Candidate-Specific 
Inoculation Videos 
 
 Against McCain’s Attacks on Obama 
(Taxes) 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JhMzkStoPMU 
 Against McCain’s Attacks on Obama 
(Energy) 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fQEN32_hufQ 
 Against Obama’s Attacks on McCain 
(Taxes) 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GyxUgyDBzeg 




Attack-Phase Candidate-Sponsored Attack Advertising Videos 
 McCain Attack against Obama (Both 
Ways) 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SyaeamTvftA 
 McCain Attack against Obama (Ayers) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2tev_YfGsZ4 
 Obama Attack against McCain (Charlie 
Black) 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qf2OgpNAABY
 Obama Attack against McCain (Bush) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gYO8IZQKeXQ 
 
Attack-Phase PSG-Sponsored Attack Advertising Videos 
 PSG Attack against Obama (Both 
Ways) 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W9oFobEs09o 
 PSG Attack against Obama (Ayers) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aQrVn_JzVCM 
 PSG Attack against McCain (Charlie 
Black) 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=geMOp8Xs17A 
 PSG Attack against McCain (Bush) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YbIeTKfWER4 
 
Attack-Phase Video Content: Scrubs and Mundane Commercials 
 Scrubs and Commercials http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CBgsFskTPz4 

















Illustrative Phase-Three Instrument (Attack Phase / Control Condition) 
 
 
PHASE THREE QUESTIONNAIRE: VANO
(No Video Attack Against Obama) 
 
We appreciate your continued participation in this study of how people process media 
content and media personalities. Please read instructions at the start of each section of 
this booklet, do what is asked, and complete the survey items in each section as quickly 
but as accurately as possible.  
 
After you complete this questionnaire, please report back to the main desk for further 
instructions.  
 
All of your responses in this study will be treated confidentially. But, we need some 
information so we can match up the questionnaires you complete during each of the 
three sessions, and so that we can inform your instructor about your participation in the 
study. For items concerning department, course number and instructor, we want to know 
which course/instructor we should inform about your participation in this study. PLEASE 
PRINT LEGIBLY.  
 
1. YOUR NAME: _____________________, _______________, _______
__
  (last name) (first name) (middle)
2. DEPARTMENT: __________________________________________________.
3. COURSE NUMBER (for extra credit): _______________________. 
4. INSTRUCTOR (for extra credit): ___________________________. 
     
5. Your Gender? (circle only one) Male  Female
  
6. DAY AND DATE: ___________________, _____________________.
 
Before you begin filling in the survey, you will watch a segment of typical television 
programming, which is followed by exercises and scales. Please watch the television 
segment carefully.  
 
At this time, place the DVD provided by the researcher into one of the provided portable 
DVD players. Please use the headphones provided by the researcher. Place the survey 
instrument and writing utensil aside and give your undivided attention to the video. When 
you are ready to watch the television content, press play on the portable DVD player. 
Feel free to approach the researcher with any questions.   
 
DO NOT TURN TO THE NEXT PAGE UNTIL FINISHED  
VIEWING THE VIDEO PROGRAM, INCLUDING THE COMMERCIALS  
 
 
*** WATCH TELEVISION SEGMENT NOW **** 
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RESPONSES TO BARACK OBAMA
 
The following items assess your thoughts about Barack Obama’s presidential campaign. 
The items consist of pairs of adjective opposites. The numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 
separate each of the pairs of adjective opposites. Read each of the adjectives opposite 
pairs, and then circle a number that best describes your response to Barack Obama’s 
presidential campaign. 
 
1. Negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Positive
2. Bad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Good
3. Unfavorable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Favorable
4. Unacceptable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Acceptable
5. Wrong 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Right
6. Foolish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Wise
 
The next items assess your feelings about Barack Obama’s presidential campaign. 
Please circle the number that best indicates your feelings about Barack Obama’s 
presidential campaign, where 0 means “none of this feeling” and 7 means “a great deal 
of this feeling.” 
 
1. Irritated 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
2. Annoyed 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
3. Angry 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
4. Cheerful 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
5. Happy 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
6. Content 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
 
The next items assess your intentions to behaviorally support Barack Obama’s 
presidential campaign. We want to know the extent to which you disagree or agree with 
each of the statements below. Read each of the statements and then circle a number 
(between 1 and 7), where 1 indicates strong disagreement and 7 indicates strong 
agreement with the following statements.   
 
1. I will contribute money to Barack Obama’s presidential campaign. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
2. I will volunteer my time on behalf of Barack Obama’s presidential campaign.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
3. I will go to the polls and vote for Barack Obama on Election Day. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
 
The next items are designed to measure the confidence of your responses to Barack 
Obama’s presidential campaign. 
 
1. Estimate the certainty of your responses to Barack Obama’s presidential campaign 
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The following items assess the certainty of your responses to Barack Obama’s 
presidential campaign. The items consist of pairs of adjective opposites. The numbers 1, 
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 separate each of the pairs of adjective opposites. Read each of the 
adjectives opposite pairs, and then circle a number that best describes your response to 
the Barack Obama’s presidential campaign. 
 
1. Sure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unsure
2. Confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not Confident
3. Certain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Uncertain
4. Negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Positive
5. Right 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Wrong
 
The next items assess how much you think and talk about Barack Obama’s presidential 
campaign. We want to know the extent to which you engage in the following activities. 
Read each of the statements and then circle a number (between 1 and 7), where 1 
indicates “rarely” and 7 means “often”.  
 
1. Compared to other issues, how often do you think about Barack Obama’s 
presidential campaign? 
 Rarely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Often
2. Compared to other issues, how often do you discuss Barack Obama’s presidential 
campaign with friends, family members, or others?
 Rarely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Often
 
RESPONSES TO JOHN MCCAIN
 
The next items assess your thoughts about John McCain’s presidential campaign. The 
items consist of pairs of adjective opposites. The numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 
separate each of the pairs of adjective opposites. Read each of the adjectives opposite 
pairs, and then circle a number that best describes your response to John McCain’s 
presidential campaign. 
 
1. Negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Positive
2. Bad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Good
3. Unfavorable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Favorable
4. Unacceptable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Acceptable
5. Wrong 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Right
6. Foolish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Wise
 
The next items assess your feelings about John McCain’s presidential campaign. Please 
circle the number that best indicates your feelings about John McCain’s presidential 
campaign, where 0 means “none of this feeling” and 6 means “a great deal of this 
feeling.” 
 
1. Irritated 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
2. Annoyed 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
3. Angry 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
4. Cheerful 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
5. Happy 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
6. Content 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
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The next items assess your intention to behaviorally support John McCain’s presidential 
campaign. We want to know the extent to which you are willing to engage in the 
following behaviors. Read each of the statements and then circle a number (between 1 
and 7), where 1 indicates strong disagreement and 7 indicates strong agreement with 
the following statements.  
 
1. I will contribute money to John McCain’s presidential campaign. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
2. I will volunteer my time on behalf of John McCain.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
3. I will go to the polls and vote for John McCain on Election Day. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
 
The next items are designed to measure the confidence of your responses to the John 
McCain’s presidential campaign. 
 
1. Estimate the certainty of your responses to John McCain’s presidential campaign 
on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 represents no certainty and 100 indicates 
absolute certainty: _____.
 
The following items assess the certainty of your responses to John McCain’s presidential 
campaign. The items consist of pairs of adjective opposites. The numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
and 7 separate each of the pairs of adjective opposites. Read each of the adjectives 
opposite pairs, and then circle a number that best describes your response to John 
McCain. 
 
1. Sure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unsure
2. Confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not Confident
3. Certain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Uncertain
4. Negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Positive
5. Right 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Wrong
 
The next items assess how much you think and talk about John McCain’s presidential 
campaign. We want to know the extent to which you engage in the following activities. 
Read each of the statements and then circle a number (between 1 and 7), where 1 
indicates “rarely” and 7 means “often”.  
 
1. Compared to other issues, how often do you think about John McCain’s presidential 
campaign? 
 Rarely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Often
2. Compared to other issues, how often do you discuss John McCain’s presidential 
campaign with friends, family members?
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RESPONSES TO AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
 
The next items are designed to assess your feelings about American Democracy. 
Please circle the number that best matches your feelings about American Democracy, 
where 0 means “none of this feeling” and 6 means “a great deal of this feeling.” 
 
1. Irritated 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
2. Annoyed 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
3. Angry 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
4. Cheerful 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
5. Happy 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
6. Content 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
 
The next items assess your thoughts about American Democracy. The items consist of 
pairs of adjective opposites. The numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 separate each of the 
pairs of adjective opposites. Read each of the adjectives opposite pairs, and then circle 
a number that best describes your response to American Democracy. 
 
1. Negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Positive
2. Bad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Good
3. Unfavorable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Favorable
4. Unacceptable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Acceptable
5. Wrong 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Right
6. Foolish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Wise
 
The next items are designed to measure the confidence of your responses to American 
Democracy. 
 
1. Estimate the certainty of your responses to American Democracy on a scale from 0 
to 100, where 0 represents no certainty and 100 indicates absolute certainty: 
_______. 
 
The following items assess the certainty of your responses to American Democracy. The 
items consist of pairs of adjective opposites. The numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 
separate each of the pairs of adjective opposites. Read each of the adjectives opposite 
pairs, and then circle a number that best describes your response to American 
Democracy. 
 
1. Sure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unsure
2. Confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not Confident
3. Certain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Uncertain
4. Negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Positive
5. Right 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Wrong
 
The next items assess how much you think and talk about American democracy. We 
want to know the extent to which you engage in the following activities. Read each of the 
statements and then circle a number (between 1 and 7), where 1 means “rarely” and 7 
means “often”.  
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1. Compared to other issues, how often do you think about the issue of American 
democracy? 
 Rarely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Often
  
2. Compared to other issues, how often do you discuss with friends, family members, 
or others the issue of American democracy?




The next items assess how much you think and talk about presidential politics. We want 
to know the extent to which you engage in the following activities. Read each of the 
statements and then circle a number (between 1 and 7), where 1 means “rarely” and 7 
means “often”.  
 
1. Compared to other issues, how often do you think about the issue of presidential 
politics? 
 Rarely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Often
2. Compared to other issues, how often do you discuss with friends, family members, 
or others the issue of presidential politics?
 Rarely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Often
 
The next items measure your more specific views of government. Please indicate to 
what extent you disagree or agree with each of the statements below. Read each of the 
statements and then circle a number (between 1 and 7), where 1 means strong 
disagreement and 7 means strong agreement with the following statements.  
 
1. I can always trust the government in Washington to do what is right. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
2. The government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for 
themselves. It is NOT run for the benefit of all the people.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
3. The government wastes a lot of money we pay in taxes. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
4. Quite a few of the people running the government are crooked.  
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
5. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person 
like me can't really understand what's going on.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
6. People like me don't have any say about what the government does. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
7. Public officials don't care much what people like me think.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
8. The government pays attention to what the people think when it decides what to do. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
9. Having elections makes the government pay attention to what the people think. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
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RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC POLITICAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST BARACK OBAMA
 
The next items are designed to assess your feelings about the argument that Barack 
Obama supports known terrorist William Ayers. Please circle the number that best 
matches your feelings about the argument that Barack Obama supports known terrorist 
William Ayers, where 0 means “none of this feeling” and 6 means “a great deal of this 
feeling.” 
 
1. Irritated 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
2. Annoyed 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
3. Angry 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
4. Cheerful 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
5. Happy 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
6. Content 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
 
The next items assess your thoughts about the argument that Barack Obama supports 
known terrorist William Ayers. The items consist of pairs of adjective opposites. The 
numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 separate each of the pairs of adjective opposites. Read 
each of the adjectives opposite pairs, and then circle a number that best describes your 
response to the argument that Barack Obama supports known terrorist William Ayers. 
 
1. Negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Positive
2. Bad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Good
3. Unfavorable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Favorable
4. Unacceptable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Acceptable
5. Wrong 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Right
6. Foolish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Wise
 
The next items are designed to measure the confidence of your responses to the 
argument that Barack Obama supports known terrorist William Ayers. 
 
1. Estimate the certainty of your responses to the argument that Barack Obama 
supports known terrorist William Ayers on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 
represents no certainty and 100 indicates absolute certainty: _______. 
 
The following items assess the certainty of your responses to the argument that Barack 
Obama supports known terrorist William Ayers. The items consist of pairs of adjective 
opposites. The numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 separate each of the pairs of adjective 
opposites. Read each of the adjectives opposite pairs, and then circle a number that 
best describes your response to the argument that Barack Obama supports known 
terrorist William Ayers. 
 
1. Sure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unsure
2. Confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not Confident
3. Certain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Uncertain
4. Negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Positive
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The next items are designed to assess your feelings about the argument that Barack 
Obama is worse than a flip flopper. Please circle the number that best matches your 
feelings about the argument that Barack Obama is worse than a flip flopper, where 0 
means “none of this feeling” and 6 means “a great deal of this feeling.” 
 
1. Irritated 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
2. Annoyed 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
3. Angry 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
4. Cheerful 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
5. Happy 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
6. Content 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
 
The next items assess your thoughts about the argument that Barack Obama is worse 
than a flip flopper. The items consist of pairs of adjective opposites. The numbers 1, 2, 3, 
4, 5, 6, and 7 separate each of the pairs of adjective opposites. Read each of the 
adjectives opposite pairs, and then circle a number that best describes your response to 
the argument that Barack Obama is worse than a flip flopper. 
 
1. Negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Positive
2. Bad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Good
3. Unfavorable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Favorable
4. Unacceptable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Acceptable
5. Wrong 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Right
6. Foolish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Wise
 
The next items are designed to measure the confidence of your responses to the 
argument that Barack Obama is worse than a flip flopper. 
 
1. Estimate the certainty of your responses to the argument that Barack Obama is 
worse than a flip flopper on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 represents no certainty 
and 100 indicates absolute certainty: _______.
 
The following items assess the certainty of your responses to the argument that Barack 
Obama is worse than a flip flopper. The items consist of pairs of adjective opposites. The 
numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 separate each of the pairs of adjective opposites. Read 
each of the adjectives opposite pairs, and then circle a number that best describes your 
response to the argument that Barack Obama is worse than a flip flopper. 
 
1. Sure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unsure
2. Confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not Confident
3. Certain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Uncertain
4. Negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Positive
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RESPONSES TO AMERICAN ISSUES PROJECT 
  
The next items assess your response to the American Issues Project’s advertising 
against Barack Obama. Please indicate to what extent to which you disagree or agree 
with each of the statements below. Please indicate to what extent you disagree or agree 
with each of the statements below. Read each of the statements and then circle a 
number (between 1 and 7), where 1 means strong disagreement and 7 means strong 
agreement with the following statements. . 
 
1. The American Issues Project communicated a sense of warmth. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
2. The American Issues Project seemed enthusiastic in communicating with me.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
3. The American Issues Project seemed interested in communicating with me.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
4. The American Issues Project seemed involved in the communication. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
5. The American Issues Project made me feel that they were similar to me. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
6. The American Issues Project seemed friendly to me
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
7. The American Issues Project acted as if they would like to get to know me better.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
8. The American Issues Project seemed like the kind of people who would be willing to 
listen to me. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
9. The American Issues Project seemed sincere in communicating to me. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
10. The American Issues Project communicated a sense of honesty. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
11. The American Issues Project appeared to care whether or not I liked them.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
12. The American Issues Project appeared interested in communicating with me.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
 
The next items continue to assess your response to the American Issues Project’s 
advertising against Barack Obama. The items consist of pairs of adjective opposites. 
The numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 separate each of the pairs of adjective opposites. 
Read each of the adjectives opposite pairs, and then circle a number that best describes 
your response to the American Issues Project’s advertising against Barack Obama. 
 
1. Unintelligent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Intelligent
2. Unqualified 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Qualified
3. Incompetent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Competent
4. Selfish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unselfish
5. Bad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Good
6. Dishonest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Honest
 
 




RESPONSES TO LET FREEDOM RING POLITICAL ACTION FUND 
 
The next items assess your response to the Let Freedom Ring Political Action Fund’s 
advertising against Barack Obama. Please indicate to what extent to which you disagree 
or agree with each of the statements below. Please indicate to what extent you disagree 
or agree with each of the statements below. Read each of the statements and then circle 
a number (between 1 and 7), where 1 means strong disagreement and 7 means strong 
agreement with the following statements. 
 
1. The Let Freedom Ring Political Action Fund communicated a sense of warmth.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
  
2. The Let Freedom Ring Political Action Fund seemed enthusiastic in communicating 
with me. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
3. The Let Freedom Ring Political Action Fund seemed interested in communicating 
with me. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
4. The Let Freedom Ring Political Action Fund seemed involved in the communication.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
5. The Let Freedom Ring Political Action Fund made me feel that they were similar to 
me. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
6. The Let Freedom Ring Political Action Fund seemed friendly to me 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
7. The Let Freedom Ring Political Action Fund acted as if they would like to get to 
know me better. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
8. The Let Freedom Ring Political Action Fund seemed like the kind of people who 
would be willing to listen to me.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
9. The Let Freedom Ring Political Action Fund seemed sincere in communicating to 
me. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
10. The Let Freedom Ring Political Action Fund communicated a sense of honesty.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
11. The Let Freedom Ring Political Action Fund appeared to care whether or not I liked 
them. 
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
12. The Let Freedom Ring Political Action Fund appeared interested in communicating 
with me. 
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The next items continue to assess your response to Let Freedom Ring Political Action 
Fund’s advertising against Barack Obama. The items consist of pairs of adjective 
opposites. The numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 separate each of the pairs of adjective 
opposites. Read each of the adjectives opposite pairs, and then circle a number that 
best describes your response to Let Freedom Ring Political Action Fund’s advertising 
against Barack Obama. 
 
1. Unintelligent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Intelligent
2. Unqualified 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Qualified
3. Incompetent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Competent
4. Selfish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unselfish
5. Bad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Good
6. Dishonest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Honest
 
RESPONSES TO JOHN MCCAIN’S COMMUNICATION ABOUT BARACK OBAMA
 
The next items assess your response to McCain 08’s advertising about Barack Obama. 
Please indicate to what extent to which you disagree or agree with each of the 
statements below. Please indicate to what extent you disagree or agree with each of the 
statements below. Read each of the statements and then circle a number (between 1 
and 7), where 1 means strong disagreement and 7 means strong agreement with the 
following statements. 
 
1. McCain communicated a sense of warmth.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
2. McCain seemed enthusiastic in communicating with me.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
3. McCain seemed interested in communicating with me.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
4. McCain seemed involved in the communication.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
5. McCain made me feel that they were similar to me.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
6. McCain seemed friendly to me.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
7. McCain acted as if they would like to get to know me better.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
8. McCain seemed like the kind of people who would be willing to listen to me.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
9. McCain seemed sincere in communicating to me.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
10. McCain communicated a sense of honesty.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
11. McCain appeared to care whether or not I liked them.
 Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
12. McCain appeared interested in communicating with me.
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The next items continue to assess your response to the McCain’s advertising about 
Barack Obama. The items consist of pairs of adjective opposites. The numbers 1, 2, 3, 
4, 5, 6, and 7 separate each of the pairs of adjective opposites. Read each of the 
adjectives opposite pairs, and then circle a number that best describes your response to 
McCain’s advertising about Barack Obama. 
 
1. Unintelligent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Intelligent
2. Unqualified 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Qualified
3. Incompetent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Competent
4. Selfish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unselfish
5. Bad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Good
6. Dishonest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Honest
 
YOU HAVE NOW COMPLETED YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THIS STUDY. PLEASE 
RETURN YOUR QUESTIONNAIRE AND COMMUNICATION MATERIALS TO THE 
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Attack Phase: Print Attack Advertisements 
 
  








    
Summary Results 
 
    
 Outcome  Hypotheses and Research Questions 
    
    
 Y  H1a: PSG-sponsored political advertising is more negative than 
candidate-sponsored political advertising. 
 
 Y  H1b: PSG-sponsored political advertising is more negative than 
FEC-sanctioned political advertising. 
 
 Y  H2a: Candidate-sponsored political attack advertising is more 
policy focused than character focused.    
 
 Y  H2b: PSG-sponsored political attack advertising is more character 




 RQ1: Is FEC-sanctioned political attack advertising more policy 
focused than character focused? 
 
 Y  H3: PSG-sponsored political attack advertising elicits a more 
favorable evaluation of the sponsor’s credibility than candidate-
sponsored political attack advertising. 
 
 N  H4a: PSG-sponsored attack advertising elicits a more favorable 
evaluation of its implied beneficiary than candidate-sponsored 
political attack advertising. 
 
 N  H4b: PSG-sponsored political attack advertising elicits a greater 
intention to vote for the implied beneficiary than candidate-




 H4c: PSG-sponsored political attack advertising elicits a less 
favorable evaluation of the targeted candidate than candidate-
sponsored political attack advertising. 
 
 N  H4d: PSG-sponsored political attack advertising elicits a lesser 
intention to vote for the targeted candidate than candidate-
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Summary Results 
 
    
 Outcome  Hypotheses and Research Questions 
    
    
 N  H5a: Compared to no political attack advertising, candidate-
sponsored political attack advertising backfires against the 
sponsoring candidate by eliciting a less favorable evaluation of the 
attack’s implied beneficiary.  
 
 N  H5b: Compared to no political attack advertising, candidate-
sponsored political attack advertising backfires against the 
sponsoring candidate by eliciting a lesser intention to vote for the 
implied beneficiary.  
 
 N  H5c: Compared to no political attack advertising, candidate-
sponsored political attack advertising also harms the targeted 





 H5d: Compared to no political attack advertising, candidate-
sponsored political attack advertising also harms the targeted 
candidate by eliciting a lesser intention to vote for the targeted 
candidate.  
 
 N  H6a: Compared to no political attack advertising, PSG-sponsored 
political attack advertising elicits a more favorable evaluation of 
the implied beneficiary. 
 
 N  H6b: Compared to no political attack advertising, PSG-sponsored 
political attack advertising elicits a greater intention to vote for the 
implied beneficiary.  
 
 N  H6c: Compared to no political attack advertising, PSG-sponsored 
political attack advertising elicits a less favorable evaluation of the 
targeted candidate. 
 
 N  H6d: Compared to no political attack advertising, PSG-sponsored 
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Summary Results 
 
    
 Outcome  Hypotheses and Research Questions 
    
    
 N  H7a: Compared to no political attack advertising, candidate-
sponsored political attack advertising elicits less democratic 
political efficacy.  
 
 N  H7b: Compared to no political attack advertising, candidate-





 RQ2a: Compared to no political attack advertising, what is the 
influence of PSG-sponsored political attack advertising on 




 RQ2b: Compared to no attack advertising, what is the influence of 
PSG-sponsored political attack advertising on trust in American 
government? 
 
 Y  H8a: Evaluation of the sponsor’s credibility intervenes in the 
relationship between video- mediated political attack advertising 




 H8b: Evaluation of the sponsor’s relational communication 
intervenes in the relationship between video-mediated political 
attack advertising and intention to vote for the targeted candidate.   
 
 N  H8c: Argument evaluation intervenes in the relationship between 
print-mediated political attack advertising and intention to vote for 
the targeted candidate.   
 
 N  H9a: Compared to exposure to print-mediated attack advertising, 
video-mediated attack advertising elicits greater positive affect 
toward the supported candidate.  
 
 N  H9b: Compared to exposure to print-mediated attack advertising, 
video-mediated attack advertising elicits greater negative affect 
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Summary Results 
 
    
 Outcome  Hypotheses and Research Questions 
    
    
 N  H10a: Compared to print-mediated political attack advertising, 
video-mediated political attack advertising elicits greater attitude-
behavior consistency with respect to evaluation of the initially 
supported candidate and vote intention. 
 
 N  H10b: Compared to print-mediated political attack advertising, 
video-mediated political attack advertising elicits greater attitude-
behavior consistency with respect to evaluation of the initially 
opposed candidate and vote intention. 
 
 N  H11a: Compared to the control condition, candidate-sponsored 
political attack advertising elicits a more favorable evaluation of 
the implied beneficiary for non-partisans than for partisans. 
 
 N  H11b: Compared to the control condition, candidate-sponsored 
political attack advertising elicits a greater intention to vote for the 
implied beneficiary for non-partisans than for partisans. 
 
 N  H11c: Compared to the control condition, candidate-sponsored 
political attack advertising elicits a less favorable evaluation of the 
targeted candidate for non-partisans than for partisans. 
 
 N  H11d: Compared to the control condition, candidate-sponsored 
political attack advertising elicits a lesser intention to vote for the 




 RQ3a: How does candidate-sponsored political attack advertising 





 RQ3b: How does candidate-sponsored political attack advertising 





 RQ4a: Compared to the control condition, how does PSG-
sponsored political attack advertising influence evaluations of the 
implied beneficiary for non-partisans versus partisans? 
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Summary Results 
 
    
 Outcome  Hypotheses and Research Questions 
    
    
 No 
Difference 
 RQ4b: Compared to the control condition, how does PSG- 
sponsored political attack advertising influence intention to vote 




 RQ4c: Compared to the control condition, how does PSG-
sponsored attack advertising influence evaluations of the targeted 




 RQ4d: Compared to the control condition, how does PSG-
sponsored political attack advertising influence intention to vote 




 RQ5a: Compared to the control condition, how does PSG-
sponsored political attack advertising influence democratic 




 RQ5b: Compared to the control condition, how does PSG-
sponsored political attack advertising influence trust in American 
government for non-partisans versus partisans? 
 
 N  H12a: Compared to the inoculation-control condition, generic 
inoculation against all political attack advertising elicits greater 
resistance to PSG-sponsored political attack advertising in terms of 
a more favorable evaluation of the targeted candidate. 
 
weak support in 
video – no 
support in print 
H12b: Compared to the inoculation-control condition, generic 
inoculation against all political attack advertising elicits greater 
resistance to PSG-sponsored political attack advertising in terms of 
a greater intention to vote for the targeted candidate. 
 
 N  H12c: Compared to the inoculation-control condition, generic 
inoculation against all political attack advertising elicits greater 
resistance to PSG-sponsored political attack advertising in terms of 
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Summary Results 
 
    
 Outcome  Hypotheses and Research Questions 
    
    
 Y  H12d: Compared to the inoculation-control condition, generic 
inoculation against all political attack advertising elicits greater 
resistance to PSG-sponsored political attack advertising in terms of 
a lesser intention to vote for the supported candidate. 
 
 N  H13a: Compared to the inoculation-control condition, candidate-
specific inoculation elicits greater resistance to PSG-sponsored 
political attack advertising in terms of a more favorable evaluation 
of the targeted candidate. 
 
confirmed in 
video – not 
confirmed in 
print 
H13b: Compared to the inoculation-control condition, candidate-
specific inoculation elicits greater resistance to PSG-sponsored 
political attack advertising in terms of a greater intention to vote 




 H13c: Compared to the inoculation-control condition, candidate-
specific inoculation elicits greater resistance to PSG-sponsored 
political attack advertising in terms of a less favorable evaluation of 
the supported candidate. 
 
 N  H13d: Compared to the inoculation-control condition, candidate-
specific inoculation elicits greater resistance to PSG-sponsored 
political attack advertising in terms of a lesser intention to vote for 




 RQ6a: Do generic and candidate-specific inoculation differ with 
respect to their ability to elicit a more favorable evaluation of the 




 RQ6b: Do generic and candidate-specific inoculation differ with 
respect to their ability to elicit a greater intention to vote for the 
candidate targeted in PSG-sponsored political attack advertising? 
 
video generic is 
more effective 
than generic print 
RQ6c: Do generic and candidate-specific inoculation differ with 
respect to their ability to elicit a less favorable evaluation of the 
candidate supported in PSG-sponsored political attack advertising? 
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Summary Results 
 
    
 Outcome  Hypotheses and Research Questions 
    
    
 N  RQ6d: Do generic and candidate-specific inoculation differ with 
respect to their ability to elicit a lesser intention to vote for the 
candidate supported in PSG- sponsored political attack 
advertising? 
 
 N  H14a: Compared to the inoculation-control condition, generic 
inoculation elicits greater resistance to candidate-sponsored 
political attack advertising in terms of a more favorable evaluation 
of the targeted candidate. 
 
 N  H14b: Compared to the inoculation-control condition, generic 
inoculation elicits greater resistance to candidate-sponsored 
political attack advertising in terms of a greater intention to vote 
for the targeted candidate. 
 
 N  H14c: Compared to the inoculation-control condition, generic 
inoculation elicits greater resistance to candidate-sponsored 
political attack advertising in terms of a less favorable evaluation 




superior to  
generic print 
H14d: Compared to the inoculation-control condition, generic 
inoculation elicits greater resistance to candidate-sponsored 
political attack advertising in terms of a lesser intention to vote for 
the supported candidate. 
 
 N  H15a: Compared to the inoculation-control condition, candidate-
specific inoculation elicits greater resistance to candidate-
sponsored political attack advertising in terms of a more favorable 
evaluation of the targeted candidate. 
 
 Y  H15b: Compared to the inoculation-control condition, candidate-
specific inoculation elicits greater resistance to candidate-
sponsored political attack advertising in terms of a greater 
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Summary Results 
 
    
 Outcome  Hypotheses and Research Questions 
    
    
 N  H15c: Compared to the inoculation-control condition, candidate-
specific inoculation elicits greater resistance to candidate-
sponsored political attack advertising in terms of a less favorable 





better than control 
H15d: Compared to the inoculation-control condition, candidate-
specific inoculation elicits greater resistance to candidate-
sponsored political attack advertising in terms of a lesser intention 




better than  
generic- weak 
print: candidate-
strong better than 
generic-weak  
RQ7a: Do generic and candidate-specific inoculation differ with 
respect to their ability to elicit a more favorable evaluation of the 
candidate targeted in candidate-sponsored political attack 




 RQ7b: Do generic and candidate-specific inoculation differ with 
respect to their ability to elicit a greater intention to vote for the 





 RQ7c: Do generic and candidate-specific inoculation differ with 
respect to their ability to elicit a less favorable evaluation of the 





 RQ7d: Do generic and candidate-specific inoculation differ with 
respect to their ability to elicit a lesser intention to vote for the 





attack: control better 
than candidate 
inoculation 
H16a: Compared to the inoculation-control condition, candidate-
specific inoculation elicits greater resistance to political attack 
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Summary Results 
 
    
 Outcome  Hypotheses and Research Questions 
    
    
PSG attack: 
candidate better than 
generic inoculation 
candidate attack: 
generic better than 
candidate inoculation 
RQ8a: Do generic and candidate-specific inoculations against 
political attack advertising differ with respect to their protection of 




 RQ8b: Do generic and candidate-specific inoculations against 
political attack advertising differ with respect to their protection of 
democratic political efficacy? 
 
 N  H17a: Compared to print-mediated inoculation, video-mediated 
inoculation elicits a more favorable evaluation of the inoculation 
sponsor’s source credibility. 
 
 N  H17b: Compared to print-mediated inoculation, video-mediated 
inoculation elicits a more favorable evaluation of the inoculation 
sponsor’s relational communication. 
 
 N  H18a: Compared to print-mediated inoculation, video-mediated 
inoculation elicits more inoculation-phase positive affect for the 
initially supported candidate.   
 
N H18b: Compared to print-mediated inoculation, video-mediated 
inoculation elicits more affective associative network content 
about the initially supported candidate.    
 
N 
print elicited  
more threat 
than video 
H18c: Compared to print-mediated inoculation, video inoculation 
elicits more threat in the process of resistance to political attack 
advertising. 
 
 N  H18d: Compared to print-mediated inoculation, video-mediated 
inoculation elicits less counter argumentation against potential 
attacks on the initially supported candidate. 
 
 N  H18e: Compared to video-mediated inoculation, print-mediated 
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Summary Results 
 
    
 Outcome  Hypotheses and Research Questions 
    
    
 N  H18f: Compared to video-mediated inoculation, print-mediated 
inoculation elicits a less favorable evaluation of political attack 
advertising. 
 
 N  H18g: Compared to print-mediated inoculation, video-mediated 
inoculation elicits greater phase-two attitudinal confidence 
regarding the initially supported candidate. 
 
 N  H18h: Compared to print-mediated inoculation, video-mediated 
inoculation elicits more phase-two attitudinal confidence regarding 
the evaluation of the political attack advertising. 
 
N 
print tended to elicit 
more attitude-
behavior consistency 
H18i: Compared to print-mediated inoculation, video-mediated 
inoculation elicits more inoculation-phase attitude-behavior 
consistency between evaluation of the initially supported candidate 
and intention to vote for that candidate. 
 
N 
both print and video 
elicited attitude – 
behavior consistency 
H18j: Compared to print-mediated inoculation, video-mediated 
inoculation elicits more inoculation-phase attitude-behavior 
consistency between evaluation of the initially opposed candidate 
and intention to vote against that candidate. 
 
 N  H18k: Compared to print-mediated inoculation, video-mediated 
inoculation elicits more phase-two attitude accessibility with 
respect to the 2008 general election.   
 
 N  H18l: Compared to print-mediated inoculation, video-mediated 
inoculation elicits more phase-two attitude accessibility with 
respect to the initially-supported candidate.   
 
 N  H18m: Compared to print-mediated inoculation, video-mediated 
inoculation elicits more phase-two associative network content 
regarding the initially-supported candidate. 
 
 Y  H18n: Compared to print-mediated inoculation, video-mediated 
inoculation elicits more strongly accessible associative network 
content regarding the initially-supported candidate. 
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Summary Results 
 
    
 Outcome  Hypotheses and Research Questions 
    
    
 Y  H19a: In terms of a more favorable evaluation of the targeted 
candidate, print-mediated inoculation confers more resistance to 
printed attacks than to video-mediated attacks. 
 
 Y  H19b: In terms of a greater intention to vote for the targeted 
candidate, printed inoculation confers more resistance to printed 
attacks than to video-mediated attacks. 
 
 N  H19c: In terms of a less favorable evaluation of the implied 
beneficiary of the attack, print-mediated inoculation confers more 
resistance to print-mediated attacks than to video-mediated attacks. 
 
 Y  H19d: In terms of lesser intention to vote for the implied 
beneficiary of the attack, print-mediated inoculation confers more 
resistance to printed attacks than to video-mediated attacks. 
 
 N  H20a: In terms of a more favorable evaluation of the targeted 
candidate, video-mediated inoculation confers more resistance to 
video-mediated attacks than to printed attacks.  
 
 N  H20b: In terms of a greater intention to the vote for the targeted 
candidate, video-mediated inoculation confers more resistance to 
video-mediated attacks than to printed attacks. 
 
 N  H20c: In terms of a less favorable evaluation of the implied 
beneficiary of the political attack, video-mediated inoculation 
confers more resistance to video-mediated attacks than to printed 
attacks. 
 
 N  H20d: In terms of a lesser intention to vote for the implied 
beneficiary of the political attack, video-mediated inoculation 
confers more resistance to video-mediated political attacks than to 
printed attacks. 
 
 
